Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  2|         does not employ mind as a special faculty dealing with truth,
 2   I,  2|          All those, then, who had special regard to the fact that
 3   I,  3|      interaction always implies a special nature in the two interagents.
 4   I,  4|      qualitative alterations (the special nature of the parts and
 5   I,  4|       nature of the parts and the special modes of their changes being
 6   I,  4|          moved, and in the second special absurdities which follow
 7  II,  6|     senses. I call by the name of special object of this or that sense
 8  II,  6|          this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of
 9  II,  6|       what we propose to call the special objects of this or that
10  II,  6|            the first kind-that of special objects of the several senses-constitute
11  II,  8|           animal, and that with a special organ. As we saw, everything
12 III,  1|        Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common
13 III,  1| incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g. movement, rest,
14 III,  1|         of continuity, and by the special sensibles; for each sense
15 III,  1| impossible that there should be a special sense for any one of the
16 III,  1|   directly; there is therefore no special sense required for their
17 III,  1|      senses perceive each other’s special objects incidentally; not
18 III,  1|  percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all form
19 III,  1|           which go along with the special sensibles? Had we no sense
20 III,  1|          from each and all of the special sensibles.~
21 III,  3|  opposites; for perception of the special objects of sense is always
22 III,  3|    follows. Perception (1) of the special objects of sense is never
23 III,  3|  concomitant objects to which the special sensibles attach (I mean
24 III,  6|           while the seeing of the special object of sight can never