Book, Paragraph

 1  IV, 4 |           is true, the negation is false, and when this is true,
 2  IV, 4 |           true, the affirmation is false, it will not be possible
 3  IV, 5 |          at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs
 4  IV, 5 | impressions are true and which are false is not obvious; for the
 5  IV, 5 |           sense in question-is not false, still appearance is not
 6  IV, 6 |          that all things are alike false and true, for things do
 7  IV, 7 |       define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that
 8  IV, 7 |         what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is
 9  IV, 7 |            what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor
10  IV, 7 |            it says what is true or false. When it connects in one
11  IV, 7 |            in another way, what is false.-Again, there must be an
12  IV, 7 |           seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed,
13  IV, 8 |        things are true and all are false also makes each of these
14  IV, 8 |         hand can all statements be false; yet this would seem more
15  IV, 8 |        other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible
16  IV, 8 |           all statements should be false; for one side of the contradiction
17  IV, 8 |     impossible that both should be false; for it is one side of the
18  IV, 8 |          the contradiction that is false.-Therefore all such views
19  IV, 8 |          he who says everything is false makes himself also false.-
20  IV, 8 |           false makes himself also false.-And if the former person
21  IV, 8 |       excepts his own as being not false, none the less they are
22  IV, 8 |           true and the same always false,-but this obviously changes;
23  IV, 8 |       everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that
24   V, 7 |         the side" means that it is false to say it is.~(4) Again, "
25   V, 12|    commensurate, then, is not only false but also of necessity false.
26   V, 12|        false but also of necessity false. The contrary of this, the
27   V, 12|     necessary that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should
28   V, 12|         seated is not of necessity false. The possible, then, in
29   V, 12|          which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true;
30   V, 29|                            29~"The false" means (1) that which is
31   V, 29|            means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a)
32   V, 29|      sitting"; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes;
33   V, 29|      produce in us. We call things false in this way, then,-either
34   V, 29|         that does not exist.~(2) A false account is the account of
35   V, 29|        objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is
36   V, 29|             Hence every account is false when applied to something
37   V, 29|         the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle.
38   V, 29|            and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account
39   V, 29|           things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3)
40   V, 29|            these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready
41   V, 29|         things are which produce a false appearance. This is why
42   V, 29|       Hippias that the same man is false and true is misleading.
43   V, 29|          For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the
44   V, 29|           bad is better. This is a false result of induction-for
45  VI, 2 |        true (’non-being’ being the false), while besides these there
46  VI, 4 |          not in the sense of being false, depends on combination
47  VI, 4 |           are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite
48  IX, 4 |    diagonal is impossible. For the false and the impossible are not
49  IX, 4 |            you are standing now is false, but that you should be
50  IX, 10|           in the sense of true and false. This depends, on the side
51  IX, 10|         same statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible
52  IX, 10|           time true and at another false, but the same opinions are
53  IX, 10|          are always true or always false.~But with regard to incomposites,
54  IX, 10|           our judgement be true or false, it is implied that the
55  XI, 2 |          that are are substance is false. Further, how can they be
56  XI, 6 |           all statements cannot be false nor all true, both because
57  XI, 6 |             and because if all are false it will not be true to say
58  XI, 6 |            are true it will not be false to say all are false.~
59  XI, 6 |            be false to say all are false.~
60 XIII, 9|           and their principles are false. And it is hard to make
61 XIV, 2 |           the things that are, the false and the character of falsity.
62 XIV, 2 |           assume something that is false, as geometers assume the
63 XIV, 2 |          geometers assume anything false (for the enunciation is
64 XIV, 2 |   categories, and besides this the false is said not to be, and so