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 1 4 |     ambiguity. "Those learn who know: for it is those who know
 2 4 |       know: for it is those who know their letters who learn
 3 8 |                      8~Since we know on how many points apparent
 4 8 |  apparent syllogisms depend, we know also on how many sophistical
 5 8 |        these arguments.~That we know them by the same line of
 6 10|        considered, and does not know or suppose that there is
 7 11|     number of people who do not know what is or is not possible
 8 11|  subject which a man may indeed know without knowing the theory
 9 11|          but which if he do not know, he is bound to be ignorant
10 11|         of those who profess to know things. What serves them
11 11|    general principles: for they know these of themselves just
12 16|       to questions: for what we know, we often do not know in
13 16|        we know, we often do not know in a different context.
14 16|       in refutations, though we know the thing on which the connexion
15 19|        not understand what they know? "Yes, but not those who
16 19|          Yes, but not those who know it in the manner described":
17 19|    thing to say that "those who know cannot understand what they
18 19|     cannot understand what they know", and to say that "those
19 19|      and to say that "those who know something in this particular
20 20|    Euthydemus proving "Then you know now in Sicily that there
21 20|         evil is a good thing to know." "Yes. But, you see, evil
22 23|      die by itself." Does a man know either by learning or by
23 24|   depend upon Accident. "Do you know what I am going to ask you?
24 24|        am going to ask you? you know the man who is approaching",
25 24|    Coriscus", so that suppose I know Coriscus, but do not know
26 24|       know Coriscus, but do not know the man who is approaching,
27 24|      isn’t the case that I both know and do not know the same
28 24|     that I both know and do not know the same man; nor, again,
29 24|      say that it is possible to know and not to know the same
30 24|     possible to know and not to know the same thing, only not
31 24|    accordingly, when they don’t know the man who is coming towards
32 24|     coming towards them, but do know Corsicus, they assert that
33 24|        they assert that they do know and don’t know the same
34 24|     that they do know and don’t know the same object, but not
35 24|      true and it is possible to know and not to know the same
36 24|     possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet with
37 24|       figure is approaching. To know and not to know the same
38 24| approaching. To know and not to know the same thing is generally
39 24|         for in that way he does know and not know the same thing,
40 24|        way he does know and not know the same thing, though not
41 26|        man who knows A to be A, know the thing called A?" and
42 32|      not even be Greek. "Do you know this?" "Yes." "But this
43 32|       this is he: therefore you know he". No: rather "this" has
44 32|         same meaning in "Do you know this?" as in "This is a
45 34|         confess that he did not know. We have made clear, in