Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2 |     as subject. Now Melissus says that Being is infinite.
 2   I, 2 |       limited, as Parmenides says, for though the limit is
 3   I, 5 |      both of which exist, be says, the one as being, the other
 4  II, 4 |      Empedocles does when he says that the air is not always
 5  II, 4 |      chance". At any rate he says in his cosmogony that "it
 6  II, 8 |     to perish, as Empedocles says his "man-faced ox-progeny"
 7 III, 4 | imperishable" as Anaximander says, with the majority of the
 8 III, 5 |   one of them, as Heraclitus says that at some time all things
 9 III, 5 |      infinite is at rest. He says that the infinite itself
10 III, 6 |    than Melissus. The latter says that the whole is infinite,
11  IV, 1 |     chaos first. At least he says:~"First of all things came
12  IV, 2 |     why Plato in the Timaeus says that matter and space are
13  IV, 2 |    is different from what he says in his so-called "unwritten
14  IV, 6 |    were moved there must, he says, be void, but void is not
15  VI, 9 |       is fallacious, when he says that if everything when
16  VI, 9 |     of the course, since (so says Zeno) the time occupied
17 VIII, 1| described by Anaxagoras, who says that all things were together
18 VIII, 1|     a becoming: for time, he says, is uncreated. Plato alone
19 VIII, 1|   view of Empedocles when he says that the constitution of
20 VIII, 5|  Anaxagoras is right when he says that Mind is impassive and
21 VIII, 8|   extremity of Z to H: then, says the argument, D will have
22 VIII, 9| combining". Anaxagoras, too, says that "Mind", his first movent, "