Book, Paragraph

 1  II,  3 |       There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance,
 2  II,  3 |         accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and
 3  II,  5 |        feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes
 4  II,  5 |           the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further,
 5  II,  5 |         modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of
 6  II,  6 |           character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the
 7 III,  1 |             for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are
 8 III,  1 |          these gains are worthy of choice, and whose moving principle
 9 III,  2 |    delimited, we must next discuss choice; for it is thought to be
10 III,  2 |            better than actions do.~Choice, then, seems to be voluntary,
11 III,  2 |       voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur
12 III,  2 |          not seem to be right. For choice is not common to irrational
13 III,  2 |        with appetite, but not with choice; while the continent man
14 III,  2 |          on the contrary acts with choice, but not with appetite.
15 III,  2 |            appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite.
16 III,  2 |          pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor
17 III,  2 |         than any others objects of choice.~But neither is it wish,
18 III,  2 |           it seems near to it; for choice cannot relate to impossibles,
19 III,  2 |         relates rather to the end, choice to the means; for instance,
20 III,  2 |            be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things
21 III,  2 |         badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather
22 III,  2 |         get or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being related
23 III,  2 |           not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it, that
24 III,  2 |       voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been
25 III,  2 |          deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle
26 III,  3 |          except that the object of choice is already determinate,
27 III,  3 | deliberation that is the object of choice. For every one ceases to
28 III,  3 |          the people. The object of choice being one of the things
29 III,  3 |        desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire
30 III,  3 |             that we have described choice in outline, and stated the
31 III,  5 |         means must be according to choice and voluntary. Now the exercise
32 III,  8 |      natural, and to be courage if choice and motive be added.~Men,
33   V,  3 |     greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier
34   V,  3 |            and what is worthier of choice a greater good.~This, then,
35   V,  5 |           is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just,
36   V,  6 |            might be not deliberate choice but passion. He acts unjustly,
37   V,  8 |       voluntary acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by
38   V,  8 |           by choice, others not by choice; by choice those which we
39   V,  8 |           others not by choice; by choice those which we do after
40   V,  8 |         after deliberation, not by choice those which we do without
41   V,  8 |           when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man and
42   V,  8 |          if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
43   V,  8 |        just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if he
44   V,  11|           is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative (
45  VI,  2 |           character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate
46  VI,  2 |         concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore
47  VI,  2 |           the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter
48  VI,  2 |             not its final cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire
49  VI,  2 |       cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning
50  VI,  2 |        view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without
51  VI,  2 |         desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason
52  VI,  2 |            is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to
53  VI,  12|           states must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues
54  VI,  12|        must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the
55  VI,  12|   themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question
56  VI,  12|           be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but
57  VI,  13|       question; plain too that the choice will not be right without
58 VII,  3 |            accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought
59 VII,  4 |         while others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit
60 VII,  4 |            necessary but worthy of choice in themselves (e.g. victory,
61 VII,  4 |          of touch and taste-not by choice but contrary to his choice
62 VII,  4 |         choice but contrary to his choice and his judgement, is called
63 VII,  4 |          of them make a deliberate choice while the others do not.~
64 VII,  4 |            are by nature worthy of choice, while others are contrary
65 VII,  4 |           nature a thing worthy of choice for its own sake; yet excesses
66 VII,  6 |             these have no power of choice or calculation, but they
67 VII,  7 |            objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and
68 VII,  7 |            defeated by them but by choice. (Of those who do not choose
69 VII,  7 |  continence is also more worthy of choice than endurance. Now the
70 VII,  8 |       repent; for he stands by his choice; but incontinent man is
71 VII,  8 |        incontinence is contrary to choice while vice is in accordance
72 VII,  8 |         vice is in accordance with choice; not but what they are similar
73 VII,  9 |       every rule and any and every choice, or the man who abides by
74 VII,  9 |            who abides by the right choice, and is he incontinent who
75 VII,  9 |         who abandons any and every choice and any and every rule,
76 VII,  9 |          that is not false and the choice that is right; this is how
77 VII,  9 |         incidentally any and every choice but per se the true rule
78 VII,  9 |            true rule and the right choice by which the one abides
79 VII,  12|          person, but worthy of his choice, and some will not be worthy
80 VII,  12|         some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person,
81 VII,  13|           thing most worthy of our choice; and this activity is pleasure.
82 VII,  14|          appear the more worthy of choice. (a) Firstly, then, it is
83 VIII,  5|           but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from
84 VIII,  5|           love involves choice and choice springs from a state of