Book, Paragraph

  1   I,  2  |  sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of
  2   I,  2  |       for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems
  3   I,  2  |         for a state, that of the state seems at all events something
  4   I,  4  |        us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that
  5   I,  7  |        point; but we must try to state this even more clearly.
  6   I,  7  |        has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of
  7   I,  7  |         this is the case, and we state the function of man to be
  8   I,  7  |        and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they
  9   I,  8  |         possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity.
 10   I,  8  |          or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without
 11   I,  8  |      pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man
 12   I,  10 |          be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary
 13   I,  13 |         also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of
 14  II,  3  |        we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative
 15  II,  6  |        only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say
 16  II,  6  |        but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then,
 17  II,  6  |          of man also will be the state of character which makes
 18  II,  6  |       many.~ ~Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with
 19  II,  7  |        small sums, so there is a state similarly related to proper
 20  II,  7  |        is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard
 21  II,  8  |         both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the
 22  II,  9  |        get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from
 23  II,  9  |     plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised,
 24 III,  1  |          what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences
 25 III,  4  |         appears to him? For each state of character has its own
 26 III,  5  |      somehow responsible for his state of mind, he will also be
 27 III,  7  |  conformity to the corresponding state of character. This is true,
 28 III,  8  |       have proceeded more from a state of character, because less
 29 III,  8  |         in accordance with one’s state of character.~(5) People
 30 III,  12 |         is more like a voluntary state than cowardice. For the
 31 III,  12 |       and desire), but the whole state is less so; for no one craves
 32  IV,  1  |          of the gifts but in the state of character of the giver,
 33  IV,  1  |          move towards the middle state. For he has the characteristics
 34  IV,  1  |       the intermediate and right state. But meanness is both incurable (
 35  IV,  2  |           The deficiency of this state of character is called niggardliness,
 36  IV,  2  |          said at the begining, a state of character is determined
 37  IV,  3  |          whether we consider the state of character or the man
 38  IV,  4  |        at all events this is the state of character that is praised,
 39  IV,  5  |     respect to anger; the middle state being unnamed, and the extremes
 40  IV,  5  |   blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words; for the decision
 41  IV,  5  |        is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy—that in
 42  IV,  5  |         must cling to the middle state.—Enough of the states relative
 43  IV,  6  |      enough, and that the middle state is laudable—that in virtue
 44  IV,  6  |       corresponds to this middle state is very much what, with
 45  IV,  6  |      call a good friend. But the state in question differs from
 46  IV,  7  |       for it is in virtue of his state of character and by being
 47  IV,  8  |         been said.~To the middle state belongs also tact; it is
 48  IV,  9  |       more like a feeling than a state of character. It is defined,
 49  IV,  9  |         feeling rather than of a state of character.~The feeling
 50  IV,  9  |      virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this will be shown later.
 51   V,  1  |          by justice that kind of state of character which makes
 52   V,  1  |      similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly
 53   V,  1  |          contrary objects, but a state of character which is one
 54   V,  1  |           Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary,
 55   V,  1  |         is, as a certain kind of state without qualification, virtue.~
 56   V,  2  |        and a good citizen of any state taken at random.~Of particular
 57   V,  9  |         as a result of a certain state of character is neither
 58   V,  9  |          the result of a certain state of character, just as to
 59   V,  10 |           is equitable, and this state of character is equity,
 60   V,  10 |      justice and not a different state of character.~
 61   V,  11 |         whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For
 62   V,  11 |          also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss
 63   V,  11 |          that he is treating the state unjustly.~Further (b) in
 64   V,  11 |    action implies injustice as a state of character), while being
 65  VI,  1  |           learn what is the best state of each of these two parts;
 66  VI,  2  |          since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with
 67  VI,  2  | productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (
 68  VI,  2  |        and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with
 69  VI,  2  |     intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its
 70  VI,  3  | Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of capacity to demonstrate,
 71  VI,  4  |  reliable); so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different
 72  VI,  4  |      different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence
 73  VI,  4  |        is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make, and
 74  VI,  4  |       any art that is not such a state nor any such state that
 75  VI,  4  |        such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art
 76  VI,  4  |          art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving
 77  VI,  4  |           then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving
 78  VI,  4  |         art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving
 79  VI,  5  |        it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with
 80  VI,  5  |      must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with
 81  VI,  5  |        it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact
 82  VI,  5  |         shown by the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten
 83  VI,  7  |          be the same; for if the state of mind concerned with a
 84  VI,  8  |    practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence
 85  VI,  9  |  excellence in deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains
 86  VI,  12 |          but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none
 87  VI,  12 |         one must be in a certain state when one does the several
 88  VI,  12 |         soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue,
 89  VI,  13 |    difference in action; and his state, while still like what it
 90  VI,  13 |         virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects
 91  VI,  13 |       and its objects add "that (state) which is in accordance
 92  VI,  13 |         divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which
 93  VI,  13 |         For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right
 94  VI,  13 |          the right rule, but the state that implies the presence
 95  VI,  13 |     about all the affairs of the state.~
 96 VII,  1  |       kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state;
 97 VII,  1  |     state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice
 98 VII,  1  |        so neither has a god; his state is higher than virtue, and
 99 VII,  1  |     brute is a different kind of state from vice.~Now, since it
100 VII,  2  |         before he gets into this state, think he ought to act so,
101 VII,  2  |          appetites are good, the state of character that restrains
102 VII,  3  |   related to these (for then his state would be the same as self-indulgence),
103 VII,  3  |        for some people when in a state of opinion do not hesitate,
104 VII,  3  |        it we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility
105 VII,  3  |         by men in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance
106 VII,  3  |        has not when he is in the state of passion, or has it in
107 VII,  3  |        about" as a result of the state of passion), but in that
108 VII,  4  |     owing to a similarity in the state of feeling people apply
109 VII,  5  |    nature is the cause of such a state no one would call incontinent,
110 VII,  5  |      simply. For every excessive state whether of folly, of cowardice,
111 VII,  7  |         possible to be in such a state as to be defeated even by
112 VII,  7  |      softness and endurance. The state of most people is intermediate,
113 VII,  8  |        that the latter is a good state and the former a bad one.~
114 VII,  10 |        which is in excess of the state characteristic of most men;
115 VII,  11 | perceptible process to a natural state, and that no process is
116 VII,  12 |       activity and another being state, the processes that restore
117 VII,  12 |        restore us to our natural state are only incidentally pleasant;
118 VII,  12 |       activity of so much of our state and nature as has remained
119 VII,  12 |         nature is in its settled state as they do when it is being
120 VII,  12 |          activity of the natural state, and instead of "perceptible" "
121 VII,  12 |         practical wisdom nor any state of being is impeded by the
122 VII,  13 |       But since no one nature or state either is or is thought
123 VII,  14 |          excess.~Since we should state not only the truth, but
124 VII,  14 |      true view-therefore we must state why the bodily pleasures
125 VII,  14 |        better to be in a healthy state than to be getting into
126 VII,  14 |          and, besides, a neutral state is painful to many people
127 VIII,  5 |      called good in respect of a state of character, others in
128 VIII,  5 |          a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love may
129 VIII,  5 |        and choice springs from a state of character; and men wish
130 VIII,  5 |     feeling but as a result of a state of character. And in loving
131 VIII,  8 |         come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the
132 VIII,  14|          But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority
133  IX,  6  |        Phoenissae, they are in a state of faction; for it is not
134  IX,  6  |     result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion