Book, Paragraph

 1   I,  3 |      that the soul is a~spatial magnitude. It is evident that Plato
 2   I,  3 |    unity like that of a spatial magnitude. Hence~mind cannot have
 3   I,  3 |         characterizes~a spatial magnitude. How, indeed, if it were
 4   I,  3 |    indeed, if it were a spatial magnitude,~could mind possibly think?
 5   I,  3 |       in the~sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point (
 6   I,  3 |      called a part of a spatial magnitude). If we accept the~latter
 7   I,  3 |       circle, or~indeed possess magnitude at all? On the other hand,
 8  II,  6 | movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not peculiar
 9  II,  12|        is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that
10  II,  12|        or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a certain
11  II,  12|     certain ratio or power in a magnitude. This enables us to explain
12 III,  1 |         movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, unity; for all
13 III,  1 |      perceive by movement, e.g. magnitude by movement, and therefore
14 III,  1 |      for figure is a species of magnitude), what is at rest by the
15 III,  1 |       sensibles, e.g. movement, magnitude, and number, which go along
16 III,  1 |      concomitance of colour and magnitude. As it is, the fact that
17 III,  3 |       mean e.g. of movement and magnitude); it is in respect of these
18 III,  4 |   distinguish between a spatial magnitude and what it is to be such,