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 1 1 |      not, though inexperience may make them appear so: for
 2 4 |     of expression. Of this we may assure ourselves both by
 3 4 |    proof based on this-and it may be on other assumptions
 4 4 |       wish that you the enemy may capture". Also the thesis, "
 5 4 |      has a double meaning: it may mean that the speaker is
 6 5 |       double of three. Or, it may be, they show that it is
 7 5 |     double in breadth. Or, it may be, they show it to be both
 8 5 | however, additional premisses may actually give rise to a
 9 6 |        In the first place, we may see if they are inconclusive:
10 6 |    accident in this, that you may secure an admission of the
11 8 |    syllogisms and refutations may depend. By a sophistical
12 8 | branch of dialectic: and this may prove a false conclusion
13 8 |     more over, the conclusion may follow not in fact but only
14 8 |       and manner, the fallacy may be dependent on some limit
15 9 |      obviously demonstrations may be infinite too. Now refutations
16 9 | infinite too. Now refutations may be true as well as false:
17 10|   have one meaning-as e.g. it may be that "Being" and "One"
18 10|   concedes. Next, all of them may be directed to the expression.
19 11|     is any false diagram that may be offered in proof of a
20 11| geometry, but one which a man may possess, even though he
21 11|       the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing
22 12|   ways paradoxical statements may be committed. In their view
23 16|      out of temper.~Answerers may clearly see how to meet
24 17|       matter how precisely he may have addressed his argument
25 17|      kind, in order that they may not be thought to be obstructionists
26 18|       false, in order that we may effect the solution either
27 20|          No." "But a good man may be a bad cobbler: therefore
28 22|      the argument that "a man may give what he has not got":
29 24|        the present suggestion may very well apply in some
30 24|     so-and-so's property". We may suppose of course, on the
31 24|       even there: for a thing may be "good" and be "X's" without
32 25|    particular case the unjust may very well be better than
33 25|      the decision in question may very well be a just decision,
34 31|       bare word "double", one may perhaps say, has not even
35 33|       or positive as the case may be, that is just as generally
36 34|   springs out of them. For it may be that in everything, as