Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 7  |       characteristics of special cases.~We say that one thing comes
 2   I, 7  |        we do not say this in all cases, as we do not say (1) "from
 3   I, 7  |       from surveying the various cases of becoming in the way we
 4   I, 7  |           coming to be". In some cases we do not use the expression "
 5   I, 7  |    unqualified sense.~Now in all cases other than substance it
 6   I, 7  |         plain that these are all cases of coming to be from a substratum.~
 7  II, 1  |    production. But while in some cases (for instance houses and
 8  II, 2  |         state in each of the two cases the definitions of the things
 9  II, 4  |       market. Similarly in other cases of chance it is always possible,
10  II, 5  |         indefinite. (Yet in some cases one might raise the question
11  II, 7  |         qualification or in most cases); (2) that "this must be
12  II, 8  |         If then in art there are cases in which what is rightly
13 III, 5  |     consideration of the various cases serves to show us whether
14  IV, 14 |       and similarly in all other cases. But what is before is in
15   V, 2  |     applicable, so that in these cases the motion is accidental.
16   V, 4  |       complete, just as in other cases completeness and wholeness
17   V, 4  |      continuous.~And besides the cases already mentioned there
18   V, 4  |          the motion: for in some cases the motion is differentiated
19   V, 5  |         not a motion. And in all cases of a thing that has no contrary
20   V, 6  |        true of the corresponding cases of remaining. But there
21  VI, 4  |          we now see that in most cases the fact that all the terms
22  VI, 6  |         contradictories. In such cases we have only to take the
23  VI, 7  |      whole finite motion. In all cases where a thing is in motion
24 VII, 1  |        some are greater, in both cases the whole motion is infinite.
25 VII, 3  |   sense-perception, for in these cases pleasure is felt either
26 VII, 4  | something different in different cases: "equal" is similarly equivocal;
27 VII, 4  |         the attribute in the two cases is really one and the same?~
28 VII, 4  |          is different in the two cases. It would seem, however
29 VII, 4  |        is different in different cases: thus "equality", "sweetness",
30 VII, 4  |        is different in different cases. Moreover, it is not any
31 VII, 4  |          is different in the two cases, e.g. when the alterations
32 VII, 4  |          is different in the two cases. I state it thus because
33 VIII, 1 |   predominance, he should adduce cases where such a state of things
34 VIII, 1 |      that this occurs in certain cases comes the assumption that
35 VIII, 1 |    applied to certain individual cases, he is wrong in making it
36 VIII, 3 |        therefore, that there are cases of occasional motion and
37 VIII, 4 |      something else: and in some cases their motion is natural,
38 VIII, 4 |        something else is in some cases natural, in other unnatural:
39 VIII, 4 |     unnaturally, because in such cases it is clear that the motion
40 VIII, 4 |        else we distinguished the cases in which the motion is unnatural:
41 VIII, 4 |          natural. It is in these cases that difficulty would be
42 VIII, 4 |          clear that in all these cases the thing does not move
43 VIII, 5 |      have the result that in all cases of things being in motion
44 VIII, 6 |         the animal: thus in some cases the cause is nourishment:
45 VIII, 10|          that the movent in such cases moves something else at