Book, Paragraph

  1   I,  1  |           is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the
  2   I,  1  |             and for this reason the good has rightly been declared
  3   I,  2  |            clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will
  4   I,  2  |           be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge
  5   I,  2  |           that this end must be the good for man. For even if the
  6   I,  3  |         knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who
  7   I,  3  |          educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and
  8   I,  3  |            all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence
  9   I,  4  |          every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say
 10   I,  4  |             have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is
 11   I,  4  |           knows all things himself;~Good, he that hearkens when men
 12   I,  5  |             ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure;
 13   I,  5  |            who receives it, but the good we divine to be something
 14   I,  5  |         wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is
 15   I,  6  |       better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what
 16   I,  6  |             numbers); but the term "good" is used both in the category
 17   I,  6  |        these goods. Further, since "good" has as many senses as "
 18   I,  6  |           this is so, neither will "good itself" and particular goods,
 19   I,  6  |        goods, in so far as they are good. But again it will not be
 20   I,  6  |            But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal,
 21   I,  6  |            plausible account of the good, when they place the one
 22   I,  6  |           for themselves are called good by reference to a single
 23   I,  6  |          two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others
 24   I,  6  |           us separate, then, things good in themselves from things
 25   I,  6  |       whether the former are called good by reference to a single
 26   I,  6  |             of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those
 27   I,  6  |             place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing
 28   I,  6  |      nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that
 29   I,  6  |         other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case
 30   I,  6  |          have named are also things good in themselves, the account
 31   I,  6  |      themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something
 32   I,  6  |           distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some
 33   I,  6  |         what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the
 34   I,  6  |           by being derived from one good or by all contributing to
 35   I,  6  |             all contributing to one good, or are they rather one
 36   I,  6  |           even if there is some one good which is universally predicable
 37   I,  6  |           better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them
 38   I,  6  |             though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency
 39   I,  6  |           side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents
 40   I,  6  |          own craft by knowing this "good itself", or how the man
 41   I,  7  |          Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask
 42   I,  7  |          likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for
 43   I,  7  |             we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and
 44   I,  7  |           final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final.
 45   I,  7  |            to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient.
 46   I,  7  |        without being counted as one good thing among others—if it
 47   I,  7  |         that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a
 48   I,  7  |           function or activity, the good and the "well" is thought
 49   I,  7  |            we say "so-and-so-and "a good so-and-so" have a function
 50   I,  7  |            kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without
 51   I,  7  |             the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so
 52   I,  7  |    principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble
 53   I,  7  |             of a good man to be the good and noble performance of
 54   I,  7  |             this is the case, human good turns out to be activity
 55   I,  7  |          serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably
 56   I,  7  |        outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in
 57   I,  8  |      defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The
 58   I,  8  |             a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics
 59   I,  8  |          whether we place the chief good in possession or in use,
 60   I,  8  |         exist without producing any good result, as in a man who
 61   I,  8  |          rightly win, the noble and good things in life.~Their life
 62   I,  8  |           noble actions is not even good; since no one would call
 63   I,  8  |         pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each
 64   I,  8  |           highest degree, since the good man judges well about these
 65   I,  8  |           lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children,
 66   I,  8  |     children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death.
 67   I,  8  |             identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify
 68   I,  9  |           of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly
 69   I,  9  |             certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.~
 70   I,  10 |       discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for
 71   I,  10 |      honours and dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of children
 72   I,  10 |     descendants—some of them may be good and attain the life they
 73   I,  10 |         decorously, if he is "truly good" and "foursquare beyond
 74   I,  10 |         importance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite
 75   I,  10 |          with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out
 76   I,  10 |            For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears
 77   I,  10 |         best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military
 78   I,  10 |           army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the best
 79   I,  11 |       whether the dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from
 80   I,  11 |            even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them,
 81   I,  11 |             from those who are. The good or bad fortunes of friends,
 82   I,  12 |             and in general both the good man and virtue itself because
 83   I,  12 |          praise the strong man, the good runner, and so on, because
 84   I,  12 |            certain way to something good and important. This is clear
 85   I,  12 |          and happy. And so too with good things; no one praises happiness
 86   I,  12 |             the fact that, though a good, it is not praised indicated
 87   I,  12 |            this is what God and the good are; for by reference to
 88   I,  13 |            make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws.
 89   I,  13 |            is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human
 90   I,  13 |           we were seeking was human good and the happiness human
 91   I,  13 |       respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps
 92   I,  13 |          this respect the dreams of good men are better than those
 93  II,  1  |       legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them,
 94  II,  1  |            and it is in this that a good constitution differs from
 95  II,  1  |          playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are
 96  II,  1  |           all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result
 97  II,  1  |            men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This,
 98  II,  2  |              but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry
 99  II,  2  |            and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any
100  II,  3  |              about all of these the good man tends to go right and
101  II,  3  |             is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder.
102  II,  3  |             uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly
103  II,  4  |         even a prospect of becoming good.~But most people do not
104  II,  4  |        philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat
105  II,  5  |           because we are not called good or bad on the ground of
106  II,  5  |           for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor
107  II,  5  |         nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have
108  II,  6  |         excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which
109  II,  6  |           both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence
110  II,  6  |            horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running
111  II,  6  |             both good in itself and good at running and at carrying
112  II,  6  |         character which makes a man good and which makes him do his
113  II,  6  |             so that we often say of good works of art that it is
114  II,  6  |          the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look
115  II,  6  |       Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited),
116  II,  6  |         mean of virtue;~For men are good in but one way, but bad
117  II,  7  |  good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; of the persons at
118  II,  7  |             is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man,
119  II,  7  |        beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful
120  II,  9  |            it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is
121 III,  2  |             for by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain
122 III,  2  |           to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have opinions
123 III,  2  |            a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for
124 III,  2  |            is good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly be
125 III,  2  |             what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do
126 III,  2  |          are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason
127 III,  4  |            some think it is for the good, others for the apparent
128 III,  4  |             others for the apparent good. Now those who say that
129 III,  4  |          Now those who say that the good is the object of wish must
130 III,  4  |           to be so, it must also be good; but it was, if it so happened,
131 III,  4  |          those who say the apparent good is the object of wish must
132 III,  4  |           wish, but only what seems good to each man. Now different
133 III,  4  |             different things appear good to different people, and,
134 III,  4  |         absolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish, but
135 III,  4  |            each person the apparent good; that that which is in truth
136 III,  4  |            an object of wish to the good man, while any chance thing
137 III,  4  |             for bodies which are in good condition, while for those
138 III,  4  |         heavy, and so on; since the good man judges each class of
139 III,  4  |           pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others
140 III,  4  |          pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not. We therefore
141 III,  4  |            choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.~
142 III,  5  |             and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is
143 III,  5  |             men desire the apparent good, but have no control over
144 III,  5  |            and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed
145 III,  5  |              To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears
146 III,  5  |             natural but because the good man adopts the means voluntarily
147 III,  6  |      disgrace; he who fears this is good and modest, and he who does
148 III,  6  |             to be any longer either good or bad for the dead. But
149 III,  9  |             brave but have no other good; for these are ready to
150 III,  11 |              make for health or for good condition, he will desire
151  IV,  1  |      characteristic of virtue to do good than to have good done to
152  IV,  1  |             to do good than to have good done to one, and more characteristic
153  IV,  1  |           that giving implies doing good and doing what is noble,
154  IV,  1  |           and taking implies having good done to one or not acting
155  IV,  3  |           he deserves most, must be good in the highest degree; for
156  IV,  3  |             truly proud man must be good. And greatness in every
157  IV,  3  |           of a proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be
158  IV,  3  |            virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered. Pride,
159  IV,  3  |          are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately
160  IV,  3  |            wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever
161  IV,  3  |            be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained
162  IV,  3  |            superiority in something good is held in greater honour.
163  IV,  3  |       having them; but in truth the good man alone is to be honoured;
164  IV,  3  |             enjoy high position and good fortune, but unassuming
165  IV,  3  |         humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself of
166  IV,  3  |             think himself worthy of good things, and seems also not
167  IV,  3  |         worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not
168  IV,  3  |           and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public,
169  IV,  5  |                                   5~Good temper is a mean with respect
170  IV,  5  |            a name as well, we place good temper in the middle position,
171  IV,  5  |      good-tempered man, then, since good temper is praised. For the
172  IV,  5  |         vengeance or punishment.~To good temper we oppose the excess
173  IV,  6  |          affection added, we call a good friend. But the state in
174  IV,  8  |           to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there
175  IV,  9  |            even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent
176  IV,  9  |             reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for
177  IV,  9  |         that shame is felt, and the good man will never voluntarily
178  IV,  9  |          said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does
179  IV,  9  |    conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he
180  IV,  9  |          bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such
181   V,  1  |            exhibit them; for (A) if good condition is known, bad
182   V,  1  |         also becomes known, and (B) good condition is known from
183   V,  1  |         from the things that are in good condition, and they from
184   V,  1  |     condition, and they from it. If good condition is firmness of
185   V,  1  |         taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person
186   V,  1  |    particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue
187   V,  1  |            that the things that are good absolutely may also be good
188   V,  1  |         good absolutely may also be good for them, and should choose
189   V,  1  |          choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man
190   V,  1  |            thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is directed
191   V,  1  |     graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he is thought
192   V,  1  |            thought to be "another's good", because it is related
193   V,  2  |          the objects with which the good man is concerned.~It is
194   V,  2  |            education for the common good. But with regard to the
195   V,  2  |             without qualification a good man, we must determine later
196   V,  2  |             is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen of
197   V,  2  |         same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken
198   V,  3  |      treated too little, of what is good. In the case of evil the
199   V,  3  |           lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater
200   V,  3  |         what is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of
201   V,  3  |        worthier of choice a greater good.~This, then, is one species
202   V,  4  |             no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad
203   V,  4  |            a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a
204   V,  4  |            one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed
205   V,  4  |          contrary ways; more of the good and less of the evil are
206   V,  5  |            position mere slavery-or good for good-and if they cannot
207   V,  6  |           much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little
208   V,  6  |             himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a
209   V,  6  |          that justice is "another's good"), therefore a reward must
210   V,  9  |             he does not think to be good, but the incontinent man
211   V,  9  |             his share of some other good, e.g. of honour or of intrinsic
212   V,  9  |    achievement than knowing what is good for the health; though even
213   V,  9  |           who participate in things good in themselves and can have
214   V,  10 |          other virtues, instead of "good" meaning by epieikestebon
215   V,  10 |             or the equitable is not good, if they are different;
216   V,  10 |          different; or, if both are good, they are the same.~These,
217   V,  10 |       equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior.
218   V,  11 |           the medical art, and that good condition does in the art
219  VI,  2  |              if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue
220  VI,  2  |       practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth
221  VI,  2  |      practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement
222  VI,  2  |          without a moral state; for good action and its opposite
223  VI,  2  |          which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire
224  VI,  5  |       deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself,
225  VI,  5  |             of thing conduce to the good life in general. This is
226  VI,  5  |            well with a view to some good end which is one of those
227  VI,  5  |       regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while
228  VI,  5  |          itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.
229  VI,  5  |        because they can see what is good for themselves and what
230  VI,  5  |          for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider
231  VI,  5  |           those can do this who are good at managing households or
232  VI,  7  |           Now if what is healthy or good is different for men and
233  VI,  7  |           be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more
234  VI,  7  |        philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.~But if
235  VI,  7  |         have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about
236  VI,  7  |            is without qualification good at deliberating is the man
237  VI,  8  |       judicial. Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one
238  VI,  8  |           think thus seek their own good, and consider that one~ought
239  VI,  8  |       wisdom; yet perhaps one’s own good cannot exist~without household
240  VI,  9  |         things they know about, but good deliberation is a kind of
241  VI,  9  |             well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind
242  VI,  9  |             tends to attain what is good. But (2) it is possible
243  VI,  9  |             possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and
244  VI,  10 |          men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither
245  VI,  10 |           understanding with men of good understanding.) Now understanding
246  VI,  10 |        which men are said to be "of good understanding", viz. from
247  VI,  11 |             of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement
248  VI,  11 |          equities are common to all good men in relation to other
249  VI,  12 |           things just and noble and good for man, but these are the
250  VI,  12 |           which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none
251  VI,  12 |            for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be
252  VI,  12 |             no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to
253  VI,  12 |             all the things that the good man ought), so is it, it
254  VI,  12 |          seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain
255  VI,  12 |           not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts
256  VI,  12 |      practically wise without being good.~
257  VI,  13 |     something else as that which is good in the strict sense-we seek
258  VI,  13 |            it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without
259  VI,  13 |        called without qualification good; for with the presence of
260 VII,  1  |             Hector that he was very good,~For he seemed not, he,~
261 VII,  1  |            be included among things good and praiseworthy, and both
262 VII,  2  |            for if the appetites are good, the state of character
263 VII,  2  |          not all continence will be good; while if they are weak
264 VII,  2  |            opinion, there will be a good incontinence, of which Sophocles’
265 VII,  2  |    incontinence, but judges what is good to be evil and something
266 VII,  2  |      consequence he will do what is good and not what is evil.~(5)
267 VII,  3  |           object; e.g. "dry food is good for every man", and "I am
268 VII,  4  |        victory, honour, wealth, and good and pleasant things of this
269 VII,  4  |             are naturally noble and good, e.g. those who busy themselves
270 VII,  4  |          wicked); for these too are good, and those who busy themselves
271 VII,  8  | considerations that the latter is a good state and the former a bad
272 VII,  9  |       account. Now if continence is good, both the contrary states
273 VII,  10 |          time practically wise, and good in respect of character.
274 VII,  10 |        wicked, since his purpose is good; so that he is half-wicked.
275 VII,  10 |           the right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of
276 VII,  11 |           one thing bad and another good without qualification. Further,
277 VII,  11 |         think that no pleasure is a good, either in itself or incidentally,
278 VII,  11 |             incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the
279 VII,  11 |             that some pleasures are good but that most are bad. (
280 VII,  11 |           even if all pleasures are good, yet the best thing in the
281 VII,  11 |         view that pleasure is not a good at all are (a) that every
282 VII,  11 |          art of pleasure; but every good is the product of some art. (
283 VII,  11 |          that not all pleasures are good are that (a) there are pleasures
284 VII,  12 |      grounds that pleasure is not a good, or even the chief good,
285 VII,  12 |             good, or even the chief good, is plain from the following
286 VII,  12 |          First, since that which is good may be so in either of two
287 VII,  12 |            of two senses (one thing good simply and another good
288 VII,  12 |             good simply and another good for a particular person),
289 VII,  12 |             b) Further, one kind of good being activity and another
290 VII,  12 |           it is in the strict sense good; for they think that activity
291 VII,  12 |            what sense pleasures are good without qualification and
292 VII,  12 |             what sense some are not good; now both the brutes and
293 VII,  13 |           to be avoided and bad, is good. Pleasure, then, is necessarily
294 VII,  13 |              then, is necessarily a good. For the answer of Speusippus,
295 VII,  13 |        contrary both to pain and to good, as the greater is contrary
296 VII,  13 |          does not prevent the chief good from being some pleasure,
297 VII,  13 |         pleasure, just as the chief good may be some form of knowledge
298 VII,  13 |            pleasure. Thus the chief good would be some pleasure,
299 VII,  13 |       misfortunes is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean
300 VII,  13 |           things, some people think good fortune the same thing as
301 VII,  13 |            it is not that, for even good fortune itself when in excess
302 VII,  13 |            then be no longer called good fortune; for its limit is
303 VII,  13 |             being somehow the chief good:~No voice is wholly lost
304 VII,  13 |             our faculties, is not a good, it will not be the case
305 VII,  13 |            pleasure, if it is not a good but the happy man may even
306 VII,  13 |            is neither an evil nor a good, if pleasure is not; why
307 VII,  13 |     Therefore, too, the life of the good man will not be pleasanter
308 VII,  14 |          For the contrary of bad is good. Are the necessary pleasures
309 VII,  14 |             the necessary pleasures good in the sense in which even
310 VII,  14 |            that which is not bad is good? Or are they good up to
311 VII,  14 |            bad is good? Or are they good up to a point? Is it that
312 VII,  14 |       pleasure is thought not to be good for these two reasons, as
313 VII,  14 |         therefore only incidentally good.) (b) Further, they are
314 VII,  14 |            for it is not simple nor good.~We have now discussed continence
315 VII,  14 |         what sense some of them are good and others bad; it remains
316 VIII,  1 |            the same people that are good men and are friends.~Not
317 VIII,  2 |            the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but
318 VIII,  2 |            to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced
319 VIII,  2 |           useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are
320 VIII,  2 |              Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them?
321 VIII,  2 |          then, the good, or what is good for them? These sometimes
322 VIII,  2 |             that each loves what is good for himself, and that the
323 VIII,  2 |           for himself, and that the good is without qualification
324 VIII,  2 |  qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable
325 VIII,  2 |          each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good.
326 VIII,  2 |         good for him but what seems good. This however will make
327 VIII,  2 |           nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would
328 VIII,  2 |            we ought to wish what is good for his sake. But to those
329 VIII,  2 |          But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill,
330 VIII,  2 |            not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these
331 VIII,  3 |    themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each
332 VIII,  3 |             for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those
333 VIII,  3 |        loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships,
334 VIII,  3 |            other hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships
335 VIII,  3 |           friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for
336 VIII,  3 |             alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves.
337 VIII,  3 |        other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who
338 VIII,  3 |         enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and
339 VIII,  3 |          and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification
340 VIII,  3 |       friend, for the good are both good without qualification and
341 VIII,  3 |          they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without
342 VIII,  3 |              and the actions of the good are the same or like. And
343 VIII,  3 |       friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure
344 VIII,  3 |              and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we
345 VIII,  3 |          friends, and that which is good without qualification is
346 VIII,  4 |       resemblance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant
347 VIII,  4 |            sake of utility; for the good are also useful to each
348 VIII,  4 |           friends of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is
349 VIII,  4 |          bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend
350 VIII,  4 |         their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for
351 VIII,  4 |     relation.~The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof
352 VIII,  4 |            oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the feeling
353 VIII,  4 |            the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy
354 VIII,  4 |          sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy the other
355 VIII,  4 |           is in virtue of something good and something akin to what
356 VIII,  4 |          since even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure.
357 VIII,  4 |        respect like each other, but good men will be friends for
358 VIII,  5 |         virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of
359 VIII,  5 |    friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said;
360 VIII,  5 |            is without qualification good or pleasant seems to be
361 VIII,  5 |           each person that which is good or pleasant to him; and
362 VIII,  5 |            pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable
363 VIII,  5 |        lovable and desirable to the good man for both these reasons.
364 VIII,  5 |             friend men love what is good for themselves; for the
365 VIII,  5 |             for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend
366 VIII,  5 |         becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each, then,
367 VIII,  5 |            then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an
368 VIII,  5 |            in the friendship of the good.~
369 VIII,  6 |      greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must, too,
370 VIII,  6 |     continuously, nor even with the Good itself if it were painful
371 VIII,  6 |            being pleasant, are also good, and good for them too;
372 VIII,  6 |        pleasant, are also good, and good for them too; for so they
373 VIII,  6 |           Now we have said that the good man is at the same time
374 VIII,  7 |           us most decisively in all good things. But it is clear
375 VIII,  7 |           and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends
376 VIII,  7 |           for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that
377 VIII,  7 |           saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake,
378 VIII,  7 |             each man wishes what is good.~
379 VIII,  8 |        those who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are
380 VIII,  8 |             it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong
381 VIII,  8 |   intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the
382 VIII,  8 |            what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become
383 VIII,  10|          excels his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs
384 VIII,  10|          the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is clearer in the
385 VIII,  10|             city-all or most of the good things to themselves, and
386 VIII,  11|             his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with
387 VIII,  11|             is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and
388 VIII,  11|         better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits
389 VIII,  12|             to them as to something good and superior; for they have
390 VIII,  12|           especially when these are good), and in general between
391 VIII,  12|          virtue, if the parties are good; for each has its own virtue
392 VIII,  12|         easily); for children are a good common to both and what
393 VIII,  13|            for not only can equally good men become friends but a
394 VIII,  13|            each man desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise
395 VIII,  14|             should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful
396 VIII,  14|           think it is the part of a good friend to help those who
397 VIII,  14|            of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if
398 VIII,  14|             who contributes nothing good to the common stock is not
399 VIII,  14|            power is thought to be a good man. This is why it would
400  IX,  2  |      preference to a friend or to a good man, and should show gratitude
401  IX,  2  |             one whom he knows to be good, while the other makes a
402  IX,  2  |            the one person lent to a good man, expecting to recover
403  IX,  3  |          one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly
404  IX,  3  |             loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can
405  IX,  4  |             wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake
406  IX,  4  |             of these is true of the good man’s relation to himself (
407  IX,  4  |            as they think themselves good; virtue and the good man
408  IX,  4  |     themselves good; virtue and the good man seem, as has been said,
409  IX,  4  |          wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does
410  IX,  4  |            is characteristic of the good man to work out the good),
411  IX,  4  |            good man to work out the good), and does so for his own
412  IX,  4  |            thinks. For existence is good to the virtuous man, and
413  IX,  4  |          man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses to
414  IX,  4  |          even now God possesses the good); he wishes for this only
415  IX,  4  |            hopes for the future are good, and therefore pleasant.
416  IX,  4  |      characteristics belongs to the good man in relation to himself,
417  IX,  4  |       themselves and think they are good, they share in these attributes?
418  IX,  4  |        things they themselves think good, things that are pleasant
419  IX,  4  |          and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can
420  IX,  6  |            unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous
421  IX,  8  |            his own accord-while the good man acts for honour’s sake,
422  IX,  8  |            plain, and also that the good man loves most this part
423  IX,  8  |             of goods.~Therefore the good man should be a lover of
424  IX,  8  |           ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he does;
425  IX,  8  |            best for itself, and the good man obeys his reason. It
426  IX,  8  |           reason. It is true of the good man too that he does many
427  IX,  8  |     therefore assigning the greater good to himself. The same too
428  IX,  8  |            then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility
429  IX,  8  |            men are praised for, the good man is seen to assign to
430  IX,  9  |            have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient
431  IX,  9  |       strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man,
432  IX,  9  |            is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it
433  IX,  9  |      friends than by strangers, the good man will need people to
434  IX,  9  |           things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better
435  IX,  9  |           his days with friends and good men than with strangers
436  IX,  9  |             has the things that are good; nor will he need those
437  IX,  9  |           and being active, and the good man’s activity is virtuous
438  IX,  9  |             friends are pleasant to good men (since these have both
439  IX,  9  |           own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have
440  IX,  9  |           is supremely happy; for a good man qua good delights in
441  IX,  9  |           happy; for a good man qua good delights in virtuous actions
442  IX,  9  |             from the company of the good, as Theognis has said before
443  IX,  9  |     virtuous man. For that which is good by nature, we have said,
444  IX,  9  |             is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself.
445  IX,  9  |           among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves,
446  IX,  9  |             is of the nature of the good; and that which is good
447  IX,  9  |             good; and that which is good by nature is also good for
448  IX,  9  |           is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which
449  IX,  9  |      follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems
450  IX,  9  |          particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for
451  IX,  9  |     pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is
452  IX,  9  |             and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant);
453  IX,  9  |             and particularly so for good men, because to them existence
454  IX,  9  |        because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are
455  IX,  9  |           them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous
456  IX,  9  |           since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that
457  IX,  10 |           is enough.~But as regards good friends, should we have
458  IX,  10 |          obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one cannot have
459  IX,  11 |             we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They
460  IX,  11 |             but it is more noble in good fortune, and so we also
461  IX,  11 |             and so we also seek for good men as our friends, since
462  IX,  11 |         friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in bad,
463  IX,  11 |           their pleasure at our own good fortune. For this cause
464  IX,  11 |        friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent
465  IX,  12 |             while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented
466  IX,  12 |           friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their