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 1 4 |   independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though
 2 9 |            Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it
 3 9 |        now, it was true before to say that it would be white,
 4 9 |       place it was always true to say "it is" or "it will be".
 5 9 |          if it was always true to say that a thing is or will
 6 9 |           be necessary.~Again, to say that neither the affirmation
 7 9 |         true, maintaining, let us say, that an event neither will
 8 9 |       Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was both white
 9 9 |      place, it was always true to say that it would be.~Yet this
10 9 |        other false, but we cannot say determinately that this
11 10|           in its meaning. Thus we say "man is white" and "white
12 11|         composite proposition and say that he is a good shoemaker.
13 11|          Thus it will be right to say that he is a white man so
14 11|           times. Similarly we may say that Socrates is Socrates
15 11|           yet, if it were true to say that that which is white
16 11|          the two propositions and say simply that he is a good
17 11|           animal" and "biped" and say that a man is an animal
18 11|          any one instance, and to say that some one particular
19 11| proposition "Homer is so-and-so", say "a poet"; does it follow
20 11|         is not, it is not true to say that because it is the object
21 12|          it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood is
22 12|            not-man walks"; for to say "man walks" merely equivalent
23 13|           realized, it is true to say that it is not impossible