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 1 1 |       that is apparent but not real. Now for some people it
 2 5 |      happens like this also in real reasoning; e.g. Melissus’
 3 9 |  merely apparent without being real, and, if it be real, what
 4 9 |      being real, and, if it be real, what is the reason for
 5 9 |      refutation that is either real or apparent, i.e. either
 6 18|       an apparent proof and no real one-there must be both the
 7 18|      the conclusion is not the real state of the case: those,
 8 24| conceivably possible to find a real ambiguity in the phrase "
 9 32|       of a stone, you call him real: therefore of a stone it
10 32|        it follows that "him is real"." No: rather, talking of
11 32|        of a stick, you call it real: therefore, of a stick it
12 32|    stick it follows that it is real." "Stone", however, and "