Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  1 |       difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall have to
 2   I,  1 |          form the starting-points in different subjects must be different,
 3   I,  1 |           different subjects must be different, as e.g. in the case of
 4   I,  1 |        whether its various forms are different specifically or generically:
 5   I,  3 |              for they are moved in a different sense from that in which
 6   I,  4 |              which makes flesh has a different ratio between the elements
 7   I,  4 |             of the bodily parts is a different mixture of the elements,
 8   I,  4 |           other hand, if the soul is different from the mixture, why does
 9   I,  4 |          organs.~The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent
10   I,  4 |            units within the body are different from the points of the body,
11   I,  5 |           soul, unless the soul be a different sort of number-other, that
12   I,  5 |              each of them requires a different part of the soul? So too
13   I,  5 |         numerically identical in the different segments, for both of the
14  II,  2 |              it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing
15  II,  3 |       immediate intuition presents a different problem.~It is evident that
16  II,  5 |              what is actual but also different senses in which things can
17  II,  5 |             an alteration in a quite different sense from the usual meaning.~
18  II,  5 |            pointed out that they are different and how they are different.
19  II,  5 |           different and how they are different. We cannot help using the
20  II,  6 |   discriminates more than one set of different qualities. Each sense has
21  II,  8 |            it is both, but each in a different way"? Sound is a movement
22  II,  8 |             The distinctions between different sounding bodies show themselves
23  II,  8 |               Nature uses it for two different purposes, as the tongue
24  II,  10|  discriminated by sight; so is, in a different way, what is over brilliant),
25  II,  11|       because that through which the different movements are transmitted
26 III,  2 |           which perceives sight were different from sight, we must either
27 III,  2 |            we perceive that they are different? It must be by sense; for
28 III,  2 |             says that two things are different must be one; for sweet is
29 III,  2 |            must be one; for sweet is different from white. Therefore what
30 III,  2 |             it asserts the one to be different and the other to be different
31 III,  2 |        different and the other to be different is not accidental to the
32 III,  2 |             and that the objects are different now; the objects therefore
33 III,  2 |               and what is white in a different way. Is it the case then
34 III,  3 |      sensibility. For imagination is different from either perceiving or
35 III,  3 |         speak elsewhere.~Thinking is different from perceiving and is held
36 III,  3 |           supposed opinion cannot be different from that of the sensation (
37 III,  4 |          being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that.
38 III,  4 |            of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality
39 III,  4 |              discriminated either by different faculties, or by the same
40 III,  4 |              the same faculty in two different states: for flesh necessarily
41 III,  4 |             apprehended by something different either wholly separate from
42 III,  4 |              constitutive essence is different, if we may distinguish between
43 III,  4 |         apprehended, therefore, by a different power or by the same power
44 III,  4 |            or by the same power in a different state. To sum up, in so
45 III,  7 |             This must therefore be a different kind from movement; for
46 III,  7 |          what has been perfected, is different from movement.~To perceive
47 III,  7 |       appetite and avoidance are not different, either from one another
48 III,  7 | sense-perception; but their being is different.~To the thinking soul images
49 III,  7 |             one, a single mean, with different manners of being.~With what
50 III,  7 |          form a single identity with different modes of being; so too will
51 III,  8 |            no matter.~Imagination is different from assertion and denial;
52 III,  9 |              is a part, is that part different from those usually distinguished
53 III,  9 |              which is, in its being, different from all, while it is very
54 III,  10|             part; for these are more different from one another than the