Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 1 |       the early philosophers are divided. Some of them assert that
 2   I, 2 |         one and the same moment, divided through and through, even
 3   I, 2 |  divided-not even if it has been divided into innumerable parts,
 4   I, 2 |    innumerable parts, themselves divided innumerable times. Nothing
 5   I, 2 |        through, let it have been divided. What, then, will remain?
 6   I, 2 |      there will be something not divided, whereas ex hypothesis the
 7   I, 2 |         since, when the body was divided into two or more parts,
 8   I, 2 |       that, as the body is being divided, a minute section-a piece
 9   I, 2 |        consideration. If, having divided a piece of wood or anything
10   I, 2 |        wood, therefore, has been divided potentially through and
11   I, 2 |   actually both (indivisible and divided), but that it would be simultaneously
12   I, 2 |          would be simultaneously divided at any and every point.
13   I, 2 |   obvious that a body is in fact divided into separable magnitudes
14   I, 2 |         a body be simultaneously divided at every point, for that
15   I, 2 |       that the magnitude must be divided away into nothing. For it
16   I, 8 |          i.e. a plenum, and part divided? Further, they maintain,
17   I, 9 |  difference between "having been divided into parts which remain
18   I, 9 |       though it has not yet been divided, it will be in a state of
19   I, 9 |  dividedness-since, as it can be divided, nothing inconceivable results.
20   I, 10| combining constituents have been divided into parts so small, and
21   I, 10|         No body, however, can be divided into its "least" parts:
22   I, 10|   impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is
23   I, 10|     combine: for they are easily divided into small particles, since
24  II, 9 | come-to-be: for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become