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| Alphabetical [« »] thief 2 thigh 1 thin 3 thing 554 thing-and 1 thing-itself 1 things 893 | Frequency [« »] 622 same 600 all 571 these 554 thing 540 by 520 will 518 other | Aristotle Metaphysics IntraText - Concordances thing |
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1 I, 1 | several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity 2 II, 1 | without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher 3 II, 1 | things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, 4 II, 2 | kind. For neither can one thing proceed from another, as 5 II, 2 | something else, and so one thing always for the sake of another. 6 II, 2 | should be produced. For one thing comes from another in two 7 II, 2 | hand, coming from another thing as water comes from air 8 II, 2 | destruction of the other thing. This is why changes of 9 II, 2 | that which is the first thing by whose destruction something 10 III, 1 | and deny one and the same thing or not, and all other such 11 III, 1 | is, but also whether one thing always has one contrary. 12 III, 1 | the parts present in each thing, into which it is divided; 13 III, 1 | besides the matter, any thing that is a cause in itself 14 III, 1 | apart from the concrete thing (by the concrete thing I 15 III, 1 | concrete thing (by the concrete thing I mean the matter with something 16 III, 2 | object in question? The same thing may have all the kinds of 17 III, 2 | since men may know the same thing in many ways, we say that 18 III, 2 | he who recognizes what a thing is by its being so and so 19 III, 2 | most fully who knows what a thing is, not he who knows its 20 III, 2 | only when we know what the thing is, e.g. what squaring a 21 III, 2 | affirmed or denied, and that a thing cannot at the same time 22 III, 2 | ways, the most paradoxical thing of all is the statement 23 III, 2 | speaks of (for no perceptible thing is straight or round in 24 III, 3 | primary constituents of a thing; e.g. it is the primary 25 III, 3 | genera; but if we know each thing by its definition, and the 26 III, 3 | the constituent parts of a thing.~(7) Besides this, even 27 III, 3 | posterior. Further, where one thing is better and another worse, 28 III, 3 | should we suppose any such thing to exist alongside of the 29 III, 4 | apart from the concrete thing, whenever something is predicated 30 III, 4 | something besides the concrete thing, viz. the shape or form.~ 31 III, 4 | and how is the concrete thing these two elements?~(9) 32 III, 4 | neither when added makes a thing greater nor when subtracted 33 III, 4 | order, and an indivisible thing can exist in such a way 34 III, 6 | is a "this" and a single thing, Socrates will be several 35 III, 6 | indicates a "this" and a single thing.~If, then, the principles 36 IV, 1 | clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in 37 IV, 2 | are many senses in which a thing may be said to "be", but 38 IV, 2 | point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to "be" 39 IV, 2 | is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves 40 IV, 2 | to the medical art, one thing being called medical because 41 IV, 2 | are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer 42 IV, 2 | negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It 43 IV, 2 | are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are 44 IV, 2 | and "man" are the same thing, and so are "existent man" 45 IV, 2 | these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart 46 IV, 2 | further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental 47 IV, 2 | really investigating the one thing of which the negation or 48 IV, 2 | either say simply that that thing is not present, or that 49 IV, 2 | just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation 50 IV, 2 | are many senses in which a thing is said to be one, these 51 IV, 2 | Socrates seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has 52 IV, 2 | same thing, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what 53 IV, 3 | one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as 54 IV, 3 | time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for 55 IV, 4 | is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and 56 IV, 4 | if we do not think of one thing; but if this is possible, 57 IV, 4 | might be assigned to this thing.)~Let it be assumed then, 58 IV, 4 | be and not to be the same thing, except in virtue of an 59 IV, 4 | not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be 60 IV, 4 | one, they must mean one thing. But it was shown earlier’ 61 IV, 4 | impossible that the same thing should not at that time 62 IV, 4 | it is impossible for the thing not to be. It is, then, 63 IV, 4 | time true to say the same thing is a man and is not a man.~ 64 IV, 4 | means one and the same thing as "man", again we shall 65 IV, 4 | nothing to prevent the same thing from being both a man and 66 IV, 4 | an answer which means one thing, and not add that "it is 67 IV, 4 | therefore, even if the same thing is a thousand times a man 68 IV, 4 | and that there is no such thing as "being essentially a 69 IV, 4 | there is to be any such thing as "being essentially a 70 IV, 4 | of it); for there was one thing which it meant, and this 71 IV, 4 | denoting the substance of a thing means that the essence of 72 IV, 4 | that the essence of the thing is nothing else. But if 73 IV, 4 | will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, 74 IV, 4 | For if it is true that a thing is a man and a not-man, 75 IV, 4 | true in all cases, and a thing is both white and not-white, 76 IV, 4 | says, for instance, that a thing is white, and again that 77 IV, 4 | alike of each subject, one thing will in no wise differ from 78 IV, 4 | assert and deny the same thing truly at the same time. 79 IV, 4 | who judges either that the thing is so or that it is not 80 IV, 4 | Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another 81 IV, 4 | he must also judge one thing to be a man and another 82 IV, 4 | another to be not-a-man, one thing to be sweet and another 83 IV, 4 | yet he ought, if the same thing were alike a man and not-a-man. 84 IV, 5 | themselves; so that the same thing must both be and not be. 85 IV, 5 | existence out of the same thing. If, then, that which is 86 IV, 5 | not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before 87 IV, 5 | so that in some sense a thing can come to be out of that 88 IV, 5 | it cannot, and the same thing can at the same time be 89 IV, 5 | same respect. For the same thing can be potentially at the 90 IV, 5 | belief, and that the same thing is thought sweet by some 91 IV, 5 | each and all men~"Tis one thing thinks-the substance of 92 IV, 5 | be. And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present 93 IV, 5 | something that exists; and if a thing is coming to be, there must 94 IV, 5 | that it is not the same thing to change in quantity and 95 IV, 5 | Grant that in quantity a thing is not constant; still it 96 IV, 5 | its form that we know each thing.-And again, it would be 97 IV, 6 | is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to 98 IV, 6 | to opinion.-Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation 99 IV, 6 | it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number 100 IV, 6 | things; and if the same thing is both half and equal, 101 IV, 6 | is thought. And if each thing is to be relative to that 102 IV, 6 | same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also 103 IV, 6 | the same time to the same thing. For of contraries, one 104 IV, 7 | term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something 105 IV, 7 | on being asked whether a thing is white, says "no", he 106 V, 1 | means (1) that part of a thing from which one would start 107 V, 1 | 2) That from which each thing would best be originated, 108 V, 1 | as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, e,g, 109 V, 1 | not as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, and from 110 V, 1 | arts. (6) That from which a thing can first be known,-this 111 V, 1 | called the beginning of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are 112 V, 1 | first point from which a thing either is or comes to be 113 V, 1 | some are immanent in the thing and others are outside. 114 V, 1 | outside. Hence the nature of a thing is a beginning, and so is 115 V, 1 | and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will, and 116 V, 2 | as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the 117 V, 2 | the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing 118 V, 2 | for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause 119 V, 2 | several causes of the same thing, and in no accidental sense ( 120 V, 2 | movement).-Again, the same thing is the cause of contraries; 121 V, 2 | present causes a particular thing, we sometimes charge, when 122 V, 2 | effects of causes; e.g. a thing may be called the cause 123 V, 2 | builder with this particular thing that is being built; but 124 V, 3 | component immanent in a thing, and indivisible in kind 125 V, 3 | that the element of each thing is the first component immanent 126 V, 4 | immanent part of a growing thing, from which its growth first 127 V, 4 | first, counting from the thing, or the first in general; 128 V, 4 | because the nature of a thing is one kind of essence.~ 129 V, 5 | which, as a condition, a thing cannot live; e.g. breathing 130 V, 5 | says: "For every necessary thing is ever irksome"), and compulsion 131 V, 5 | are somehow derived; for a thing is said to do or suffer 132 V, 5 | that because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and 133 V, 5 | demonstration is a necessary thing because the conclusion cannot 134 V, 6 | Coriscus" (for it is the same thing to say "Coriscus and what 135 V, 6 | the continuous by art. A thing is called continuous which 136 V, 6 | which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter 137 V, 7 | a builder; for here "one thing is another" means "one is 138 V, 7 | are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute 139 V, 7 | accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an accidental 140 V, 7 | both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because 141 V, 7 | that it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it 142 V, 8 | called the substance of each thing.~It follows, then, that " 143 V, 8 | the shape or form of each thing.~ 144 V, 9 | are accidents of the same thing, and "a man" and "musical" 145 V, 9 | either of more than one thing or of one thing when it 146 V, 9 | than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more 147 V, 9 | than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for 148 V, 9 | which shares with another thing the greater number or the 149 V, 9 | altering, is like that other thing. The senses of "unlike" 150 V, 10 | the same time to the same thing; hence their constituents 151 V, 11 | reference to some one definite thing according to some rule, 152 V, 12 | change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or 153 V, 12 | in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing 154 V, 12 | thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e.g. the art 155 V, 12 | potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of 156 V, 12 | change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua 157 V, 12 | another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) 158 V, 12 | also (2) the source of a thing’s being moved by another 159 V, 12 | s being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. 160 V, 12 | things to rest is a "potent" thing) in another thing or in 161 V, 12 | potent" thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; 162 V, 12 | distinct senses); and a thing is capable in another sense 163 V, 12 | because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other, has 164 V, 12 | either merely because the thing might chance to happen or 165 V, 12 | source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua 166 V, 12 | another thing or in the same thing qua other. For other things 167 V, 12 | source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua 168 V, 12 | another thing or in the same thing qua other".~ 169 V, 15 | then have said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is 170 V, 15 | way of speaking the same thing would be said twice,-’the 171 V, 15 | is relative, if the same thing happens to be double and 172 V, 16 | the complete time of each thing is that outside which it 173 V, 16 | is a completion; for each thing is complete and every substance 174 V, 16 | to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, 175 V, 17 | the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond 176 V, 17 | spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude; (3) 177 V, 17 | magnitude; (3) the end of each thing (and of this nature is that 178 V, 17 | 4) the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; 179 V, 18 | form or substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of 180 V, 18 | sense the matter of each thing and the proximate substratum 181 V, 18 | The following belong to a thing in virtue of itself:-(1) 182 V, 18 | 1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue 183 V, 18 | 3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly 184 V, 18 | Whatever attributes belong to a thing alone, and in so far as 185 V, 20 | or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between 186 V, 20 | is a "habit" of the whole thing.~ 187 V, 21 | quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white 188 V, 22 | of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even 189 V, 22 | naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally 190 V, 22 | 2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would 191 V, 22 | naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has 192 V, 22 | negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because 193 V, 22 | may be used because the thing has little of the attribute ( 194 V, 22 | not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it 195 V, 23 | many things:-(1) to treat a thing according to one’s own nature 196 V, 23 | wear.-(2) That in which a thing is present as in something 197 V, 23 | of it is said to have the thing; e.g. the bronze has the 198 V, 23 | things contained; for a thing is said to be held by that 199 V, 23 | 4) That which hinders a thing from moving or acting according 200 V, 24 | to a part of that other thing; e.g. the child comes from 201 V, 24 | It means coming after a thing in time, e.g. night comes 202 V, 25 | definition which explains a thing are also parts of the whole; 203 V, 26 | each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity 204 V, 26 | being severally one single thing, because all are living 205 V, 27 | any chance quantitative thing that can be said to be " 206 V, 28 | other nor both into the same thing (e.g. form and matter are 207 V, 28 | another or into some one thing.~ 208 V, 29 | that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it 209 V, 29 | there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its 210 V, 29 | there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself 211 V, 29 | the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute 212 V, 29 | possible to describe each thing not only by the account 213 V, 30 | all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but 214 VI, 1 | certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics 215 VI, 2 | or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring 216 VI, 2 | to state, i.e. when the thing does not happen, e.g.’on 217 VII, 1 | several senses in which a thing may be said to "be", as 218 VII, 1 | being" meant is "what a thing is" or a "this", and in 219 VII, 1 | indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what 220 VII, 1 | we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good 221 VII, 1 | healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be 222 VII, 1 | several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet 223 VII, 1 | 2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know 224 VII, 3 | be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. 225 VII, 3 | for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to 226 VII, 3 | is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity 227 VII, 3 | itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity 228 VII, 4 | it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be 229 VII, 4 | of this the essence of a thing; not that which is propter 230 VII, 4 | formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white 231 VII, 4 | by accident; but for ever thing else as well, if it has 232 VII, 4 | definition", like "what a thing is", several meanings? " 233 VII, 4 | several meanings? "What a thing is" in one sense means substance 234 VII, 4 | sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others 235 VII, 4 | secondary way, so too "what a thing is" belongs in the simple 236 VII, 4 | quality also is a "what a thing is",-not in the simple sense, 237 VII, 4 | belong, just as "what a thing is" does, primarily and 238 VII, 4 | reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the 239 VII, 4 | meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; 240 VII, 5 | concave nose are the same thing, snub and concave will be 241 VII, 5 | and concave will be the thing; but if snub and concave 242 VII, 5 | snubness apart from the thing of which it is an attribute 243 VII, 5 | snub nose" or the same thing will have been said twice, 244 VII, 5 | that we are saying the same thing twice, as in these instances.) 245 VII, 6 | must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the 246 VII, 6 | concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different 247 VII, 6 | be the substance of each thing.~Now in the case of accidental 248 VII, 6 | a white man are the same thing, as people say, so that 249 VII, 6 | self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily the same as 250 VII, 6 | there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence. 251 VII, 6 | being participated in.)~Each thing itself, then, and its essence 252 VII, 6 | and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know 253 VII, 6 | But indeed not only are a thing and its essence one, but 254 VII, 6 | primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its 255 VII, 6 | be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered 256 VII, 6 | then, in what sense each thing is the same as its essence 257 VII, 7 | mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance.) 258 VII, 7 | reason is that though a thing comes both from its privation 259 VII, 7 | arrangement as a house, the thing is thought to be produced 260 VII, 7 | And so, as there also a thing is not said to be that from 261 VII, 7 | change in that from which a thing comes to be, and not permanence). 262 VII, 8 | present in the sensible thing, is not produced, nor is 263 VII, 8 | the medium in which the thing made will be, and part will 264 VII, 8 | and the whole will be the thing produced, which corresponds 265 VII, 8 | produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from 266 VII, 8 | present, and one part of the thing is matter and the other 267 VII, 8 | not a "this"-a definite thing; but the artist makes, or 268 VII, 9 | of art is produced from a thing which shares its name (as 269 VII, 9 | accident; for the cause of the thing’s producing the product 270 VII, 9 | everything. It is from "what a thing is" that syllogisms start; 271 VII, 10 | as the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula 272 VII, 10 | formula to the part of the thing, the question is already 273 VII, 10 | that which measures another thing in respect of quantity". 274 VII, 10 | consists. If then matter is one thing, form another, the compound 275 VII, 10 | a sense called part of a thing, while in a sense it is 276 VII, 10 | form. (For the form, or the thing as having form, should be 277 VII, 10 | should be said to be the thing, but the material element 278 VII, 10 | are parts of the concrete thing, but not also of the form, 279 VII, 10 | into which as its matter a thing is divided, are posterior; 280 VII, 10 | substance but the concrete thing that is divided into these 281 VII, 10 | being so, to the concrete thing these are in a sense prior, 282 VII, 10 | is the finger of a living thing, but a dead finger is a 283 VII, 10 | we come to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle, i.e. 284 VII, 10 | the animal or the living thing, or the soul of each individual 285 VII, 11 | form, but to the concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain 286 VII, 11 | not possible to define any thing; for definition is of the 287 VII, 11 | will the formula of the thing be evident. In the case 288 VII, 11 | is possible to make one thing the Form-itself of all, 289 VII, 11 | others mean the concrete thing), but if "Socrates" or " 290 VII, 11 | formula (for clearly the thing is one, but in virtue of 291 VII, 11 | in virtue of what is the thing one, although it has parts?),- 292 VII, 11 | contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others 293 VII, 11 | that the essence and the thing itself are in some cases 294 VII, 12 | differentiae (for then the same thing would share in contraries; 295 VII, 12 | they are present in one thing; for on this principle a 296 VII, 12 | all the attributes of a thing. But surely all the attributes 297 VII, 12 | be a formula of some one thing; for substance means a " 298 VII, 12 | be the substance of the thing and its definition, since 299 VII, 12 | shall be saying the same thing more than once-as many times 300 VII, 13 | firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar 301 VII, 13 | belong to more than one thing. Of which individual then 302 VII, 13 | describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two 303 VII, 14 | will be the Idea of one thing and the substance of another; 304 VII, 15 | two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I mean 305 VII, 15 | to something besides the thing defined; e.g. if one were 306 VII, 15 | subject; e.g. if another thing with the stated attributes 307 VII, 16 | that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. 308 VII, 17 | what, i.e. what kind of thing, substance should be said 309 VII, 17 | this form—’why does one thing attach to some other?’ For 310 VII, 17 | something else. Now "why a thing is itself" is a meaningless 311 VII, 17 | or the existence of the thing must already be evident-e. 312 VII, 17 | eclipsed-but the fact that a thing is itself is the single 313 VII, 17 | to answer "because each thing is inseparable from itself, 314 VII, 17 | about the predication of one thing of another. And why are 315 VII, 17 | have the existence of the thing as something given, clearly 316 VII, 17 | matter is some definite thing; e.g. why are these materials 317 VII, 17 | And why is this individual thing, or this body having this 318 VII, 17 | matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance 319 VII, 17 | is the substance of the thing. Evidently, then, in the 320 VII, 17 | else that one will be the thing itself), so that again in 321 VII, 17 | the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. 322 VII, 17 | is the substance of each thing (for this is the primary 323 VII, 17 | hand, is that into which a thing is divided and which is 324 VIII, 1 | it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of 325 VIII, 2 | just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold because it 326 VIII, 2 | substance is the cause of each thing’s being, we must seek in 327 VIII, 3 | a sign for the composite thing, "a covering consisting 328 VIII, 3 | but as related to a single thing. But this question, while 329 VIII, 3 | on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, 330 VIII, 3 | this is the cause of the thing’s being, and if the cause 331 VIII, 3 | rigmarole") but of what sort a thing, e.g. silver, is, they thought 332 VIII, 4 | several matters for the same thing, when the one matter is 333 VIII, 4 | ultimate matter. For one thing comes from another in two 334 VIII, 4 | matter of fact, the same thing can be made of different 335 VIII, 4 | the matter peculiar to the thing.~Regarding the substances 336 VIII, 5 | question how the matter of each thing is related to its contrary 337 VIII, 6 | not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?~Clearly, 338 VIII, 6 | triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a "composition" 339 VIII, 6 | form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and 340 VIII, 6 | cause of unity and of a thing’s being one; for each thing 341 VIII, 6 | thing’s being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential 342 IX, 1 | divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, 343 IX, 1 | as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a "power" of 344 IX, 1 | source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua 345 IX, 1 | another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one 346 IX, 1 | originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively 347 IX, 1 | passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; 348 IX, 1 | to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua 349 IX, 1 | another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue 350 IX, 1 | being acted on is one (for a thing may be "capable" either 351 IX, 1 | different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because 352 IX, 1 | originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and 353 IX, 1 | on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; 354 IX, 1 | And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it 355 IX, 2 | sources of change in another thing or in the artist himself 356 IX, 2 | rational formula explains a thing and its privation, only 357 IX, 2 | do not occur in the same thing, but science is a potency 358 IX, 2 | linked them up with the same thing. And so the things whose 359 IX, 2 | potency of merely doing a thing or having it done to one 360 IX, 2 | former: for he who does a thing well must also do it, but 361 IX, 3 | Megaric school does, that a thing "can" act only when it is 362 IX, 3 | same, and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate), 363 IX, 3 | that it is possible that a thing may be capable of being 364 IX, 3 | walking and yet walk. And a thing is capable of doing something 365 IX, 3 | mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and 366 IX, 4 | not be measured, because a thing may well be capable of being 367 IX, 5 | potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be 368 IX, 6 | actuality-what, and what kind of thing, actuality is. For in the 369 IX, 6 | then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we 370 IX, 6 | capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast 371 IX, 6 | that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, 372 IX, 6 | moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has 373 IX, 7 | 7~What, and what kind of thing, the actual is, may be taken 374 IX, 7 | must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when 375 IX, 7 | there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, 376 IX, 7 | house; if nothing in the thing acted on-i.e. in the matter-prevents 377 IX, 7 | becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing 378 IX, 7 | thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those 379 IX, 7 | seems that when we call a thing not something else but " 380 IX, 7 | but "thaten"-that other thing is always potentially (in 381 IX, 7 | sense of that word) the thing which comes after it in 382 IX, 7 | And if there is a first thing, which is no longer, in 383 IX, 7 | have stated, then, when a thing is to be said to exist potentially 384 IX, 8 | principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded 385 IX, 8 | another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, 386 IX, 8 | something else but in the thing itself qua itself. To all 387 IX, 8 | with a potentially existing thing is to it. I mean that to 388 IX, 8 | by an actually existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician 389 IX, 8 | for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and 390 IX, 8 | exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate 391 IX, 8 | e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other 392 IX, 8 | building is realized in the thing that is being built, and 393 IX, 8 | the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e.g. 394 IX, 8 | act of building is in the thing that is being built and 395 IX, 8 | and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven, and 396 IX, 8 | general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but 397 IX, 8 | perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially. The 398 IX, 8 | either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of 399 IX, 10 | and truth or falsity? A thing of this sort is not composite, 400 IX, 10 | regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental 401 X, 1 | degree; and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, 402 X, 1 | cause of its continuity. A thing is of this sort because 403 X, 1 | so that evidently if a thing has by nature a principle 404 X, 1 | primary sense one extended thing. Some things, then, are 405 X, 1 | it is indivisible if the thing is indivisible in kind or 406 X, 1 | for it is not the same thing to be fire and to be an 407 X, 1 | but while as a particular thing with a nature of its own 408 X, 1 | smaller; so that the first thing from which, as far as our 409 X, 1 | doubtless every continuous thing is divisible.~The measure 410 X, 1 | always homogeneous with the thing measured; the measure of 411 X, 2 | every class is a definite thing, and in no case is its nature 412 X, 2 | comprised neither in "what a thing is" nor in quality, but 413 X, 2 | just to be a particular thing.~ 414 X, 3 | numerically"; again, (2) we call a thing the same if it is one both 415 X, 3 | different from some particular thing in some particular respect, 416 X, 3 | differ. And this identical thing is genus or species; for 417 X, 3 | meaning that identical thing which is essentially predicated 418 X, 4 | so, it is clear that one thing have more than one contrary ( 419 X, 4 | we mean simply that the thing has suffered privation, 420 X, 5 | 5~Since one thing has one contrary, we might 421 X, 5 | but it follows that one thing is contrary to two others, 422 X, 6 | one and ones" or "white thing and white things", or to 423 X, 6 | in numbers as measure to thing measurable; and these are 424 X, 6 | contraries; (2) as knowledge to thing known, a term being called 425 X, 6 | is a number; i.e. if the thing is indivisible it is not 426 X, 6 | measure, and the knowable the thing measured, the fact that 427 X, 7 | more of a quality than one thing and less than another is 428 X, 8 | mean that one identical thing which is predicated of both 429 X, 8 | genus is an element in a thing’s nature), nor is it so 430 X, 8 | in the same genus. For a thing’s difference from that from 431 X, 9 | but those which are in the thing taken as including its matter 432 X, 9 | are other. The concrete thing is other, but not other 433 X, 10 | that every imperishable thing should be different from 434 X, 10 | different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every 435 X, 10 | just as not every pale thing is different in form from 436 X, 10 | in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can 437 X, 10 | dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at 438 X, 10 | or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, 439 X, 10 | essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds 440 X, 10 | consequence of which one thing is perishable and another 441 XI, 1 | of these is the sort of thing which the mathematical sciences 442 XI, 2 | and belongs to no sensible thing.-Further, if there is another 443 XI, 2 | rather a "this"-a separable thing, so that if there is knowledge 444 XI, 2 | apart from the concrete thing (by which I mean the matter 445 XI, 3 | latter is useful to it. And a thing is called healthy in a similar 446 XI, 3 | healthy in a similar way; one thing because it is indicative 447 XI, 3 | in this same way; each thing that is is said to "be" 448 XI, 4 | so far as each particular thing is.-Physics is in the same 449 XI, 5 | truth,-viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same 450 XI, 5 | principle that the same thing cannot be and not be at 451 XI, 5 | signifies more than one thing, it must be made plain to 452 XI, 5 | true-viz. that the same thing can at one and the same 453 XI, 6 | it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and 454 XI, 6 | because often a particular thing appears beautiful to some 455 XI, 6 | things, but a particular thing appears pleasant to some 456 XI, 6 | argue), unless the same thing was at the beginning white 457 XI, 6 | sensation; for the same thing never appears sweet to some 458 XI, 6 | statements about the same thing seems to have arisen largely 459 XI, 6 | in saying that the same thing both is and is not four 460 XI, 7 | the movement is not in the thing done, but rather in the 461 XI, 7 | includes the matter of the thing, but that of "concave" is 462 XI, 7 | there is such a kind of thing in the world, here must 463 XI, 8 | is no science of such a thing; for all science is of that 464 XI, 8 | and the possibility of a thing’s either occurring or not 465 XI, 8 | accidental); and of such a thing the causes are unordered 466 XI, 8 | happens by accident. For as a thing may exist, so it may be 467 XI, 9 | other "downwards", or one thing is "light" and another " 468 XI, 9 | For it is not the same thing to be bronze and to be a 469 XI, 9 | later, is evident. For each thing is capable of being sometimes 470 XI, 9 | reality of both. For while a thing is capable of causing movement 471 XI, 10 | traversed or limited; further, a thing may be infinite in respect 472 XI, 10 | a separate, independent thing. For if it is neither a 473 XI, 10 | infinites; but the same thing cannot be many infinites ( 474 XI, 10 | sense that it is a single thing whether exhibited in distance 475 XI, 11 | which is not a particular thing at all can in no wise be 476 XI, 11 | these are the changes from a thing to its contradictory, it 477 XI, 12 | which was true of the other thing ceases to be true, though 478 XI, 12 | opposed in another way.) A thing changes, then, at the same 479 XI, 12 | into some other definite thing; therefore it will be the 480 XI, 12 | quality, in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or 481 XI, 12 | that at which a changing thing, if it changes continuously 482 XI, 12 | is nothing to prevent a thing of some other class from 483 XI, 12 | is successive; and if a thing is continuous, it touches, 484 XII, 2 | there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, 485 XII, 2 | Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, 486 XII, 2 | potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come 487 XII, 2 | come to be, and not one thing? For "reason" is one, so 488 XII, 3 | something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle 489 XII, 3 | nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man), 490 XII, 3 | apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case 491 XII, 4 | the elements present in a thing are causes, but also something 492 XII, 5 | For in some cases the same thing exists at one time actually 493 XII, 6 | time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute 494 XII, 6 | e.g. as a matter of fact a thing moves in one way by nature, 495 XII, 7 | simple" means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) 496 XII, 7 | complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete 497 XII, 8 | single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides 498 XII, 9 | else, either of the same thing always or of something different. 499 XII, 9 | the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things 500 XII, 9 | who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if