Book, Paragraph

 1   V, 6 |       of number; for the first measure is the beginning, since
 2   V, 6 |        each class is the first measure of the class; the one, then,
 3   V, 15|       as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge,
 4   V, 15|     and 1 is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these
 5   V, 25|        sense, only those which measure the whole; this is why two,
 6   X, 1 |    especially "to be the first measure of a kind", and most strictly
 7   X, 1 |      the other categories. For measure is that by which quantity
 8   X, 1 |      in the other classes too "measure" means that by which each
 9   X, 1 |        is first known, and the measure of each is a unit-in length,
10   X, 1 |        In all these, then, the measure and starting-point is something
11   X, 1 |      everywhere we seek as the measure something one and indivisible;
12   X, 1 |      away or to add, there the measure is exact (hence that of
13   X, 1 |        we imitate this sort of measure. For in the case of a furlong
14   X, 1 |   subtracted, all men make the measure, whether of liquids or of
15   X, 1 |       know it by means of this measure. And indeed they know movement
16   X, 1 |      is the starting-point and measure (for they assume the movement
17   X, 1 |        have mentioned.~But the measure is not always one in number—
18   X, 1 |  articulate sounds by which we measure are more than one, and the
19   X, 1 |     Thus, then, the one is the measure of all things, because we
20   X, 1 |        thing is divisible.~The measure is always homogeneous with
21   X, 1 |        the thing measured; the measure of spatial magnitudes is
22   X, 1 |       so, and not say that the measure of numbers is a number;
23   X, 1 |        if one claimed that the measure of units is units and not
24   X, 1 |        perception, we call the measure of things for the same reason,
25   X, 1 |       are measured rather than measure other things. But it is
26   X, 1 |    Protagoras says "man is the measure of all things", as if he
27   X, 1 |      meaning of the word, is a measure, and most properly of quantity,
28   X, 6 |    have been measured with the measure. It is in this sense also
29   X, 6 |      to the many in numbers as measure to thing measurable; and
30   X, 6 |         for inasmuch as one is measure and the other measurable,
31   X, 6 |     might be thought to be the measure, and the knowable the thing
32   X, 6 |        number and the one is a measure.~
33  XI, 6 |        he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply
34  XI, 6 |     appears to each man is the measure. This difficulty may be
35  XI, 6 |        must be taken to be the measure, and the other must not.
36 XII, 7 |        same; for "one" means a measure, but "simple" means that
37 XIV, 1 |     The one" evidently means a measure. And in every case there
38 XIV, 1 | quantities a quantity (and the measure is indivisible, in the former
39 XIV, 1 |        for "the one" means the measure of some plurality, and "
40 XIV, 1 |       is not a number; for the measure is not measures, but both
41 XIV, 1 |     not measures, but both the measure and the one are starting-points.)
42 XIV, 1 |      are starting-points.) The measure must always be some identical
43 XIV, 1 |     the things are horses, the measure is "horse", and if they
44 XIV, 1 |        a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps "living being",
45 XIV, 2 |       unit", unless it means a measure or the quantitatively indivisible.