Book, Paragraph

 1  II, 1 |           THE investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another
 2  II, 1 |          one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the
 3  II, 1 |           little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable
 4  II, 1 |      amassed. Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial
 5  II, 1 |           that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part
 6  II, 1 |          expressed views about the truth; for from some thinkers
 7  II, 1 |            called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical
 8  II, 1 |           theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical
 9  II, 1 |     present). Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a
10  II, 1 |             so is it in respect of truth.~
11 III, 1 |           to get possession of the truth, but it is not easy even
12 III, 4 |     necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity
13  IV, 2 | philosopher has to investigate the truth.-An indication of this may
14  IV, 2 |       single meaning. Probably the truth is that they have not; yet
15  IV, 3 |           say anything about their truth or falsity,-neither the
16  IV, 3 |         discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are
17  IV, 4 |           And (ii) if one may with truth apply the predicates separately,
18  IV, 4 |         the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should be
19  IV, 4 |        healthy state as far as the truth is concerned.~Again, however
20  IV, 4 |           norm, there must be some truth to which the more true is
21  IV, 4 |       better founded and liker the truth, and we shall have got rid
22  IV, 5 |          of the sensible world the truth of appearances. For they
23  IV, 5 |            For they think that the truth should not be determined
24  IV, 5 |            that either there is no truth or to us at least it is
25  IV, 5 |         who have seen most of such truth as is possible for us (and
26  IV, 5 |      express these views about the truth, is it not natural that
27  IV, 5 |        lose heart? For to seek the truth would be to follow flying
28  IV, 5 |            were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought, "
29  IV, 5 |            Regarding the nature of truth, we must maintain that not
30  IV, 6 |           easily persuaded of this truth, for it is not difficult
31  IV, 6 |      themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears
32  IV, 8 |           assuming what falsity or truth means. If that which it
33  IV, 8 |            driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite
34  VI, 4 |    combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend
35  VI, 4 |            unity); for falsity and truth are not in things-it is
36  VI, 4 |            and "whats" falsity and truth do not exist even in thought—
37 VII, 4 |          be said to be known),-the truth being that we use the word
38 VII, 10|            to the individuals.~The truth has indeed now been stated,
39 VII, 11|         for it leads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that
40  IX, 10|    combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought
41  IX, 10|             when is what is called truth or falsity present, and
42  IX, 10|           we who say this have the truth. If, then, some things are
43  IX, 10|            being or not being, and truth or falsity? A thing of this
44  IX, 10|         incommensurable"; nor will truth and falsity be still present
45  IX, 10|        previous cases. In fact, as truth is not the same in these
46  IX, 10|           is not the same; but (a) truth or falsity is as follows—
47  IX, 10|          contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the
48  IX, 10|             being" that answers to truth and the "non-being" that
49  IX, 10|      falsity, in one case there is truth if the subject and the attribute
50  IX, 10|         does not exist at all. And truth means knowing these objects,
51  XI, 5 |         the contrary recognize the truth,-viz. that the same thing
52  XI, 5 |         not possible to infer this truth itself from a more certain
53  XI, 6 |            our judgement about the truth. For in pursuing the truth
54  XI, 6 |         truth. For in pursuing the truth one must start from the
55  XI, 6 |        assuming that they know the truth about it and that it is
56  XI, 10|         numerable. Concretely, the truth is evident from the following
57 XIII, 2|   conclusion contrary alike to the truth and to the usual views follow,
58 XIII, 2|         spatial magnitudes, but in truth they must be posterior;
59 XIII, 4|          on the question about the truth of things they accepted
60 XIII, 7|        even in this way, though in truth it is impossible. For it
61 XIII, 8|            the starting-point, the truth about the numbers must rather
62 XIII, 8|           two is in a sense one-in truth each of the two units exists