Book,  Paragraph

  1   I,  1 |        present grounds, appear. One thing, however, is clear. We cannot
  2   I,  2 |          then, that there is such a thing as simple movement, and
  3   I,  2 |       contrary of the natural and a thing can have no more than one
  4   I,  2 |       circular motion. But a single thing has a single contrary; and
  5   I,  2 |             the circle is a perfect thing. This cannot be said of
  6   I,  3 |            the centre. The heaviest thing will be that which sinks
  7   I,  3 |         both relatively to the same thing: for things are heavy and
  8   I,  5 |          can. There is then no such thing as an infinite sphere or
  9   I,  6 |          point. If there is no such thing as infinite weight, then
 10   I,  6 |          weight, if there is such a thing, being, on the one hand,
 11   I,  7 |           if it is impossible for a thing to have come to be white,
 12   I,  7 |            is thus impossible for a thing to be moving to a place
 13   I,  7 |             is shown that no finite thing possesses infinite power,
 14   I,  7 |     infinite power, and no infinite thing finite power.) If then that
 15   I,  7 |           movement is impossible. A thing must move either naturally
 16   I,  7 |           Again, a place in which a thing rests or to which it moves
 17   I,  8 |      naturally and by constraint. A thing moves naturally to a place
 18   I,  8 |    constraint. On the other hand, a thing moves by constraint to a
 19   I,  8 |          make whether we say that a thing is this distance away or
 20   I,  9 |           form of the sphere is one thing and the gold or bronze sphere
 21   I,  9 |             the circle again is one thing, the bronze or wooden circle
 22   I,  9 |       example beside the particular thing. This may, of course, sometimes
 23   I,  9 |           matter, i.e. a particular thing. Now since the universe
 24   I,  9 |        could there arise, any other thing that was aquiline. Similarly,
 25   I,  9 |             general rule is this: a thing whose essence resides in
 26   I,  9 |           particular and a material thing: if however, it is composed
 27   I,  10|            be destroyed. Further, a thing whose present state had
 28   I,  10|             unordered; and the same thing cannot be at the same time
 29   I,  11|              does not exist; such a thing is ungenerated in the sense
 30   I,  11|            generation such that the thing now is which then was not.
 31   I,  11|           is untrue to say that the thing can ever come into being,
 32   I,  11|           destruction such that the thing which now is later ceases
 33   I,  11|           it is impossible that the thing should be destroyed, i.e.
 34   I,  11|             the limit or maximum. A thing, then, which is within it.
 35   I,  11|            is of the maximum, and a thing said, with reference to
 36   I,  12|            the sequel. If there are thing! capable both of being and
 37   I,  12|         every category, whether the thing is, for example, "man",
 38   I,  12|       possible for one and the same thing to exist for infinite time
 39   I,  12|           absolutely. Now it is one thing to be absolutely false,
 40   I,  12|       absolutely false, and another thing to be absolutely impossible.
 41   I,  12|             Thus it is not the same thing to make a false and to make
 42   I,  12|            the other also. But if a thing has for infinite time more
 43   I,  12|            must coincide. Thus if a thing which exists for infinite
 44   I,  12|    impossible that one and the same thing should be capable of always
 45   I,  12|         Thus it is impossible for a thing always to exist and yet
 46   I,  12|      predicable of one and the same thing, and thus that, intermediate
 47   I,  12|     therefore sometimes is not. One thing, then, will have the power
 48   I,  12|            being present in any one thing together, while either A
 49   I,  12|            of time during which the thing is and another during which
 50   I,  12|        never predicated of the same thing but one or other of everything,
 51   I,  12|            always existing, was the thing destroyed, why, after an
 52   I,  12|           generated or destructible thing existed for an infinite
 53   I,  12|           every moment, so that the thing will have for an infinite
 54   I,  12|            all time, even while the thing was as yet ungenerated and
 55   I,  12|       impossible it is either for a thing which is generated to be
 56   I,  12|            indestructible, or for a thing which is ungenerated and
 57   I,  12|         capacity, the matter of the thing being the cause equally
 58   I,  12|           cannot truly be said of a thing now that it exists last
 59  II,  1 |            some immortal and divine thing which possesses movement,
 60  II,  1 |        other movement. A limit is a thing which contains; and this
 61  II,  2 |             to mean that part, in a thing capable of movement, from
 62  II,  2 |     themselves. For in no inanimate thing do we observe a part from
 63  II,  4 |       previously defined, we mean a thing outside which no part of
 64  II,  4 |        finish which no manufactured thing nor anything else within
 65  II,  7 |            presumption being that a thing is composed of the same
 66  II,  12|            their ultimate good. One thing then has and enjoys the
 67  II,  12|          the end, there will be one thing that always possesses health,
 68  II,  13|            befits the most precious thing: but fire, they say, is
 69  II,  13|           the same with that of the thing or the natural centre. But
 70  II,  13|             same effect on the same thing.~Further, against Empedocles
 71  II,  13|             in the place to which a thing naturally moves, it will
 72  II,  13|            motion,-why, I mean, one thing, if nothing stops it, moves
 73  II,  13|           it, moves up, and another thing to the centre. Again, their
 74  II,  13|       indeed, to be the case that a thing to which movement this way
 75  II,  14|            fixed stars. Yet no such thing is observed. The same stars
 76  II,  14|            constraint. For a single thing has a single movement, and
 77  II,  14|       single movement, and a simple thing a simple: contrary movements
 78  II,  14|           cannot belong to the same thing, and movement away from
 79  II,  14|            of this motion is that a thing which possesses weight is
 80 III,  1 |     substance is either a body or a thing which cannot come into existence
 81 III,  1 |         solidity, except one single thing which persists as the basis
 82 III,  1 |         divisible in an indivisible thing, but the attributes of bodies
 83 III,  1 |       impossible, if two parts of a thing have no weight, that the
 84 III,  1 |           weight. For while a heavy thing may always be heavier than
 85 III,  1 |          than something and a light thing lighter than something,
 86 III,  1 |           lighter than something, a thing which is heavier or lighter
 87 III,  1 |           or light, just as a large thing is larger than others, but
 88 III,  1 |       larger is not always large. A thing which, judged absolutely,
 89 III,  1 |             which is heavy. A heavy thing therefore is always divisible.
 90 III,  1 |  consequence is easy to draw. For a thing is soft if its surface can
 91 III,  1 |         superior in weight to it, a thing which has weight. But the
 92 III,  2 |         always one. For naturally a thing moves in one way, while
 93 III,  2 |           not happen. So the moving thing must stop somewhere, and
 94 III,  2 |         they must move, and a moved thing which has no natural impetus
 95 III,  2 |             greater since the heavy thing must move further. Let the
 96 III,  2 |       source of movement within the thing itself, while a force is
 97 III,  3 |             and aither are the same thing.) But since every natural
 98 III,  5 |    greatness and smallness, since a thing with small parts is fine
 99 III,  5 |           small parts is fine and a thing with large parts coarse.
100 III,  5 |           out widely is fine, and a thing composed of small parts
101 III,  6 |             all. A place in which a thing is at rest is a place in
102 III,  7 |          one of excretion. The same thing happens again when the residue
103 III,  7 |           this of every perceptible thing. For any one who gives each
104  IV,  3 |            form, and the place of a thing, and in each it is observable
105  IV,  3 |          its object fortuitous: the thing altered is different from
106  IV,  3 |       altered is different from the thing increased, and precisely
107  IV,  3 |            But since the place of a thing is the boundary of that
108  IV,  3 |             in the other cases. One thing changes in quality, another
109  IV,  3 |            and so in place, a light thing goes upward, a heavy thing
110  IV,  3 |          thing goes upward, a heavy thing downward. The only difference
111  IV,  3 |          may be. And since the same thing which is healable is also
112  IV,  3 |              and in the case of the thing healed, when nothing stays
113  IV,  3 |             or off which the moving thing rebounded, as was explained
114  IV,  5 |                                 5~A thing then which has the one kind
115  IV,  5 |        always moves upward, while a thing which has the opposite matter
116  IV,  5 |            little water. But such a thing has never been observed
117  IV,  6 | instance-sink down; and sometimes a thing floats because it is small,
118  IV,  6 |          force applied by the heavy thing towards disruption and division
119  IV,  6 |           if the force of the heavy thing is the weaker, will it ride