Book, Paragraph

 1  IV, 2 |        thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from
 2  IV, 4 |      impossible to enumerate its accidental attributes, which are infinite
 3  IV, 4 |          that all attributes are accidental; for this is the distinction
 4  IV, 4 |          and accident-"white" is accidental to man, because though he
 5  IV, 4 |        But if all statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary
 6  IV, 4 |      which they are made, if the accidental always implies predication
 7  IV, 4 |         terms can be combined in accidental predication. For (1) an
 8  IV, 4 |     white, only because both are accidental to man. But (2) Socrates
 9  IV, 4 |       sense, that both terms are accidental to something else. Since
10  IV, 4 |         then some predicates are accidental in this and some in that
11  IV, 4 |       sense, (a) those which are accidental in the latter sense, in
12  IV, 4 |         sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates, cannot form
13  IV, 4 |         white" have another term accidental to it, e.g. "musical". For
14  IV, 4 |    musical". For this is no more accidental to that than that is to
15  IV, 4 |        while some predicates are accidental in this sense, others are
16  IV, 4 |      sense in which "musical" is accidental to Socrates; and the accident
17  IV, 4 |       that not all terms will be accidental. There must, then, even
18   V, 2 |        the same thing, and in no accidental sense (e.g. both the art
19   V, 2 |         effect. Again, there are accidental causes and the classes which
20   V, 2 |         classes that include the accidental cause are also causes, e.g. "
21   V, 2 |         and man is an animal. Of accidental causes also some are more
22   V, 2 |        causes, whether proper or accidental, some are called causes
23   V, 2 |         similarly in the case of accidental effects. Again, both accidental
24   V, 2 |  accidental effects. Again, both accidental and proper causes may be
25   V, 2 |          as the genus, or as the accidental, or as the genus that includes
26   V, 2 |          genus that includes the accidental, and these either as combined,
27   V, 7 |       are said to "be" (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own
28   V, 7 |      their own nature.~(1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say "the
29   V, 7 |          one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this
30   V, 9 |          which is the same in an accidental sense, e.g. "the pale" and "
31  VI, 2 |          one was seen’ to be the accidental, and another the true (’
32  VI, 2 |        we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific
33  VI, 2 |        naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name.
34  VI, 2 |          say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether "
35  VI, 2 |      arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously akin to non-being.
36  VI, 2 |       say further, regarding the accidental, what its nature is and
37  VI, 2 |          of the existence of the accidental; for that which is neither
38  VI, 2 |       for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the
39  VI, 2 |       productive of them, but to accidental results there corresponds
40  VI, 2 |      accident, the cause also is accidental. Therefore, since not all
41  VI, 2 |       are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance
42  VI, 2 |    sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything will
43  VI, 2 |         must be the cause of the accidental. And we must take as our
44  VI, 2 |          which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists,
45  VI, 2 |       there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science
46  VI, 2 |       for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such laws.
47  VI, 2 |      have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause
48  VI, 4 |                 4~Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently
49 VII, 6 |        thing.~Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be
50 VII, 6 |       follow that the essence of accidental unities should be the same
51 VII, 6 |        and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both
52 VII, 6 |          must be one.~(But of an accidental term, e.g.’the musical’
53 VII, 6 |       for both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the
54 VII, 6 |         quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that
55 VII, 11|          their essences, nor are accidental unities like that of "Socrates"
56 VII, 12|        if we divide according to accidental qualities, e.g. if we were
57 VIII, 5|      corruptions in question are accidental, and it is the matter of
58  IX, 10|      what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds
59   X, 8 |      differentiated in no merely accidental way, whether conceived as
60   X, 10|          perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being
61  XI, 8 |          busies itself about the accidental. For neither does architecture
62  XI, 8 |          busies itself about the accidental, so that Plato is not far
63  XI, 8 | non-being.~That a science of the accidental is not even possible will
64  XI, 8 |        if we try to see what the accidental really is. We say that everything
65  XI, 8 |      might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but
66  XI, 8 |        Now we have said what the accidental is, and it is obvious why
67  XI, 8 |       for the most part, but the accidental is in neither of these classes.~
68  XI, 8 |     causes and principles of the accidental, of the same kind as there
69  XI, 8 |          this was supposed to be accidental). Therefore all things will
70  XI, 8 |        indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the
71  XI, 8 |          by accident. Luck is an accidental cause at work in such events
72  XI, 8 |          is large.~Since nothing accidental is prior to the essential,
73  XI, 8 |       the essential, neither are accidental causes prior. If, then,
74  XI, 11|        change, some change in an accidental sense, like that in which "
75  XI, 11|     causes movement either in an accidental sense or in respect of a
76  XI, 11|     heating. Change which is not accidental is found not in all things,
77  XI, 11|      full that its generation is accidental, yet it is true to say that "
78  XI, 12|        so that their movement is accidental), nor of agent and patient,
79 XIII, 3|         subject-not with what is accidental to it (e.g. not with the