Book, Paragraph

 1 III, 4 |          or from many? It is like saying that the line is made out
 2  IV, 2 |           predicates in question, saying how they are related to
 3  IV, 4 |          deny, one must either be saying what is true when one separates
 4  IV, 4 |   separately, our opponent is not saying what he professes to say,
 5  IV, 4 |      right, what can they mean by saying that the nature of existing
 6  IV, 5 |       there is more is thought.~A saying of Anaxagoras to some of
 7  IV, 5 |         criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to
 8  IV, 6 |          must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that
 9  IV, 8 |           the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while
10 VII, 5 |          it turns out that we are saying the same thing twice, as
11 VII, 7 |          cases. Therefore, as the saying goes, it is impossible that
12 VII, 7 |       describe both the matter by saying it is brass, and the form
13 VII, 7 |         is brass, and the form by saying that it is such and such
14 VII, 10|          must meet the inquiry by saying that the question cannot
15 VII, 12|      proper division, we shall be saying the same thing more than
16 VII, 12| definitions, e.g. of that of man, saying "animal which is two-footed
17 VII, 13|           cannot. And what we are saying will be plainer from what
18 VIII, 3|          actually to explain, not saying what it is, but that it
19   X, 1 |        objects. Such thinkers are saying nothing, then, while they
20   X, 1 |           while they appear to be saying something remarkable.~Evidently,
21  XI, 5 |           would seem also that in saying the man is not a horse one
22  XI, 5 |         or not less right than in saying he is not a man, so that
23  XI, 5 |         one will also be right in saying that the same person is
24  XI, 6 |                             6~The saying of Protagoras is like the
25  XI, 6 |           hold, justifies them in saying that the same thing both
26  XI, 6 |        white we shall be wrong in saying it is neither black nor
27 XII, 10|       first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle,
28 XIII, 4|       what will be the meaning of saying that there is something
29 XIV, 1 |           To suggest this is like saying that the white is a first
30 XIV, 2 |          If that which we are now saying is true universally-that
31 XIV, 2 |         issue with and refute the saying of Parmenides:~"For never
32 XIV, 4 |      contrary. And if, as we were saying, the matter is that which