Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2  |        and palpable and offers no difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous
 2   I, 2  |      bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be raised, but
 3   I, 2  |    infinitum.~There is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps
 4   I, 2  |           one with the whole, the difficulty arises that they will be
 5   I, 2  |          many-as if there was any difficulty about the same thing being
 6   I, 3  |        and palpable and offers no difficulty at all: admit one ridiculous
 7   I, 6  |          question of considerable difficulty.~
 8   I, 7  |           by each other. But this difficulty also is solved by the fact
 9   I, 8  |          proceed to show that the difficulty of the early thinkers, as
10   I, 8  |         is one way of solving the difficulty. Another consists in pointing
11  II, 2  |          indeed one might raise a difficulty. Since there are two natures,
12  II, 8  |        and then good-bye to it.~A difficulty presents itself: why should
13  II, 8  |         the kind) which may cause difficulty on this point. Yet it is
14 III, 2  |          given, and also from the difficulty of defining it otherwise.~
15 III, 3  |             3~The solution of the difficulty that is raised about the
16 III, 3  |       This view has a dialectical difficulty. Perhaps it is necessary
17 III, 4  |      appropriate and presents the difficulty that is felt by everybody-not
18 III, 5  |         some other cause.~Another difficulty emerges at the same time.
19 III, 6  |         is infinite. (There is no difficulty in refuting the theory of
20  IV, 1  |          where will it be? Zeno’s difficulty demands an explanation:
21  IV, 2  |          naturally expect to find difficulty in determining what place
22  IV, 7  |          to solve a quite general difficulty, but are not proving the
23   V, 1  |        and heat. Here, however, a difficulty may be raised. Affections,
24   V, 2  |          that which is moved with difficulty after a long time or whose
25   V, 4  |         the various knowledges. A difficulty, however, may be raised
26   V, 4  |          walking. But is not this difficulty removed by the principle
27   V, 4  |         not one. And akin to this difficulty there is another; viz. is
28   V, 6  |         its not-being. And here a difficulty may be raised: if not-being
29   V, 6  |           to it.~Again, a further difficulty may be raised. How is it,
30   V, 6  |      place.~There is also another difficulty involved in the view that
31 VII, 4  |                               4~A difficulty may be raised as to whether
32 VIII, 2 |           does not do so: for the difficulty raised by our objector really
33 VIII, 2 |           thought to present more difficulty than the others, namely,
34 VIII, 4 |          own motion.~The greatest difficulty, however, is presented by
35 VIII, 4 |         It is in these cases that difficulty would be experienced in
36 VIII, 5 |       which is impossible.~Here a difficulty arises: if something is
37 VIII, 6 |           about which we raised a difficulty at the outset-why is it
38 VIII, 8 |           is how we must meet the difficulty that then arises, which
39 VIII, 8 |        argument used to solve the difficulty stated above: we cannot
40 VIII, 8 |        forward a solution of this difficulty turning on the fact that
41 VIII, 10|         will be well to discuss a difficulty that arises in connexion
42 VIII, 10|           must recognize that the difficulty raised cannot be solved
43 VIII, 10| circumference.~There is a further difficulty in supposing it to be possible