Book, Paragraph
1 I, 1 | vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular
2 I, 2 | sense of having the same definition, like "raiment" and "dress",
3 I, 2 | is" may be many either in definition (for example "to be white"
4 I, 3 | which is white" differ in definition, not in the sense that they
5 I, 3 | also "white". Since the definition of the latter is different (
6 I, 3 | consider the mere nature of a definition. For instance, if "man"
7 I, 3 | subject or that in whose definition the subject of which it
8 I, 3 | snubness" contains the definition of "nose", to which we attribute
9 I, 3 | attribute snubness. Further, the definition of the whole is not contained
10 I, 3 | possibly not be "biped", or the definition of "man" must come into
11 I, 3 | man" must come into the definition of "biped"-which is impossible,
12 I, 7 | as the "this"), and the definition was one as we agreed; then
13 I, 9 | before coming to be. (For my definition of matter is just this-the
14 II, 1 | which is specified in the definition of the thing.~For the word "
15 II, 1 | the form specified in the definition, which we name in defining
16 II, 3 | number), and the parts in the definition.~Again (3) the primary source
17 II, 7 | mathematics, to the "what" (to the definition of "straight line" or "commensurable", &
18 II, 9 | sake of which" is in the definition.~Necessity in mathematics
19 II, 9 | beginning starts from the definition or essence; as in artificial
20 II, 9 | necessary is present also in the definition. For if one defines the
21 II, 9 | it is of iron. For in the definition too there are some parts
22 III, 1 | Examples will elucidate this definition of motion. When the buildable,
23 III, 1 | without qualification, i.e. in definition, the fulfilment of bronze
24 III, 2 | 2~The soundness of this definition is evident both when we
25 III, 2 | then the suggested mode of definition, namely that it is a sort
26 III, 3 | they are not the same in definition (as "raiment" and "dress"),
27 III, 3 | only such as have the same definition. But indeed it by no means
28 III, 3 | the action of X" differ in definition.~What then Motion is, has
29 III, 3 | healing, &c. A similar definition will apply to each of the
30 III, 5 | bounded by a surface" is the definition of body there cannot be
31 III, 6 | new part is different.~Our definition then is as follows:~A quantity
32 IV, 1 | it), nor as the form and definition of things, nor as end, nor
33 IV, 3 | the specific form "in" the definition of the specific form.~(5)
34 IV, 11| motion yet differs from it in definition, and is not identical with
35 IV, 11| but because it is one in definition: for this determines the
36 V, 1 | change from not-being.~Now a definition of motion has been given
37 V, 3 | extremities are two. This definition makes it plain that continuity
38 V, 3 | property of things prior in definition, e.g. numbers, while contact
39 V, 4 | locomotion: for according to our definition there can be continuity
40 VI, 2 | in conformity with the definition sometimes given of "the
41 VI, 2 | and if we take this as the definition of continuous, it follows
42 VI, 6 | This is clear from our definition of "primary", in which the
43 VIII, 1| fact, even apart from the definition of motion, every one would
44 VIII, 9| the order of nature, of definition, and of time alike the complete
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