Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  13 |            his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which
 2  II,  1  |         confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the
 3  II,  1  |    circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of
 4  II,  1  |              kind; it is because the states of character correspond
 5  II,  2  |     determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced,
 6  II,  3  |            We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure
 7  II,  3  |        define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest;
 8  II,  5  |           kinds—passions, faculties, states of character, virtue must
 9  II,  5  |           pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things
10  II,  5  |       remains is that they should be states of character.~Thus we have
11  II,  6  |             and the definition which states its essence virtue is a
12  II,  7  |             has no name (many of the states have no name), while the
13  II,  7  |     satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly determined.)
14  II,  7  | niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and
15  II,  7  |            us speak of the remaining states according to the method
16  II,  7  |             blame. Now most of these states also have no names, but
17  II,  7  |            envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain
18  II,  7  |             even rejoices. But these states there will be an opportunity
19  II,  7  |           after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds
20  II,  8  |              to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the
21  II,  8  |           the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively
22  II,  8  |            in the other cases.~These states being thus opposed to one
23 III,  5  |              particular objects that states of character are produced
24 III,  5  |           partly responsible for our states of character, and it is
25 III,  5  |              means and that they are states of character, and that they
26 III,  5  |          prescribes. But actions and states of character are not voluntary
27 III,  5  |         control the beginning of our states of character the gradual
28 III,  5  |              this way, therefore the states are voluntary.~Let us take
29 III,  7  |            said previously that many states of character have no names),
30  IV,  2  |           scale than he ought.~These states of character, then, are
31  IV,  5  |          middle state.—Enough of the states relative to anger.~
32  IV,  6  |            and contentious. That the states we have named are culpable
33  IV,  7  |           bad plan to describe these states as well; for we shall both
34   V,  1  |              and the faculties as of states of character. A faculty
35   V,  1  |              its contrary, and often states are recognized from the
36   V,  4  |            intermediate, and in some states they call judges mediators,
37  VI,  1  |           these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned,
38  VI,  1  |            which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate
39  VI,  1  |         necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only
40  VI,  2  |              is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those
41  VI,  3  |         beginning, and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed
42  VI,  3  |           Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul
43  VI,  5  |            at managing households or states. (This is why we call temperance (
44  VI,  6  |           some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have
45  VI,  11 |            what is true.~Now all the states we have considered converge,
46  VI,  11 |            reason.~This is why these states are thought to be natural
47  VI,  12 |              them if the virtues are states of character, just as we
48  VI,  12 |             that in themselves these states must be worthy of choice
49 VII,  1  |              point out that of moral states to be avoided there are
50 VII,  2  |             of the other blameworthy states. Is it then practical wisdom
51 VII,  2  |              is the strongest of all states. But this is absurd; the
52 VII,  5  |            kinds to discover similar states of character to those recognized
53 VII,  5  |               I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female
54 VII,  5  |              told of Phalaris.~These states are brutish, but (B) others
55 VII,  5  |                and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom,
56 VII,  7  |          lean more towards the worse states.~Now, since some pleasures
57 VII,  7  |             the incontinent.) of the states named, then, the latter
58 VII,  9  |              good, both the contrary states must be bad, as they actually
59 VII,  10 |          softness are, and how these states are related to each other.~
60 VII,  12 |            natural constitutions and states of being, and therefore
61 VII,  12 |           without qualification. The states they produce, therefore,
62 VII,  14 |            Is it that where you have states and processes of which there
63 VIII,  1 |         Friendship seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers
64 VIII,  4 |              utility, in which sense states are said to be friendly (
65 VIII,  4 |       friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage),
66 VIII,  13|            friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits arising