Book, Paragraph

 1 III, 3 |       theory be genera, down to the indivisible species; but as it is, some
 2 III, 3 |             of a principle, and the indivisible is one, and everything indivisible
 3 III, 3 |  indivisible is one, and everything indivisible is so either in quantity
 4 III, 4 |         Further, if unity-itself is indivisible, according to Zeno’s postulate
 5 III, 4 |           is of a low order, and an indivisible thing can exist in such
 6 III, 4 |           even against him (for the indivisible when added will make the
 7 III, 4 |     magnitude proceed from one such indivisible or from many? It is like
 8 III, 5 |            that the point, which is indivisible, was divided into two).
 9   V, 3 |            immanent in a thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds;
10   V, 3 |             is small and simple and indivisible is called an element. Hence
11   V, 3 |            genera are universal and indivisible (for there is no definition
12   V, 6 |          movement is one when it is indivisible, and it is indivisible in
13   V, 6 |           is indivisible, and it is indivisible in respect of time. Those
14   V, 6 |             of things whose kind is indivisible to sense. The substratum
15   V, 6 |        water is said to be one, qua indivisible in kind; and, on the other
16   V, 6 |        states the essence of one is indivisible from another definition
17   V, 6 |         thought of whose essence is indivisible, and cannot separate them
18   V, 6 |           But everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in
19   V, 6 |             kind. Now that which is indivisible in quantity is called a
20   V, 10|              e.g. man and horse are indivisible in genus, but their definitions
21 VII, 8 |             form; for their form is indivisible.~
22 VII, 13|      identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes. It is clear
23 VIII, 3|           it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae
24   X, 1 |              whose movement is more indivisible and simpler. (2) That which
25   X, 1 |             its movement is one and indivisible in place and time; so that
26   X, 1 |             the thought of which is indivisible; and it is indivisible if
27   X, 1 |           is indivisible; and it is indivisible if the thing is indivisible
28   X, 1 |         indivisible if the thing is indivisible in kind or in number. (3)
29   X, 1 |             then, the individual is indivisible, and (4) in kind, that which
30   X, 1 | intelligibility and in knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes
31   X, 1 |        thought or the definition is indivisible.~But it must be observed
32   X, 1 |             to be one" means "to be indivisible, being essentially one means
33   X, 1 |            perhaps "to be whole and indivisible"; but it means especially "
34   X, 1 | starting-point is something one and indivisible, since even in lines we
35   X, 1 |           even in lines we treat as indivisible the line a foot long. For
36   X, 1 |           measure something one and indivisible; and this is that which
37   X, 1 |            for we posit the unit as indivisible in every respect); but in
38   X, 1 |             of kind. And the one is indivisible just because the first of
39   X, 1 |             each class of things is indivisible. But it is not in the same
40   X, 1 |             way that every "one" is indivisible e.g. a foot and a unit;
41   X, 1 |           and a unit; the latter is indivisible in every respect, while
42   X, 1 |             will be one if they are indivisible in quantity, and others
43   X, 1 |              and others if they are indivisible in quality; and so that
44   X, 1 |             so that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua
45   X, 3 |            the one and plurality as indivisible and divisible; for that
46   X, 3 |        plurality, and that which is indivisible or not divided is called
47   X, 3 |  explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because
48   X, 3 |           more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in definition plurality
49   X, 3 |           plurality is prior to the indivisible, because of the conditions
50   X, 6 |        number; i.e. if the thing is indivisible it is not a number. But
51   X, 6 |            divisible and the latter indivisible, while in another sense
52   X, 8 |            the same genus and being indivisible (and those things are the
53   X, 8 |          have no contrariety, being indivisible); we say "being indivisible",
54   X, 8 |         indivisible); we say "being indivisible", for in the process of
55   X, 9 |   contrariety. This is the ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition +
56  XI, 1 |            the genera (for they are indivisible, but the genera are divided
57  XI, 10|          accident of it, it will be indivisible; for the divisible is either
58  XI, 10|      magnitude or plurality. But if indivisible, it is not infinite, except
59  XI, 10|              Therefore it is either indivisible, or if it is partible, it
60  XI, 10|           it must be impartible and indivisible. But the actually infinite
61  XI, 10|         actually infinite cannot be indivisible; for it must be of a certain
62 XII, 7 |            but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement
63 XIII, 2|            sensible things are such indivisible entities, or, without being
64 XIII, 2|           being so themselves, have indivisible entities in them? The result
65 XIII, 3|            For a man qua man is one indivisible thing; and the arithmetician
66 XIII, 3|          arithmetician supposed one indivisible thing, and then considered
67 XIII, 3|      attribute belongs to a man qua indivisible. But the geometer treats
68 XIII, 3|             neither qua man nor qua indivisible, but as a solid. For evidently
69 XIII, 3|           perchance he had not been indivisible, can belong to him even
70 XIII, 7|          the units. And their being indivisible will make no difference
71 XIII, 7|            them; for points too are indivisible, but yet a pair of them
72 XIII, 8|             is not true to speak of indivisible spatial magnitudes; and
73 XIII, 8|         number; e.g. the first, the indivisible, line, then the 2 &c.; these
74 XIII, 8|      particular or the element, are indivisible. But they are starting-points
75 XIII, 9|            is impossible, for it is indivisible; and to generate it from
76 XIII, 9|           each of the parts must be indivisible (or it will be a plurality
77 XIII, 9|              Nor again can there be indivisible parts of a distance, as
78 XIII, 9|             are said to be made are indivisible parts of plurality; for
79 XIV, 1 |        quantity (and the measure is indivisible, in the former case in kind,
80 XIV, 2 |       measure or the quantitatively indivisible. If, then, the quantitative
81 XIV, 5 |         excreted from that which is indivisible. Does it come from its contrary,