Book, Paragraph

 1   V, 4 |   has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
 2  VI, 1 |   the essence-some making it plain to the senses, others assuming
 3  VI, 1 |      theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.
 4 VII, 11|    thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to define
 5 VII, 11|      stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the bronze or
 6 VII, 12|    are cuts. Therefore it is plain that the definition is the
 7 VII, 13|     these standpoints, it is plain that no universal attribute
 8 VII, 13|     a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that
 9 VII, 17|     a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring
10  XI, 5 |   one thing, it must be made plain to which of these the word
11  XI, 9 |      what we say is true, is plain from the following facts.
12 XII, 7 |     in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in
13 XIII, 2|   the sensible solids, it is plain that besides the planes
14 XIII, 2|      sights. Therefore it is plain that the other senses as
15 XIII, 2|    pale man. Therefore it is plain that neither is the result
16 XIII, 2|      sensibles either, it is plain that they either do not
17 XIII, 9|     separating them. This is plain from the results; for without
18 XIV, 6 | sense, however, they make it plain that goodness belongs to