Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2|     clear as we proceed. For to suppose that a body (i.e. a magnitude)
 2   I, 2|         make any magnitude.~But suppose that, as the body is being
 3   I, 2|        division? For even if we suppose there is some quality, yet
 4   I, 2|        It is wrong, however, to suppose, as some assert, that coming-to-be
 5   I, 2| philosophers we are criticizing suppose that all such change is "
 6   I, 3|       coming-to-be" (whether we suppose it to occur out of what
 7   I, 3|       so that we should have to suppose there is only one kind of
 8   I, 3|      privation, is "not real". (Suppose, e.g. that "the hot" is
 9   I, 4|    change will be "alteration." Suppose, e.g. that the musical man
10   I, 5|         be magnitude. Are we to suppose that body and magnitude
11   I, 5|          It is as if we were to suppose that when, e.g. air comes-to-be
12   I, 5|       It is therefore better to suppose that in all instances of
13   I, 5|        is a greater tendency to suppose that a corpse still possesses
14   I, 8|        frequent and serial they suppose its pores to be. Such was
15   I, 8|          one") and a void. For (suppose that the universe is discretes-in-contact.
16   I, 8|         out of his senses as to suppose that fire and ice are "one":
17   I, 8|      any body", it is absurd to suppose there is a "minute" void
18  II, 5|        source"-as some thinkers suppose that Air is transformed
19  II, 6|   something. On the other hand, suppose (ii) they are not "comparable
20  II, 7|        reciprocal-who refuse to suppose that any one of the "elements"