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 1 1 |        those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech.
 2 1 |         terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this,
 3 2 |         form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun
 4 2 |         they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.~
 5 4 |          sentence, but is neither true nor false.~Let us therefore
 6 7 |      under such circumstances, be true. The proposition "every
 7 7 |       both propositions cannot be true, but the contradictories
 8 7 |  contraries can sometimes both be true with reference to the same
 9 7 |           men are white’ are both true. Of such corresponding positive
10 7 |  universal character, one must be true and the other false. This
11 7 |       always the case that one is true and the other false, for
12 7 |      necessarily at the same time true or false.~It is evident
13 7 |       always the case that one is true and the other false. We
14 8 |         the negative forms may be true or false simultaneously.~
15 9 |     positive or negative, must be true or false. Again, in the
16 9 |            one of the two must be true and the other false; whereas
17 9 |   positive or negative are either true or false, then any given
18 9 |        the future.~Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white,
19 9 |        the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not
20 9 |      stating that it is white was true; if it is not white, the
21 9 |           the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white,
22 9 |         or denials must be either true or false.~Now if this be
23 9 |        thing is white now, it was true before to say that it would
24 9 |         taken place it was always true to say "it is" or "it will
25 9 |         be". But if it was always true to say that a thing is or
26 9 |     affirmation nor the denial is true, maintaining, let us say,
27 9 |       untrue. Secondly, if it was true to say that a thing was
28 9 |          individuals, one must be true and the other false, and
29 9 |     prediction about an event was true, then through all time it
30 9 |        takes place, it was always true to say that it would be.~
31 9 |        the affirmation is no more true and no more false than the
32 9 |         in such instances must be true and the other false, but
33 9 |       indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot
34 9 |         cannot be either actually true or actually false. It is
35 9 |        and a denial one should be true and the other false. For
36 10|      diagonal line should both be true; though under certain circumstances
37 10|   propositions will never both be true at the same time or with
38 10|           contraries will both be true, as in the instance before
39 10|        animals are just" are both true.~Further, the proposition "
40 10|         are just"; for if this be true, there must be some just
41 10|        the negative answer is the true one, a certain positive
42 10|      positive proposition is also true. Thus, if the question were
43 10|          negative answer were the true one, the positive inference "
44 10|      denial must always be either true or false, and he that uses
45 10|      rather further from making a true or a false statement than
46 11|           the answer asked for is true.~At the same time it is
47 11|      subject. Nor yet, if it were true to say that that which is
48 11|           which is not, it is not true to say that because it is
49 12|           negative proposition is true of any subject, it will
50 12|         subject, it will turn out true to say that a piece of wood
51 12|     negative propositions will be true; for that which is capable
52 12|       propositions should both be true of the same subject, it
53 12|           cannot be" can never be true of the same subject at the
54 12|         cannot not be" be at once true of the same subject.~The
55 12|           is not necessary.~It is true. It is not true.~
56 12|  necessary.~It is true. It is not true.~
57 13|         these propositions may be true of the same subject; for
58 13|        two former propositions is true, the twofold possibility
59 13|           it may be". For this is true also of that which must
60 13|       necessarily realized, it is true to say that it is not impossible
61 14|          therefore consider which true judgement is the contrary
62 14|         me illustrate. There is a true judgement concerning that
63 14|      these two is contrary to the true? And if they are one and
64 14|          as the contraries of the true judgement those which opine
65 14|         be termed contrary to the true judgements, in which error
66 14|           is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really
67 14|          judgement is most really true, which concerns the subject’
68 14|        judgement which denies the true judgement is more really
69 14|          which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived,
70 14| judgements one is contrary to the true judgement, but that which
71 14|         forms the negative of the true; for instance, he who thinks
72 14|          form the contrary of the true judgement that that which
73 14|          meet the case, since two true judgements are never contrary
74 14|           this judgement might be true at the same time as that
75 14|            both judgements may be true. Nor is the judgement that
76 14|   contrary, for this too might be true, since both qualities might
77 14|       evident, also, that neither true judgements nor true propositions
78 14|       neither true judgements nor true propositions can be contrary
79 14|         when two propositions are true, a man may state both at