Book, Paragraph

 1 III, 2 |            cause, nor is there any demonstration of this kind - ’because
 2 III, 2 |        even of the things of which demonstration is possible is present only
 3 III, 2 |      taking the starting-points of demonstration as well as the causes, it
 4 III, 2 |          by the starting-points of demonstration I mean the common beliefs,
 5 III, 2 |    impossible that there should be demonstration about all of them); for
 6 III, 2 |        about all of them); for the demonstration must start from certain
 7 III, 2 |           thought that there is no demonstration of the essence of things.
 8  IV, 3 |         all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an
 9  IV, 4 |           things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should
10  IV, 4 |    impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (
11  IV, 4 |            there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things
12  IV, 4 |        which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not
13  IV, 4 |            vegetable. Now negative demonstration I distinguish from demonstration
14  IV, 4 |   demonstration I distinguish from demonstration proper, because in a demonstration
15  IV, 4 | demonstration proper, because in a demonstration one might be thought to
16  IV, 4 |           have negative proof, not demonstration. The starting-point for
17  IV, 4 |            if any one grants this, demonstration will be possible; for we
18  IV, 4 |       something is true apart from demonstration (so that not everything
19  IV, 6 |           they seek to get this by demonstration, while it is obvious from
20  IV, 6 |          for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration.~These,
21  IV, 6 |            of demonstration is not demonstration.~These, then, might be easily
22   V, 5 |          sort of necessity. Again, demonstration is a necessary thing because
23   V, 5 |       otherwise, if there has been demonstration in the unqualified sense;
24  VI, 1 |        such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence,
25 VII, 15|          neither definition of nor demonstration about sensible individual
26 VII, 15|          are destructible. If then demonstration is of necessary truths and
27 VII, 15|            thus is opinion, so too demonstration and definition cannot vary
28 VII, 15|       neither be definition of nor demonstration about sensible individuals.
29 VII, 15|            be either definition or demonstration. And so when one of the
30  XI, 1 |            the first principles of demonstration? If of one, why of this
31  XI, 1 |          in the case of attributes demonstration is possible, in that of
32  XI, 1 |        science which inquires into demonstration and science; for this is
33  XI, 7 |         this sort that there is no demonstration. of the substance or "what".~