Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2 |        one horse, or one soul-or quality and that one and the same-white
 2   I, 2 |       substance and quantity and quality are, then, whether these
 3   I, 2 |     asserted that all things are quality or quantity, then, whether
 4   I, 2 |   quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection cannot be infinite
 5   I, 2 |    formula, but not substance or quality. If then Being is both substance
 6   I, 2 |    nothing will have quantity or quality, and so the one will not
 7   I, 2 |         to be of such-and-such a quality" is the same as "to be of
 8   I, 4 |          is reduced to change of quality, while some spoke of combination
 9   I, 4 |         of kind is unknowable in quality. But the principles in question
10   I, 4 |       respect of quantity and of quality—of quantity, because there
11   I, 4 |        minimum magnitude, and of quality, because affections are
12   I, 7 |         be of such a quantity or quality or in such a relation, time,
13 III, 1 |   substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes
14 III, 1 |          other privation; (2) in quality, white and black; (3) in
15 III, 3 |      there be two alterations of quality in one subject towards one
16 III, 3 |     subject towards one definite quality? The thing is impossible:
17 III, 4 |          science are not, e.g. a quality or a point-it is not necessary
18  IV, 4 |         For just as in change of quality there is something which
19  IV, 8 |       yields; but in a void this quality is present equally everywhere,
20  IV, 9 |        on an intermission of the quality); nor can we get any portion
21   V, 1 |          distinguished as Being, Quality, Place, Time, Relation,
22   V, 2 |        motion only in respect of Quality, Quantity, and Place: for
23   V, 2 | contraries. Motion in respect of Quality let us call alteration,
24   V, 2 |          both contraries: and by Quality I do not here mean a property
25   V, 2 |        specific distinction is a quality) but a passive quality in
26   V, 2 |         a quality) but a passive quality in virtue of which a thing
27   V, 2 |          to a lesser degree of a quality will be called change to
28   V, 2 |          to the contrary of that quality, and change to a greater
29   V, 2 |         to a greater degree of a quality will be regarded as change
30   V, 2 |        from the contrary of that quality to the quality itself. It
31   V, 2 |  contrary of that quality to the quality itself. It makes no difference
32   V, 2 |       and a thing’s possessing a quality in a greater or in a lesser
33   V, 2 |          or less of the opposite quality. It is now clear, then,
34   V, 6 |        in so far as one has this quality and the other that.~Now
35  VI, 4 |         quantity is essentially, quality accidentally divisible).
36  VI, 5 |          complexion or any other quality is an accident is divisible).
37 VII, 1 |      category, e.g. substance or quality: it is specifically the
38 VII, 2 |       that which is of a certain quality is altered in so far as
39 VII, 2 |       some particular underlying quality. Thus we say that a thing
40 VII, 4 |   corresponds in the category of quality to equality in the category
41 VIII, 4|         potentially of a certain quality or of a certain quantity
42 VIII, 4|         may be both of a certain quality and of a certain quantity,
43 VIII, 4|        in regard to quantity and quality. But, be it noted, this
44 VIII, 4|     whereby what is of a certain quality changes to a condition of
45 VIII, 7|       which there is a change in quality when a thing is altered