Book, Paragraph
1 I, 2 | except through a concomitant attribute, that is, if at the same
2 I, 3 | It must be so, for (1) an attribute is predicated of some subject,
3 I, 3 | neither is possible.~(a) An attribute is either that which may
4 I, 3 | subject of which it is an attribute is involved. Thus "sitting"
5 I, 3 | an example of a separable attribute, while "snubness" contains
6 I, 3 | definition of "nose", to which we attribute snubness. Further, the definition
7 I, 3 | biped" is supposed to be an attribute of "man", it must be either
8 I, 3 | then "man" too will be an attribute of something else. But we
9 I, 3 | that substance is not the attribute of anything, that the subject
10 I, 5 | virtue of a concomitant attribute. For how could "white" come
11 I, 5 | musical" happened to be an attribute of the not-white or of the
12 I, 5 | virtue of a concomitant attribute), but into "not-white"-and
13 I, 7 | virtue of a concomitant attribute; the privation, on the other
14 I, 9 | not-being only in virtue of an attribute which it has, while the
15 II, 1 | virtue of a concomitant attribute.~I say "not in virtue of
16 II, 1 | virtue of a concomitant attribute", because (for instance)
17 II, 1 | is merely an incidental attribute, whereas the real nature
18 II, 3 | virtue of a concomitant attribute), e.g. both the art of the
19 II, 3 | in which the incidental attribute is included; thus "a man"
20 II, 3 | creature". An incidental attribute too may be more or less
21 II, 3 | genus, or an incidental attribute or a genus of that, and
22 II, 5 | affirms the essence of the attribute, ignoring the hair’s breadth
23 III, 1 | evident that motion is an attribute of a thing just when it
24 III, 2 | movable, the cause of the attribute being contact with what
25 III, 4 | substance, and not as a mere attribute of some other thing. Only
26 III, 4 | regard the infinite as an attribute of a substance which is
27 III, 4 | substance or as the essential attribute of some entity? Or in neither
28 III, 5 | itself a substance and not an attribute, it will be indivisible;
29 III, 5 | the infinite exists as an attribute, it would not be, qua infinite
30 III, 5 | which it is an essential attribute, exist in that way? If they
31 III, 5 | belongs to substance as an attribute. But, if so, it cannot,
32 III, 6 | magnitude, unless it has the attribute of being actually infinite,
33 III, 8 | something), and further is an attribute of some one of the things
34 IV, 8 | is displaced, which is an attribute possessed by all other bodies
35 IV, 11| it is not time, but an attribute of it; in so far as it numbers,
36 IV, 11| continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous.~
37 IV, 14| heaven. Is because it is an attribute, or state, or movement (
38 IV, 14| that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can exist
39 VII, 4 | not, if the nature of the attribute in the two cases is really
40 VII, 4 | things in respect of any attribute is due to a difference in
41 VII, 4 | capable of carrying the attribute? Thus horse and dog are
42 VII, 4 | which primarily contains the attribute is different in the two
43 VII, 4 | capable of carrying any attribute: each single attribute can
44 VII, 4 | any attribute: each single attribute can be carried primarily
45 VII, 4 | commensurable in respect of any attribute, not only must the attribute
46 VII, 4 | attribute, not only must the attribute in question be applicable
47 VII, 4 | differences either in the attribute itself or in that which
48 VII, 4 | difference of species? Is an attribute specifically different if
49 VII, 4 | subject is different while the attribute is the same, or must the
50 VII, 4 | is the same, or must the attribute itself be different as well?
51 VIII, 5| motion is an accidental attribute of the movents in question,
52 VIII, 5| accidental but an essential attribute. Let us consider the former
53 VIII, 5| then it is an accidental attribute, it is not necessary that
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