Book, Paragraph

  1   I,  1  |           the case of the sciences just mentioned.~
  2   I,  3  |           the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political
  3   I,  3  |            in each class of things just so far as the nature of
  4   I,  4  |            about what is noble and just, and generally, about the
  5   I,  5  |       prominent types of life—that just mentioned, the political,
  6   I,  6  |      honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness,
  7   I,  7  |           the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a
  8   I,  8  |           but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the
  9   I,  8  |            no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting
 10   I,  12 |            else; for we praise the just or brave man and in general
 11   I,  13 |         objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient
 12  II,  1  |         the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate
 13  II,  1  |            we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
 14  II,  1  |           with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing
 15  II,  4  |         saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and
 16  II,  4  |          must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing
 17  II,  4  |      temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they
 18  II,  4  |   temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as,
 19  II,  4  |            result from often doing just and temperate acts.~Actions,
 20  II,  4  |          Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they
 21  II,  4  |          when they are such as the just or the temperate man would
 22  II,  4  |         man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man
 23  II,  4  |          man who also does them as just and temperate men do them.
 24  II,  4  |          then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is
 25  II,  4  |           doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by
 26 III,  1  |       involuntarily.~Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine
 27 III,  5  |           have to dispute what has just been said, at any rate,
 28 III,  5  |           to be unjust and will be just. For neither does the man
 29 III,  5  |            thrown away his chance, just as when you have let a stone
 30 III,  5  |        from another, but must have just such as it was when given
 31  IV,  3  |           in his case it cannot be just. In the first place, then,
 32   V,  1  |          between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our
 33   V,  1  |      people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly
 34   V,  1  |        justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice
 35   V,  1  |        will be ambiguous; e.g. if "just" is so, that "unjust" will
 36   V,  1  |           and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the
 37   V,  1  |         fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and
 38   V,  1  |            and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts
 39   V,  1  |         lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid
 40   V,  1  |          each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments
 41   V,  1  |           sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and
 42   V,  2  |            and the unfair, and the just into the lawful and the
 43   V,  2  |            and similarly about the just and the unjust. The justice,
 44   V,  2  |           And how the meanings of "just" and "unjust" which answer
 45   V,  2  |          justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (
 46   V,  3  |             the unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men suppose
 47   V,  3  |         equal is intermediate, the just will be an intermediate.
 48   V,  3  |           at least two things. The just, then, must be both intermediate
 49   V,  3  |           involves two things; qua just, it is for certain people.
 50   V,  3  |            for certain people. The just, therefore, involves at
 51   V,  3  |     persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things
 52   V,  3  |         all men agree that what is just in distribution must be
 53   V,  3  |   aristocracy with excellence.~The just, then, is a species of the
 54   V,  3  |       terms will be four); and the just, too, involves at least
 55   V,  3  |         and of B with D is what is just in distribution, and this
 56   V,  3  |            and this species of the just is intermediate, and the
 57   V,  3  |           is intermediate, and the just is proportional. (Mathematicians
 58   V,  3  |            This, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the
 59   V,  3  |        then, is one species of the just.~
 60   V,  4  |      involuntary. This form of the just has a different specific
 61   V,  4  |             equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective justice
 62   V,  4  | intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate,
 63   V,  4  |         will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate,
 64   V,  4  |      reason also that it is called just (sikaion), because it is
 65   V,  4  |           two equal parts (sicha), just as if one were to call it
 66   V,  4  |          neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves,
 67   V,  4  |            nor gain.~Therefore the just is intermediate between
 68   V,  5  |           is without qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said;
 69   V,  5  |      patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and
 70   V,  5  |          are equals and associates just because this equality can
 71   V,  5  |         defined the unjust and the just. These having been marked
 72   V,  5  |            other, it is plain that just action is intermediate between
 73   V,  5  |        that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer,
 74   V,  5  |           choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute
 75   V,  5  |    injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.~
 76   V,  6  |       reciprocal is related to the just; but we must not forget
 77   V,  6  |            for is not only what is just without qualification but
 78   V,  6  |          the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between
 79   V,  6  |           than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign
 80   V,  7  |           the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true
 81   V,  7  |         there is something that is just even by nature, yet all
 82   V,  7  | ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention
 83   V,  7  |    Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by human
 84   V,  7  |         nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related
 85   V,  7  |         act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust by
 86   V,  7  |            general term is rather "just action", and "act of justice"
 87   V,  8  |                             8~Acts just and unjust being as we have
 88   V,  8  |          things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act
 89   V,  8  |          in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice
 90   V,  8  |          said either to do what is just or to act justly, except
 91   V,  8  |      equality. Similarly, a man is just when he acts justly by choice;
 92   V,  9  |          being justly treated; all just action is voluntary, so
 93   V,  9  |           and therefore that being just is easy. But it is not;
 94   V,  9  |          Similarly to know what is just and what is unjust requires,
 95   V,  9  |            not the things that are just, except incidentally); but
 96   V,  9  |            effected in order to be just, to know this is a greater
 97   V,  9  |           is characteristic of the just man no less than of the
 98   V,  9  |        certain state of character, just as to practise medicine
 99   V,  9  |         doing so in a certain way.~Just acts occur between people
100   V,  10 |       relations to justice and the just. For on examination they
101   V,  10 |       something different from the just, is yet praiseworthy; for
102   V,  10 |       praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not
103   V,  10 |            kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being
104   V,  10 |         that it is better than the just. The same thing, then, is
105   V,  10 |           The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while
106   V,  10 |           is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just
107   V,  10 |          just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal
108   V,  10 |             Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind
109   V,  10 |       equitable is, and that it is just and is better than one kind
110   V,  11 |         said. For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance
111   V,  11 |            in a particularized way just as the coward is, not in
112   V,  11 |         but this is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve
113  VI,  2  |         and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.
114  VI,  12 |         mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man,
115  VI,  12 |           are states of character, just as we are none the better
116  VI,  12 |           wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further
117  VI,  12 |            that some people who do just acts are not necessarily
118  VI,  12 |           acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts
119  VI,  13 |        very moment of birth we are just or fitted for selfcontrol
120 VII,  3  |           another sense than those just named is something that
121 VII,  3  |          or drunk. But now this is just the condition of men under
122 VII,  3  |     Empedocles, and those who have just begun to learn a science
123 VII,  4  |          that", e.g. of anger, but just simply. This is confirmed
124 VII,  6  |           acts at which it is most just to be angry are more criminal
125 VII,  7  |           emotion; since some men (just as people who first tickle
126 VII,  10 |            habit is hard to change just because it is like nature,
127 VII,  12 |          some people to be process just because they think it is
128 VII,  13 |            pleasure is essentially just a species of evil.~And (
129 VII,  13 |          from being some pleasure, just as the chief good may be
130 VIII,  1 |       justice, while when they are just they need friendship as
131 VIII,  2 |            no difference; we shall just have to say that this is "
132 VIII,  5 |    character; for love may be felt just as much towards lifeless
133 VIII,  6 |            perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love
134 VIII,  9 |  legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the common
135 VIII,  11|         seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves
136 VIII,  12|         same question as how it is just for them to behave; for
137 VIII,  13|            nor from one who did it just for the sake of acting so-and
138 VIII,  13|           so-and we must settle up just as if we had been benefited
139  IX,  1  |           fix the reward, but also just; for if the other gets in
140  IX,  1  |          law holds that it is more just that the person to whom
141  IX,  2  |          feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as
142  IX,  3  |            the other person, it is just that he should complain
143  IX,  5  |           so is only doing what is just; while he who wishes some
144  IX,  5  |         him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend
145  IX,  6  |          and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous,
146  IX,  6  |           themselves to do what is just.~
147  IX,  8  |         which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that men who
148  IX,  8  |         all things obeys this; and just as a city or any other systematic