Book, Paragraph

  1   I, 1 |    predicable uniformly of all the things that come-to-be and pass-away
  2   I, 1 |        i.e. those who generate all things out of one thing) are bound
  3   I, 1 |       those who make the matter of things more than one must distinguish
  4   I, 1 |            then, who construct all things out of a single element,
  5   I, 1 |         make the ultimate kinds of things more than one, must maintain
  6   I, 1 |           single element; i.e. all things which admit of change into
  7   I, 1 |         substratum of the changing things is one, there is "alteration".~
  8   I, 1 |         contrary that they are the things out of which everything
  9   I, 1 |           the entirety of existing things, except Strife, together
 10   I, 1 |          they can be "attached" to things and can again be "separated"
 11   I, 2 |         the conditions under which things come-to-be and pass-away,
 12   I, 2 |         the other similar compound things, come-to-be; nor again did
 13   I, 2 |         growth are attributable to things.~A similar criticism applies
 14   I, 2 |          have made. They said that things grow "by the accession of
 15   I, 2 |             and (ii) that, whereas things "alter" by change of their
 16   I, 2 |         difficulties, is this: "Do things come-to-be and "alter" and
 17   I, 2 |             for, according to him, things get coloured by "turning"
 18   I, 3 |            is an attribute of some things". For qualified coming-to-be
 19   I, 3 |           be offered: In one sense things come-to-be out of that which
 20   I, 3 |          If, then, some one of the things "which are" constantly disappearing,
 21   I, 3 |         they occur in all existing things alike. Yet, if the same
 22   I, 3 | coming-to-be of that, why are some things said to come-to-be and pass-away
 23   I, 3 |   Parmenides: for he says that the things into which change takes
 24   I, 3 |          postulate these, or other things of a similar kind, makes
 25   I, 3 |     perceive, so too they deem the things to "be" qua perceived or
 26   I, 3 |      perception which explains why things are commonly said to "pass-away"
 27   I, 3 | perceptible.~(ii) But why are some things said to "come to-be" without
 28   I, 3 |         been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally
 29   I, 3 |           than this:-why, when two things change reciprocally into
 30   I, 3 |           the Categories. For some things signify a this somewhat,
 31   I, 3 |            others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify
 32   I, 3 |      Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of "coming-to-be"
 33   I, 3 |            have explained why some things come to-be without qualification,
 34   I, 3 |         and also when the changing things are substances and nothing
 35   I, 3 |      coming-to-be continues though things are constantly being destroyed.
 36   I, 5 | diminishing in each and all of the things that grow and diminish.~
 37   I, 5 |           something common to both things (to that which is coming-to-be
 38   I, 5 |         these organic parts). Such things come-to-be, then, by the
 39   I, 6 |        compounds: those who derive things from a single element are
 40   I, 6 |            argues that "unless all things were derived from one, reciprocal
 41   I, 6 |            and passion between two things, that which underlies them
 42   I, 6 |           not true to say that all things are of this character: but
 43   I, 6 |   character: but it is true of all things between which there is reciprocal
 44   I, 6 |             can only occur between things which are such as to touch
 45   I, 6 |         touch one another; nor can things enter into combination at
 46   I, 6 |    definite account of these three things—of "contact", "combination",
 47   I, 6 |           us start as follows. All things which admit of "combination"
 48   I, 6 |            same is true of any two things, of which one "acts" and
 49   I, 6 |        derivation in the different things to which it is applied:
 50   I, 6 |       proper sense applies only to things which have "position". And "
 51   I, 6 |    position" belongs only to those things which also have a Place":
 52   I, 6 |       contact" to the mathematical things, we must also attribute "
 53   I, 6 |     extremes together", only those things will touch one another which,
 54   I, 6 |     position belongs only to those things which also have a "place",
 55   I, 6 |           pairs of opposites), all things which touch one another
 56   I, 6 |       Hence it is clear that those things are by nature such as to
 57   I, 6 |           be applied only to those things whose motion is a "qualitative
 58   I, 6 |            any rate, is clear: the things which are "such as to impart
 59   I, 6 |          one sense, will touch the things which are "such as to be
 60   I, 6 |           the relation between two things which, having position,
 61   I, 6 |           the relation between two things, one able to impart motion
 62   I, 6 |       contact" which occurs in the things of Nature.~
 63   I, 7 |          the contrary, even if two things, being "others", do act
 64   I, 7 |           or black: for unless two things either are, or are composed
 65   I, 7 |         But (iii) since only those things which either involve a "
 66   I, 7 |            contraries"-and not any things selected at random-are such
 67   I, 7 |       action and passion are, what things exhibit them, why they do
 68   I, 8 |       Moreover, according to them, things are seen through air and
 69   I, 8 |           there is nothing to keep things apart. And in this respect,
 70   I, 8 |            and the multiplicity of things. He made these concessions
 71   I, 8 |        other philosophers say that things suffer action through their
 72   I, 8 |           the manner in which some things "act" while others "suffer
 73   I, 8 |       then-even without pores-some things will "suffer action" and
 74   I, 9 |           explain the way in which things in fact possess the power
 75   I, 9 |            then, to establish that things generate and are generated,
 76   I, 10|       which can "combine"? Of what things, and under what conditions,
 77   I, 10|     properties" and "states" with "things": for we see them persisting
 78   I, 10|         that "once upon a time all things were together and combined".
 79   I, 10|   existence.)~Since, however, some things are-potentially while others
 80   I, 10|          Now, as we maintain, some things are such as to act and others
 81   I, 10|           one another; while other things, viz. agents which have
 82   I, 10|            patients. Amongst those things, however, which are reciprocally
 83   I, 10|     combined with bronze. For some things display a hesitating and
 84   I, 10|            upon the fact that some things are such as to be (a) reciprocally
 85   I, 10|         easily divisible. For such things can be "combined" without
 86  II, 1 |            are attributable to the things which undergo natural change.
 87  II, 1 |   coming-to-be and passing-away of things. (Some, for instance, postulate
 88  II, 1 |        them, as gold underlies the things that are fashioned of gold. (
 89  II, 1 |          itself open to criticism. Things which come-to-be and pass-away
 90  II, 2 |            active nor susceptible. Things are not called "heavy" and "
 91  II, 2 |          suffer action from, other things. But the "elements" must
 92  II, 2 |            that which "associates" things of the same kind (for "dissociating",
 93  II, 2 |         function, is "associating" things of the same class, since
 94  II, 2 |      homogeneous and heterogeneous things alike. And moise is that
 95  II, 5 |          to the assertion that all things are made of Fire or Earth.
 96  II, 6 |           by addition that growing things are believed to increase.
 97  II, 6 |          occurs in nature. For the things which come-to-be by natural
 98  II, 6 |            these occurrences": for things can be "mingled" fortuitously.~
 99  II, 6 |            the coming-to-be of the things which owe their existence
100  II, 6 |          that "Love and Strife set things moving, unless the very
101  II, 7 |           them. How, then, do such things come to-be? For (a) how
102  II, 9 |                       9~Since some things are such as to come-to-be
103  II, 9 | originative sources", then, of the things which come-to-be are equal
104  II, 9 |            the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the
105  II, 9 |            not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than
106  II, 9 |            account for the primary things.~Now cause, in the sense
107  II, 9 |           material origin, for the things which~are such as to come-to-be
108  II, 9 |          is not. (For~whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the
109  II, 9 |        necessity, viz. the eternal things,~others of necessity are
110  II, 9 |           And of these two sets of things, since~they cannot diverge
111  II, 9 |            the second to~he. Other things, however, can both be and
112  II, 9 |            material origin for~the things which are such as to come-to-be;
113  II, 9 |           lays it down; that "some things are Forms, others Participants
114  II, 9 |          greater part in bringing, things into being; and we are everywhere
115  II, 9 |        This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and
116  II, 9 |       enable these bodies to bring things into being-with too instrumental
117  II, 9 |   carpentry) as "the cause" of the things that come-to-be: for the
118  II, 9 |          Fire is active, i.e. sets things moving, there is a further
119  II, 9 |            manner in which it sets things moving.~
120  II, 10|         and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert
121  II, 10|            several kinds of living things have a number by which they
122  II, 10|           an Order controlling all things, and every time (i.e. every
123  II, 10| Nevertheless it Often happens that things pass-away in too short a
124  II, 10|        intermingling" by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away
125  II, 10|   irregular" coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other
126  II, 10|          the passing-away of other things.~Coming-to-be and passing-away
127  II, 10|          on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always
128  II, 10|            not-being": but not all things can possess "being", since
129  II, 10|           all the other things-the things, I mean, which are reciprocally
130  II, 11|     general principle) amongst the things which "are" some are capable
131  II, 11|        necessary.~Then are all the things that come-to-be of this
132  II, 11|          field of "being", between things that cannot possibly "not-be"
133  II, 11|       cannot possibly "not-be" and things that can "not-be"? For instance,
134  II, 11|            the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical, it is "necessary"
135  II, 11|            the coming-to-be of any things is "necessary", their coming-to-be
136  II, 11|        motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular.
137  II, 11|            so in their turn do the things whose coming-to-be the seasons
138  II, 11|         initiate.~Then why do some things manifestly come to-be in
139  II, 11|           by inquiring whether all things "return upon themselves"
140  II, 11|           it is evident that those things, whose "substance"-that
141  II, 11|          which undergoes it. Those things, on the other hand, whose "
142  II, 11|          this does not happen with things whose "substance" comes-to-be-whose "