Book, Paragraph

 1  IV, 4 |    assumption even "musical" and "white" and "man" would have had
 2  IV, 4 |         things, since even "being white" and "being a man" are different;
 3  IV, 4 |         And if any one says that "white" means one and the same
 4  IV, 4 |         from being both a man and white and countless other things:
 5  IV, 4 |          not add that "it is also white and large". For, besides
 6  IV, 4 |         man, because though he is white, whiteness is not his essence.
 7  IV, 4 |            for instance, that the white is musical and the latter
 8  IV, 4 |         musical and the latter is white, only because both are accidental
 9  IV, 4 |        the latter sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates,
10  IV, 4 |      direction; e.g. Socrates the white has not yet another accident;
11  IV, 4 |          sum. Nor again (b) will "white" have another term accidental
12  IV, 4 |        cases, and a thing is both white and not-white, and existent
13  IV, 4 |         instance, that a thing is white, and again that it is not-white),
14  IV, 7 |         grey is between black and white, or as that which is neither
15  IV, 7 |      would have to be a change to white, which was not from not-white;
16  IV, 7 |          asked whether a thing is white, says "no", he has denied
17   V, 2 |         as, for instance, if "the white" and "the musical" were
18   V, 10|      their constituents. Grey and white colour do not belong at
19   V, 13|          that the musical and the white were quanta, viz. because
20   V, 15|           a relative term; or the white is relative, if the same
21   V, 15|          happens to be double and white.~
22   V, 18|          parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and
23   V, 21|        thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter,
24 VII, 1 |        what it is, we do not say "white" or "hot" or "three cubits
25 VII, 4 |       that which is propter se as white is to a surface, because
26 VII, 4 |          not identical with being white. But again the combination
27 VII, 4 |      combination of both-’being a white surface’-is not the essence
28 VII, 4 |       thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth
29 VII, 4 |           a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one
30 VII, 4 |         belongs an essence, e.g. "white man". Let the compound be
31 VII, 4 |           defining the essence of white one were to state the formula
32 VII, 4 |           to state the formula of white man; the other because in
33 VII, 4 |            e.g. if "cloak" meant "white man", and one were to define
34 VII, 4 |           were to define cloak as white; white man is white indeed,
35 VII, 4 |         to define cloak as white; white man is white indeed, but
36 VII, 4 |      cloak as white; white man is white indeed, but its essence
37 VII, 4 |          its essence is not to be white.~But is being-a-cloak an
38 VII, 4 |         what some "this" is, e.g. white man is not precisely what
39 VII, 4 |     formula or definition even of white man, but not in the sense
40 VII, 4 |         is a definition either of white or of a substance.~
41 VII, 5 |           happens to be a man, is white), but as "male" attaches
42 VII, 5 |      explained without this; e.g. white can be explained apart from
43 VII, 6 |     thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to
44 VII, 6 |     different from the essence of white man. For if they are the
45 VII, 6 |        essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for
46 VII, 6 |         the same; for a man and a white man are the same thing,
47 VII, 6 |            so that the essence of white man and that of man would
48 VII, 6 |         same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but
49 VII, 6 |         e.g.’the musical’ or "the white", since it has two meanings,
50 VII, 6 |           accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the
51 VII, 6 |           not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man
52 VII, 6 |        the same as the man or the white man, but it is the same
53 VII, 6 |         the same as the attribute white.)~The absurdity of the separation
54 VII, 12|        endowed with feet into the white and the black, there will
55 VIII, 5|     general forms (for it is not "white" comes to be, but the wood
56 VIII, 5|          but the wood comes to be white, if everything that comes
57 VIII, 6|          the fact that a thing is white will be a "composition"
58  IX, 10|            like "that the wood is white" or "that the diagonal is
59   X, 2 |         the one is a colour, e.g. white, and then the other colours
60   X, 2 |         black is the privation of white, as darkness of light. Therefore
61   X, 2 |          a particular "one", i.e. white. And similarly if all existing
62   X, 3 |           tin is like silver, qua white, and gold is like fire,
63   X, 5 | antithesis such as "whether it is white or black", or "whether it
64   X, 5 |         black", or "whether it is white or not white" (we do not
65   X, 5 |        whether it is white or not white" (we do not ask "whether
66   X, 5 |            whether it is a man or white"), unless we are proceeding
67   X, 5 |         but that which is neither white nor black has more claim
68   X, 6 |         to say "one and ones" or "white thing and white things",
69   X, 6 |         ones" or "white thing and white things", or to compare the
70   X, 7 |           if we were to pass from white to black, we should come
71   X, 7 |        the differentiae. (E.g. if white and black are contraries,
72   X, 7 |         colours which are between white and black must be said to
73   X, 7 |      every colour would be either white or black. They are different,
74  XI, 6 |        philosophers. Since, then, white cannot come to be if the
75  XI, 6 |       come to be if the perfectly white and in no respect not-white
76  XI, 6 |        before, that which becomes white must come from that which
77  XI, 6 |       come from that which is not white; so that it must come to
78  XI, 6 |        thing was at the beginning white and not-white. But it is
79  XI, 6 |     predicated. If the subject is white we shall be wrong in saying
80  XI, 6 |           it is neither black nor white, for then it follows that
81  XI, 6 |     follows that it is and is not white; for the second of the two
82  XI, 6 |           is the contradictory of white.~We could not be right,
83  XI, 9 |      regards quality one kind is "white" and the other "black",
84 XII, 2 |           not therefore change to white)), but from the contrary,
85 XII, 2 |   actually, e.g. from potentially white to actually white, and similarly
86 XII, 2 |     potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case
87 XII, 4 |           e.g. in colour they are white, black, and surface, and
88 XIII, 5|          thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white
89 XIII, 5|       white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into
90 XIII, 8|            e.g. of "horse" or of "white", man will be a part of
91 XIV, 1 |           is like saying that the white is a first principle, not
92 XIV, 1 |         qua anything else but qua white, but yet that it is predicable
93 XIV, 1 |      subject, i.e. that its being white presupposes its being something
94 XIV, 2 |          but potentially man, and white from that which is not white
95 XIV, 2 |      white from that which is not white but potentially white, and
96 XIV, 2 |         not white but potentially white, and this whether it is
97 XIV, 2 |      there should be two kinds of white or many colours or flavours
98 XIV, 6 |        the odd in number, and the white in colour.~Again, it is