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 1 6|    a practical end, not the good in its whole extent. For
 2 6| must suppose that a seeming good may take the room of actual
 3 6|     take the room of actual good, and so may the pleasant,
 4 6|   which is itself a seeming good. From these considerations
 5 6|     the truly and primarily good (which is not at one time
 6 6|    which is not at one time good, at another time not good),
 7 6|   good, at another time not good), is too divine and precious
 8 7|  Again, I ought to create a good, a house is good: straightway
 9 7|   create a good, a house is good: straightway I make a house.
10 7|    are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible.~And
11 7|   for example if walking is good for man, one does not dwell