Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  1 |      too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without
 2   I,  1 |        to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body
 3  II,  2 |     sensation, necessarily also imagination and appetition; for, where
 4  II,  3 |         appetition. The case of imagination is obscure; we must examine
 5  II,  3 |        hold-indeed some live by imagination alone, while others have
 6  II,  3 |      while others have not even imagination. The mind that knows with
 7  II,  8 |        accompanied by an act of imagination, for voice is a sound with
 8 III,  3 |        well as sensibility. For imagination is different from either
 9 III,  3 |       and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement: we must
10 III,  3 |    first mark off the sphere of imagination and then speak of judgement.
11 III,  3 |     speak of judgement. If then imagination is that in virtue of which
12 III,  3 |     science, intelligence.~That imagination is not sense is clear from
13 III,  3 | activity, e.g. sight or seeing: imagination takes place in the absence
14 III,  3 |        sense is always present, imagination not. If actual imagination
15 III,  3 |      imagination not. If actual imagination and actual sensation were
16 III,  3 |        sensation were the same, imagination would be found in all the
17 III,  3 |       eyes are shut. Neither is imagination any of the things that are
18 III,  3 |  knowledge or intelligence; for imagination may be false.~It remains
19 III,  3 |     brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief. Further,
20 III,  3 |         brutes in which we find imagination, without discourse of reason.
21 III,  3 |   reason. It is clear then that imagination cannot, again, be (1) opinion
22 III,  3 |      the sensation (I mean that imagination must be the blending of
23 III,  3 |   alters without being noticed.~Imagination is therefore neither any
24 III,  3 |         may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement
25 III,  3 |  perception is far off. If then imagination presents no other features
26 III,  3 |         we have described, then imagination must be a movement resulting
27 III,  3 |      sense, the name Phantasia (imagination) has been formed from Phaos (
28 III,  3 |         disease or sleep.~About imagination, what it is and why it exists,
29 III,  8 |         they contain no matter.~Imagination is different from assertion
30 III,  9 |        is accompanied either by imagination or by appetite; for no animal
31 III,  10|       one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for
32 III,  10|         or calculation but only imagination).~Both of these then are
33 III,  10|        stimulation. So too when imagination originates movement, it
34 III,  10|         right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong.
35 III,  10|       apprehended in thought or imagination), the things that originate
36 III,  10|     appetite without possessing imagination; and all imagination is
37 III,  10| possessing imagination; and all imagination is either (1) calculative
38 III,  11|         movement. Can they have imagination or not? or desire? Clearly
39 III,  11|   desire. But how can they have imagination? Must not we say that, as
40 III,  11|       are indefinite, they have imagination and desire, but indefinitely?~
41 III,  11|         indefinitely?~Sensitive imagination, as we have said, is found
42 III,  11|       all animals, deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative:
43 III,  11|          This is the reason why imagination is held not to involve opinion,
44 III,  11|         though opinion involves imagination. Hence appetite contains