Book, Paragraph

 1  IV, 7 | intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything
 2  IV, 8 |          false; for one side of the contradiction must be true. Again, if
 3  IV, 8 |           for it is one side of the contradiction that is false.-Therefore
 4   V, 29|        drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could
 5   X, 4 |             kinds of opposition are contradiction and privation and contrariety
 6   X, 4 |           and of these the first is contradiction, and contradiction admits
 7   X, 4 |         first is contradiction, and contradiction admits of no intermediate,
 8   X, 4 |    contraries admit of one, clearly contradiction and contrariety are not
 9   X, 4 |          But privation is a kind of contradiction; for what suffers privation,
10   X, 4 |          Privation, therefore, is a contradiction or incapacity which is determinate
11   X, 4 |            is the reason why, while contradiction does not admit of an intermediate,
12   X, 7 |       middle term; for this is what contradiction is-an opposition, one or