Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  1 |          body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally.
 2   I,  1 |            define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain,
 3  II,  3 |            have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire,
 4 III,  7 |            such. Both avoidance and appetite when actual are identical
 5 III,  7 |           with this: the faculty of appetite and avoidance are not different,
 6 III,  9 |           if the soul is tripartite appetite will be found in all three
 7 III,  9 |         either by imagination or by appetite; for no animal moves except
 8 III,  9 |           is not the cause. Lastly, appetite too is incompetent to account
 9 III,  9 | successfully resist temptation have appetite and desire and yet follow
10 III,  9 |            that for which they have appetite.~
11 III,  10|             be sources of movement: appetite and mind (if one may venture
12 III,  10|            local movement, mind and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which
13 III,  10|    character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative
14 III,  10|         that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind
15 III,  10|           sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for
16 III,  10|          thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as
17 III,  10|             movement, the object of appetite being it a source of stimulation.
18 III,  10|             it necessarily involves appetite.~That which moves therefore
19 III,  10|          faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two
20 III,  10|          producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite;
21 III,  10|     appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced
22 III,  10|             according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary
23 III,  10|             for desire is a form of appetite. Now mind is always right,
24 III,  10|           mind is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either
25 III,  10|            case it is the object of appetite which originates movement,
26 III,  10|         described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is
27 III,  10|            one, viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest
28 III,  10|             moved is the faculty of appetite (for that which is influenced
29 III,  10|         that which is influenced by appetite so far as it is actually
30 III,  10|             is set in movement, and appetite in the sense of actual appetite
31 III,  10|     appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of movement),
32 III,  10|        animal. The instrument which appetite employs to produce movement
33 III,  10|             an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement;
34 III,  10| self-movement; it is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination;
35 III,  11|         involves imagination. Hence appetite contains no deliberative
36 III,  11|           times wish acts thus upon appetite, like one sphere imparting
37 III,  11|             movement to another, or appetite acts thus upon appetite,
38 III,  11|             appetite acts thus upon appetite, i.e. in the condition of