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 1 2|              would seem that even in his time there was no scientific
 2 3|                   but also imperceptible time, in order that the succession
 3 3|            necessarily mixed at the same time; and [it is no less plain]
 4 4|                 sweet become by lapse of time harsh or bitter, or acquire
 5 6|            sense-perception. At the same time, if this be the case [that
 6 6|                 a stroke reaches us some time after it has been struck.
 7 6|                corresponding interval of time also in which it is moved
 8 6|                 the other. But any given time is divisible into parts;
 9 6|                  that we should assume a time when the sun’s ray was not
10 7| coinstantaneously in the same individual time? The above assumption explains
11 7|                 eyes, if they are at the time deep in thought, or in a
12 7|             being unnoticed whenever the time it involves is [so small
13 7|               fact that the intervals of time [between the really successive
14 7|          conceivable that any portion of time should be [absolutely] imperceptible,
15 7|                perceive every instant of time. [This is so]; because,
16 7|               aught else in a continuous time, be at any instant unaware
17 7|                  in the time-continuum a time so small as to be absolutely
18 7|                person would, during such time, be unaware of his own existence,
19 7|                is any magnitude, whether time or thing, absolutely imperceptible
20 7|                which one perceives, or a time in which one perceives it,
21 7|                in some part of the given time he sees some part of the
22 7|                and a corresponding whole time. Now,] if one sees the whole
23 7|                and perceives it during a time which forms one and the
24 7|                  in some portion of this time, let us suppose the part
25 7|                  part gb, representing a time in which by supposition
26 7|                 in the remainder] of the time, or perceives a part [viz.
27 7|              object and during the whole time simply because he perceives [
28 7|              object] in some part of the time ab. But the same argument
29 7|               some part of a given whole time, and perceives only some
30 7|                 object in a really whole time; a conclusion which is absurd,
31 7|           perception of both Objects and Time].~Therefore we must conclude
32 7|            arguments, that no portion of time is imperceptible.~But we
33 7|                 the several objects in a time one and indivisible relatively
34 7|                 will be each at the same time one and many, as if we should
35 7|                  and the same individual time sensibles of the same sense,
36 7|                in general or at the same time; but this is impossible.~