Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 1 |   experience made art", as Polus says, "but inexperience luck."
 2  II, 1 | collectively fail, but every one says something true about the
 3 III, 1 |    something else,-as Empedocles says, love; as some one else
 4 III, 1 |           love; as some one else says, fire; while another says
 5 III, 1 |        says, fire; while another says water or air. Again (12)
 6 III, 3 |      principles; e.g. Empedocles says fire and water and the rest
 7 III, 4 |         from strife. At least he says:—~From which all that was
 8 III, 4 |         like. "For by earth," he says,~we see earth, by water
 9  IV, 3 |         as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he
10  IV, 3 |  Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily
11  IV, 4 |         say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to
12  IV, 4 | different things. And if any one says that "white" means one and
13  IV, 4 |    separates the predicates (and says, for instance, that a thing
14  IV, 4 |     about nothing at all; for he says nothing. For he says neither "
15  IV, 4 |          he says nothing. For he says neither "yes" nor "no",
16  IV, 4 |         denies both of these and says "neither yes nor no"; for
17  IV, 4 |    anything intelligible; for he says at the same time both "yes"
18  IV, 5 |  contraries alike, as Anaxagoras says all is mixed in all, and
19  IV, 5 |       and Democritus too; for he says the void and the full exist
20  IV, 5 |         Democritus, at any rate, says that either there is no
21  IV, 5 |        this sort. For Empedocles says that when men change their
22  IV, 5 |    before them.~And elsewhere he says that:—~So far as their nature
23  IV, 5 |          to the future, as Plato says, surely the opinion of the
24  IV, 5 |       each of which senses never says at the same time of the
25  IV, 6 |         some one; so that he who says all things that appear are
26  IV, 6 |         the same time (for touch says there are two objects when
27  IV, 6 |         our fingers, while sight says there is one)-to these we
28  IV, 7 |          is true; so that he who says of anything that it is,
29  IV, 7 |       the definition-whenever it says what is true or false. When
30  IV, 7 |        assertion or negation, it says what is true, and when it
31  IV, 7 |        whether a thing is white, says "no", he has denied nothing
32  IV, 8 |        of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true
33  IV, 8 |   destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is true
34  IV, 8 |        it is true), while he who says everything is false makes
35  IV, 8 |       statements; for that which says the true statement is true
36   V, 4 |    composition, or as Empedocles says:—~Nothing that is has a
37   V, 5 |  necessary is painful, as Evenus says: "For every necessary thing
38   V, 5 |          necessity, as Sophocles says: "But force necessitates
39   V, 6 |      universal name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as "
40 VII, 13| Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made
41 VII, 14|        relation implied when one says the animal is two-footed
42 VIII, 6|         communion", as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion
43  IX, 3 |         of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable
44   X, 1 |   fraction of us. But Protagoras says "man is the measure of all
45   X, 2 |        philosophers, of whom one says the one is love, another
46   X, 2 |         the one is love, another says it is air, and another the
47  XI, 5 |     being applied. He, then, who says "this is and is not" denies
48  XI, 5 |      what the word signifies, he says it does not signify; and
49  XI, 5 |        than the negation, he who says "man" will be no more right
50  XI, 5 |        no more right than he who says "not-man". It would seem
51  XI, 6 |     subject; for when Anaxagoras says that in everything there
52  XI, 6 |         a part of everything, he says nothing is sweet any more
53  XI, 8 |         is not far wrong when he says that the sophist spends
54  XI, 10|       one of them, as Heraclitus says all things sometime become
55 XII, 10|          any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover
56 XIII, 6|          to say.~Another thinker says the first kind of number,
57 XIV, 1 |         even the philosopher who says the unequal and the One
58 XIV, 2 |          is many; but if any one says they are the same, he has
59 XIV, 2 |      things? Neither does he who says it exists maintain that
60 XIV, 2 |     cause of anything (he rather says it is a thing existing by