Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2 |     mean that all things "are" substance or quantities or qualities?
 2   I, 2 |       to maintain.~For if both substance and quantity and quality
 3   I, 2 |        quantity, then, whether substance exists or not, an absurdity
 4   I, 2 |       can exist independently: substance alone is independent: for
 5   I, 2 |    everything is predicated of substance as subject. Now Melissus
 6   I, 2 |  category of quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection
 7   I, 2 |       in your formula, but not substance or quality. If then Being
 8   I, 2 | quality. If then Being is both substance and quantity, it is two,
 9   I, 2 |       is two, not one: if only substance, it is not infinite and
10   I, 3 |   which is not will be. Hence "substance" will not be a predicate
11   I, 3 |     only one thing.~If, then, "substance" is not attributed to anything,
12   I, 3 |    attributed to it, how does "substance" mean what is rather than
13   I, 3 |      is not? For suppose that "substance" is also "white". Since
14   I, 3 |       nothing is which is not "substance"), it follows that "white"
15   I, 3 |       it is not at all. Hence "substance" is not; for it is true
16   I, 3 |        that even "white" means substance, it follows that "being"
17   I, 3 |       have magnitude, if it is substance. For each of the two parts
18   I, 3 |      in a different sense.~(2) Substance is plainly divisible into
19   I, 3 |        instance, if "man" is a substance, "animal" and "biped" must
20   I, 3 |     and are not each of them a substance, then "man" too will be
21   I, 3 |        But we must assume that substance is not the attribute of
22   I, 3 |      anything but a particular substance? But if this is so, there
23   I, 6 |      only one contrariety, and substance is one genus: also a finite
24   I, 6 |      contraries constitute the substance of any thing. But what is
25   I, 6 |       Again (2) we hold that a substance is not contrary to another
26   I, 6 |        not contrary to another substance. How then can substance
27   I, 6 |        substance. How then can substance be derived from what are
28   I, 6 |     non-substances be prior to substance?~If then we accept both
29   I, 6 |        who make the underlying substance different from these four;
30   I, 6 |       primary contrariety. For substance is a single genus of being,
31   I, 7 |        in all cases other than substance it is plain that there must
32   I, 7 |      always presupposed, since substance alone is not predicated
33   I, 7 |         but everything else of substance.~But that substances too,
34   I, 7 |      respect of their material substance.~It is plain that these
35   I, 7 |       the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the "this" or existent.~
36   I, 9 |      is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in
37  II, 1 |        kind. Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and
38  II, 1 |    Some identify the nature or substance of a natural object with
39  II, 1 |    declared to be the whole of substance, all else being its affections,
40 III, 1 |      is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality
41 III, 4 |     sense of a self-subsistent substance, and not as a mere attribute
42 III, 4 |  infinite as an attribute of a substance which is different from
43 III, 4 |        ask how it exists; as a substance or as the essential attribute
44 III, 5 |     aggregate, but is itself a substance and not an attribute, it
45 III, 5 |       be an actual thing and a substance and principle. For any part
46 III, 5 |       are the same, if it is a substance and not predicated of a
47 III, 5 |      if it is supposed to be a substance and principle.) Therefore
48 III, 5 |       that infinity belongs to substance as an attribute. But, if
49 III, 5 |     they treat the infinite as substance, and divide it into parts.~
50 III, 6 |    come to them like that of a substance, but consists in a process
51  IV, 5 |    when you have a homogeneous substance which is continuous, the
52  IV, 7 |      is no "this" or corporeal substance. So some say that the void
53  IV, 8 |      traverse in that time any substance Z which exceeds air in thickness
54   V, 2 |                2~In respect of Substance there is no motion, because
55   V, 2 |    there is no motion, because Substance has no contrary among things
56   V, 2 |        here mean a property of substance (in that sense that which
57 VII, 1 |        the same category, e.g. substance or quality: it is specifically
58 VII, 3 |        particular fluid or hot substance as being bronze, giving
59 VIII, 4|        and naturally connected substance move itself? In so far as
60 VIII, 4|     are of naturally connected substance), nor does anything else
61 VIII, 5|        unmoved is a continuous substance), or from B the part that
62 VIII, 9|     that the motion of natural substance is motion in respect of