Book, Paragraph
1 I, 1 | that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is
2 I, 2 | geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles
3 I, 2 | that the All is one.~Now we say that (a) the continuous
4 I, 2 | the mode of expression and say "the man has been whitened"
5 I, 3 | is not; for it is true to say that it is white, which
6 I, 3 | not-being. If to avoid this we say that even "white" means
7 I, 3 | animal".~Are we then to say that the All is composed
8 I, 3 | particular not-being. To say that all things will be
9 I, 4 | everything. But things, as they say, appear different from one
10 I, 4 | mixture. For nothing, they say, is purely and entirely
11 I, 7 | characteristics of special cases.~We say that one thing comes to
12 I, 7 | mean the following. We can say (1) "man becomes musical", (
13 I, 7 | becomes-"musical"-simple also. But when (3) we say the "not-musical man becomes
14 I, 7 | things that become" we say not only "this becomes so-and-so",
15 I, 7 | regards the other we do not say this in all cases, as we
16 I, 7 | all cases, as we do not say (1) "from being a man he
17 I, 7 | are describing that, as we say, there must always be an
18 I, 7 | this becoming that". We say both that "the unmusical
19 I, 7 | concomitant attribute-plainly, I say, everything comes to be
20 I, 8 | into another path. So they say that none of the things
21 I, 8 | most appropriately when we say that a doctor does something
22 II, 1 | fire, air, water)-for we say that these and the like
23 II, 1 | concomitant attribute.~I say "not in virtue of a concomitant
24 II, 1 | relation to something else, say bronze (or gold) to water,
25 II, 1 | earth and so on, that (they say) would be their nature and
26 II, 1 | work of art. We should not say in the latter case that
27 II, 1 | bed. That is why people say that the figure is not the
28 II, 3 | is he walking about? " we say. "To be healthy", and, having
29 II, 3 | lead up to it. (Whether we say the "good itself or the "
30 II, 3 | expression for either and say, e.g. neither "Polyclitus"
31 II, 4 | they are real or not. They say that nothing happens by
32 II, 4 | worlds to spontaneity. They say that the vortex arose spontaneously,
33 II, 4 | the things which as they say are not due to chance; whereas
34 II, 5 | these two-events which all say are "by chance"-it is plain
35 II, 5 | see a spectacle. Thus to say that chance is a thing contrary
36 II, 6 | many inanimate objects. We say, for example, that the horse
37 II, 6 | follow after walking, we say that we have walked "in
38 II, 6 | would be absurd for a man to say that he had bathed in vain
39 II, 6 | contrary to nature, we do not say that it came to be by chance,
40 II, 8 | come about by chance. We say, for instance, that a stranger
41 III, 3 | one.~But (some one will say) it is contrary to reason
42 III, 4 | the even. For this, they say, when it is cut off and
43 III, 4 | Anaxagoras and Democritus do, say that the infinite is continuous
44 III, 4 | principle or source. We cannot say that the infinite has no
45 III, 4 | away. That is why, as we say, there is no principle of
46 III, 5 | it is used by those who say that the infinite exists,
47 III, 5 | ceased to be. As it is, they say, the infinite is different
48 III, 5 | in this case also we may say that it fixes itself. If
49 III, 6 | has many senses, and we say that the infinite "is" in
50 III, 6 | in the sense in which we say "it is day" or "it is the
51 III, 6 | actual existence holds. We say that there are Olympic games,
52 III, 6 | in the sense in which we say "it is day" or "it is the
53 IV, 1 | in it. What then shall we say about growing things? It
54 IV, 2 | something, he alone tried to say what it is.~In view of these
55 IV, 3 | We cannot go further and say that it is in surface in
56 IV, 4 | smaller.~Again, when we say a thing is "moved", the
57 IV, 4 | which they belong do so.~We say that a thing is in the world,
58 IV, 4 | in the world; and when we say it is in the air, we do
59 IV, 4 | hard-this is just why we say that the matter exists-so
60 IV, 4 | exist-only in the one case we say so because what was air
61 IV, 5 | for the heaven, we may say, is the All. Yet their place
62 IV, 5 | but we cannot go on and say that the heaven is in anything
63 IV, 6 | account given by those who say that it exists, then the
64 IV, 6 | the account of those who say that it does not exist,
65 IV, 6 | which is in body is body and say that what has nothing in
66 IV, 6 | problem, but rather those who say that the void exists.~(1)
67 IV, 6 | be compressed, as people say that a cask will hold the
68 IV, 7 | question: what would they say of an interval that has
69 IV, 7 | corporeal substance. So some say that the void is the matter
70 IV, 7 | kind of thing that some say place is.~But there is no
71 IV, 8 | neither will void.~If people say that the void must exist,
72 IV, 8 | those who for a like reason say the earth is at rest, so,
73 IV, 8 | moved.~Further, no one could say why a thing once set in
74 IV, 8 | but this is the same as to say that place is a separate
75 IV, 9 | density do not exist, they say, neither can things contract
76 IV, 9 | which is the reason why they say fire is rare); second, the
77 IV, 9 | reasons for which they might say that there is a void; our
78 IV, 10 | and other? It is hard to say.~(1) If it is always different
79 IV, 11 | perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently
80 IV, 11 | after" in motion that we say that time has elapsed. Now
81 IV, 11 | after, it is then that we say that there is time, and
82 IV, 11 | is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded
83 IV, 11 | and an "after", then we say that there is time. For
84 IV, 12 | by the distance; for we say that the road is long, if
85 IV, 12 | when time exists, (2) as we say of some things that they
86 IV, 12 | as we are accustomed to say that time wastes things
87 IV, 12 | lapse of time, but we do not say the same of getting to know
88 IV, 13 | just been walking"). But to say that Troy has just been
89 IV, 13 | just been taken-we do not say that, because it is too
90 IV, 14 | before is in time; for we say "before" and "after" with
91 IV, 14 | the number of. Must we not say "of any kind"? For things
92 IV, 14 | measured by such. So that to say that the things that come
93 IV, 14 | being form a circle is to say that there is a circle of
94 IV, 14 | of time; and this is to say that it is measured by the
95 V, 1 | as for instance when we say that something musical walks,
96 V, 1 | or the chest, that is to say a part of the whole body,
97 V, 1 | is in motion, that is to say "the movable in activity".
98 V, 1 | something else, that is to say something earlier and something
99 V, 1 | in respect of which we say that a thing "comes to be"
100 V, 1 | potentially "is", that is to say the opposite of that which
101 V, 1 | nevertheless correct to say that it is that which "is
102 V, 1 | perishing", that is to say those which imply a relation
103 V, 2 | is designated: that is to say motion in the direction
104 V, 3 | either. Hence, if as some say "point" and "unit" have
105 V, 6 | among motions, we must not say that this absence of change
106 V, 6 | a state of rest: we must say that it is similar to a
107 V, 6 | Surely just the same: we may say that some alterations are
108 V, 6 | the same thing. May we not say, however, that in so far
109 VI, 1 | it is walking; that is to say, it will have completed
110 VI, 1 | indivisible, that is to say be composed of indivisible
111 VI, 2 | slower has arrived, let us say, at E. Then since A has
112 VI, 2 | in less time than this, say ZK. Now the magnitude GO
113 VI, 2 | less time than this: let us say in the time ZO. Again, since
114 VI, 2 | same time pass over GK, say, which is less than GD.
115 VI, 2 | ass over some magnitude, say BE, in a finite time, and
116 VI, 3 | a distance less than AB, say AG. But since the slower
117 VI, 3 | present.~Again, when we say that a thing is at rest,
118 VI, 4 | the whole other than DZ, say the the of each of the arts
119 VI, 4 | there is any remainder, say KI, this will be a motion
120 VI, 4 | each of the two motions DG (say) and GE, we may argue that
121 VI, 5 | something other than B, say G, it must again be changing
122 VI, 5 | moment when it is correct to say "it has changed": on the
123 VI, 5 | subject of change-that is to say that in respect of which
124 VI, 6 | reference, as e.g. when we say that a thing changes in
125 VI, 6 | moments-we are enabled to say that motion has taken place
126 VI, 6 | continuous, changes, that is to say, between contraries and
127 VI, 6 | never take any stage and say that it is absolutely the
128 VI, 6 | something else, that is to say, some part of the thing
129 VI, 7 | in motion a part of it, say GD, will occupy the finite
130 VI, 8 | motion when (that is to say in that in which) motion
131 VI, 8 | time essentially-that is to say when it fills the whole
132 VI, 8 | another it will be true to say that the thing, itself and
133 VI, 8 | So while it is true to say that that which is in motion
134 VI, 9 | changing from not-white, say, to white, and is in neither
135 VI, 9 | occupies, it is not true to say the motion can be nothing
136 VI, 9 | sense, the sense that is to say in which a musical man is
137 VII, 2 | underlying quality. Thus we say that a thing is altered
138 VII, 3 | 3~Everything, we say, that undergoes alteration
139 VII, 3 | way, to speak, that is to say, of a man or house or anything
140 VII, 3 | alterations.~Further, we say that all excellences depend
141 VII, 3 | becoming. Moreover, just as to say, when any one has passed
142 VII, 3 | state, it is incorrect to say that he becomes possessed
143 VII, 4 | difference to the argument to say that the one motion must
144 VII, 4 | commensurable either.~But may we say that things are always commensurable
145 VII, 4 | commensurable: we cannot say whether any one of them
146 VII, 4 | up the same position and say that the term "much" is
147 VII, 4 | commensurable that we may say which is the whiter, since
148 VII, 4 | attributes univocal and say merely that that contains
149 VII, 4 | single thing.~Must we then say that, if two things are
150 VII, 4 | another, i.e. we cannot say that one is more coloured
151 VII, 4 | accomplished the other half: can be say that in this case the alteration
152 VII, 4 | consequence of this we must say that two things are of equal
153 VII, 4 | perhaps we should rather say that this is not so, and
154 VII, 4 | which is in motion.) We may say, therefore, that things
155 VII, 4 | likeness". However, let us say that there is equal velocity
156 VII, 4 | are in motion-that is to say, the things to which the
157 VII, 4 | for it in both? That is to say, the alterations are the
158 VIII, 1 | in motion? Or are we to say that it never had any becoming
159 VIII, 1 | all who have anything to say about nature, because they
160 VIII, 1 | of motion. But those who say that there is an infinite
161 VIII, 1 | course on Physics. Motion, we say, is the fulfilment of the
162 VIII, 1 | consideration. For if we are to say that, while there are on
163 VIII, 1 | always means ratio. But if we say that there is first a state
164 VIII, 1 | order, then we can no longer say that it is nature’s work:
165 VIII, 1 | be better, therefore, to say with Empedocles and any
166 VIII, 1 | conclude what we have to say in support of our contention
167 VIII, 2 | set in motion, that is to say it sometimes happens that
168 VIII, 2 | animal, on the other hand, we say, moves itself: therefore,
169 VIII, 2 | shall have something to say later that will make this
170 VIII, 2 | environment. Moreover, we say that the animal itself originates
171 VIII, 2 | case-or rather we may perhaps say that it must necessarily
172 VIII, 4 | is in the thing itself we say that the motion of that
173 VIII, 4 | derived. It is impossible to say that their motion is derived
174 VIII, 5 | by something else. Now we say that the thing is moved
175 VIII, 5 | and the movent-that is to say, that which causes motion
176 VIII, 5 | reasonable, therefore, not to say necessary, to suppose the
177 VIII, 5 | making healthy is, let us say, in process of locomotion,
178 VIII, 5 | locomotion in process of, say, increase. But it is evident
179 VIII, 5 | be divided: e.g. we must say that if some one is teaching
180 VIII, 5 | this assumption we must say that one kind of motion
181 VIII, 5 | motion are limited; and if we say that the process is reversible,
182 VIII, 5 | sense in which one might say that everything that has
183 VIII, 5 | have a capacity, let us say, for increase. It is not
184 VIII, 5 | which is moved: so while we say that AB is moved by itself,
185 VIII, 5 | moved by itself, we may also say that it is moved by A. And
186 VIII, 6 | accidental sense: that is to say, the body changes its place,
187 VIII, 6 | of all those, that is to say, that experience more than
188 VIII, 8 | of the motion, that is to say, the time, and thirdly the
189 VIII, 8 | the whole of A, but must say that it is so in all of
190 VIII, 8 | in flux and decay, they say), and they go so far as
191 VIII, 8 | continuity. We need now say no more in support of the
192 VIII, 9 | finishing-point, so that we can say of certain things both that
193 VIII, 9 | to the centre: that is to say, the centre is alike starting-point,
194 VIII, 9 | no cause of this kind but say that "void" accounts for
195 VIII, 9 | decrease and alteration, they say, are effects of the "combination"
196 VIII, 9 | cause of motion: for they say that things that undergo
197 VIII, 9 | it is to be noted that we say that a thing "is in motion"
198 VIII, 9 | rest in the same place, we say that it is in motion in
199 VIII, 9 | particular respect: we do not say that it "is in motion" without
200 VIII, 10| finite or partly-that is to say two of them or one of them-finite
201 VIII, 10| occupies a certain time, let us say the time Z in moving D.
202 VIII, 10| contact with them? If we say that the movent in such
203 VIII, 10| undergoing motion, we must say further that this thing
204 VIII, 10| place in air and water. Some say that it is "mutual replacement":
205 VIII, 10| which it moves, that is to say it will itself be in process
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