Book, Paragraph

  1   I,  1 |       affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any
  2   I,  1 |         upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite,
  3   I,  1 |     imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence.
  4   I,  1 |            it is always found in a body. It therefore seems that
  5   I,  1 |        concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may
  6   I,  1 |            emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of
  7   I,  1 |        movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a
  8   I,  1 |            or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and
  9   I,  1 |        from any particular kind of body by an effort of abstraction,
 10   I,  1 |           fact and in thought from body altogether, to the First
 11   I,  3 |            are the attributes, the body in which they inhere; hence
 12   I,  3 |          originate movement in the body, it is reasonable to suppose
 13   I,  3 |           that it transmits to the body the movements by which it
 14   I,  3 |          from the movements of the body back to similar movements
 15   I,  3 |     movements of the soul. Now the body is moved from place to place
 16   I,  3 |        must in accordance with the body change either its place
 17   I,  3 |           soul might even quit its body and re-enter it, and with
 18   I,  3 |            the soul imparts to the body in which it is are the same
 19   I,  3 |           movements draw the whole body after them and so produce
 20   I,  3 |          of how the soul moves its body; the soul, it is there said,
 21   I,  3 |       mutual implication moves the body also. After compounding
 22   I,  3 |     inextricably bound up with the body; nay more, if, as is frequently
 23   I,  3 |       soul-nor is, a fortiori, the body its cause. Again, it is
 24   I,  3 |        they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body,
 25   I,  3 |           a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification
 26   I,  3 |       determine anything about the body which is to contain it,
 27   I,  3 |      body-an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and
 28   I,  3 |           its tools, each soul its body.~
 29   I,  4 |            contraries, and (b) the body is compounded out of contraries.
 30   I,  4 |          of the good states of the body) a harmony than to predicate
 31   I,  4 |    composition of the parts of the body is a view easily refutable;
 32   I,  4 |   distributed throughout the whole body there will be many souls,
 33   I,  4 |           each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue
 34   I,  4 |          other parts of the animal body? Further, if the soul is
 35   I,  4 |            when the soul quits the body?~That the soul cannot either
 36   I,  4 |           psychic units within the body are different from the points
 37   I,  4 |   different from the points of the body, there will be two sets
 38   I,  4 |            hand, the points of the body are identical with the units
 39   I,  4 |        number of the points in the body is the soul, why have not
 40   I,  5 |           soul is a subtle kind of body, is on the other entangled
 41   I,  5 |    throughout the whole percipient body, there must, if the soul
 42   I,  5 |           if the soul be a kind of body, be two bodies in the same
 43   I,  5 |      points at one point, or every body must have a soul, unless
 44   I,  5 |           the points existing in a body. Another consequence that
 45   I,  5 |        incorporeal of all kinds of body. We have now sufficiently
 46   I,  5 |            the parts of the animal body which consist wholly of
 47   I,  5 |           together? Surely not the body; on the contrary it seems
 48   I,  5 |            the soul that holds the body together; at any rate when
 49   I,  5 |          when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays.
 50   I,  5 |            each in relation to the body? For, if the whole soul
 51   I,  5 |           holds together the whole body, we should expect each part
 52   I,  5 |        hold together a part of the body. But this seems an impossibility;
 53  II,  1 |         follows that every natural body which has life in it is
 54  II,  1 |             But since it is also a body of such and such a kind,
 55  II,  1 |        kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body
 56  II,  1 |           body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter,
 57  II,  1 |           of the form of a natural body having life potentially
 58  II,  1 |         soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.
 59  II,  1 |          of actuality of a natural body having life potentially
 60  II,  1 |        life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which
 61  II,  1 |         The body so described is a body which is organized. The
 62  II,  1 |   actuality of a natural organized body. That is why we can wholly
 63  II,  1 |           whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless
 64  II,  1 |           essential whatness" of a body of the character just assigned.
 65  II,  1 |        like an axe, were a natural body, its "essential whatness",
 66  II,  1 |           have had to be a natural body of a particular kind, viz.
 67  II,  1 |          the "parts" of the living body. Suppose that the eye were
 68  II,  1 |         parts" to the whole living body; for what the departmental
 69  II,  1 |          is to the whole sensitive body as such.~We must not understand
 70  II,  1 |         the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists
 71  II,  1 |          eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal.~
 72  II,  1 |            is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain
 73  II,  1 |         not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have
 74  II,  1 |            be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the
 75  II,  2 |       either (a) health or (b) the body or some part of the body;
 76  II,  2 |           body or some part of the body; and since of the two terms
 77  II,  2 |           is the living thing, the body cannot be the actuality
 78  II,  2 |     actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the rightness of
 79  II,  2 |           soul cannot be without a body, while it csnnot he a body;
 80  II,  2 |         body, while it csnnot he a body; it is not a body but something
 81  II,  2 |      csnnot he a body; it is not a body but something relative to
 82  II,  2 |            something relative to a body. That is why it is in a
 83  II,  2 |             That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite
 84  II,  2 |         why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was
 85  II,  2 |            merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite
 86  II,  2 |          kind or character of that body. Reflection confirms the
 87  II,  4 |            or source of the living body. The terms cause and source
 88  II,  4 |           soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses
 89  II,  4 |        essence of the whole living body.~That it is the last, is
 90  II,  4 |        also the final cause of its body. For Nature, like mind,
 91  II,  4 |            the cause of the living body as the original source of
 92  II,  4 |        what is fed is the besouled body and just because it has
 93  II,  4 |            the first soul, (a) the body which has that soul in it, (
 94  II,  7 |          also found in the eternal body which constitutes the uppermost
 95  II,  7 |          resembling "the uppermost body"; for fire too contains
 96  II,  7 |         nor any kind whatsoever of body nor an efflux from any kind
 97  II,  7 |            efflux from any kind of body (if it were, it would again
 98  II,  7 |          again itself be a kind of body)-it is the presence of fire
 99  II,  7 | transparent. It is certainly not a body, for two bodies cannot be
100  II,  8 |           it is impossible for one body only to generate a sound-there
101  II,  8 |            a sound-there must be a body impinging and a body impinged
102  II,  8 |          be a body impinging and a body impinged upon; what sounds
103  II,  8 |            impact on bronze or any body which is smooth and hollow
104  II,  8 |           over and over again, the body originally set in movement
105  II,  8 |            struck by the impinging body and set in movement by it
106  II,  8 |      continuous from the impinging body up to the organ of hearing.
107  II,  8 |        that "sounds", the striking body or the struck? Is not the
108  II,  8 |          temperature of the living body and also as the matter of
109  II,  8 |          latter is the part of the body by which the temperature
110  II,  8 |     resident in these parts of the body. Not every sound, as we
111  II,  10|      through an interposed foreign body, for touch means the absence
112  II,  10|         absence of any intervening body. Further, the flavoured
113  II,  10|            flavoured and tasteable body is suspended in a liquid
114  II,  11|     air-envelope growing round our body; had we such an envelope
115  II,  11|            as flesh, for no living body could be constructed of
116  II,  11|        tactual qualities must be a body naturally attached to the
117  II,  11|            in the same part of the body. The following problem might
118  II,  11|           Let us assume that every body has depth, i.e. has three
119  II,  11|            two bodies have a third body between them they cannot
120  II,  11|           that what is liquid is a body and must be or contain water,
121  II,  11|           distinctive qualities of body as body; by such differences
122  II,  11|   distinctive qualities of body as body; by such differences I mean
123  II,  11|          of touch-that part of the body in which primarily the sense
124 III,  4 |       regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire
125 III,  4 |    sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from
126 III,  10|            the functions common to body and soul. To state the matter
127 III,  12|          either (1) to those whose body is uncompounded or (2) to
128 III,  12|          of means to an end. Every body capable of forward movement
129 III,  12|          it is not possible that a body which is not stationary
130 III,  12|           better so either for the body or for the soul? But clearly
131 III,  12|        exist better.) Therefore no body which is not stationary
132 III,  12|        without sensation.~But if a body has sensation, it must be
133 III,  12|            follows. An animal is a body with soul in it: every body
134 III,  12|        body with soul in it: every body is tangible, i.e. perceptible
135 III,  12|          animal is to survive, its body must have tactual sensation.
136 III,  12|             which is just tangible body; whereas sound, colour,
137 III,  13|            13~It is clear that the body of an animal cannot be simple,
138 III,  13|         any other sense; for every body that has soul in it must,
139 III,  13|             Consequently no animal body can consist of these other