Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 4| something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), as
 2   I, 6|      things which are such as to touch one another; nor can things
 3   I, 6|    Assuming, therefore, that "to touch" is-as we have defined it
 4   I, 6|           only those things will touch one another which, being
 5   I, 6|     opposites), all things which touch one another will have "weight"
 6   I, 6|         are by nature such as to touch one another, which (being
 7   I, 6|   interpreted in one sense, will touch the things which are "such
 8   I, 6|        them"-while they will not touch them, if the description
 9   I, 6|         and also evidently does, touch something which reciprocally
10   I, 6|      express it-for A "merely to touch" B, and that which touches
11   I, 6|      that which touches need not touch a something which touches
12   I, 6|       itself being moved, it may touch the "moved" and yet itself
13   I, 6|    touches" us, but not that we "touch" him.~The account just given
14  II, 2|          which the perception is touch; it is clear that not all
15  II, 2|        those which correspond to touch. For it is in accordance
16  II, 2|       And yet vision is prior to touch, so that its object also
17  II, 2|        is prior to the object of touch. The object of vision, however,
18  II, 2| naturally prior to the object of touch.~Accordingly, we must segregate
19  II, 2|     Contrarieties correlative to touch are the following: hot-cold,
20  II, 4|      qualities of the objects of touch. Consequently, we must explain (