Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2 |     Melissus says-nor, indeed, limited, as Parmenides says, for
 2   I, 2 |      limit is indivisible, the limited is not.~But if (c) all things
 3   I, 6 | Granted, then, that they are a limited number, it is plausible
 4 III, 4 |      them. Those who make them limited in number never make them
 5 III, 4 |      infinite.~(4) Because the limited always finds its limit in
 6 III, 4 |        if everything is always limited by something different from
 7 III, 5 |     inquiry (as physicists) is limited to its special subject-matter,
 8 III, 5 |       the All, even if it were limited, cannot either be or become
 9 III, 6 |     the former describes it as limited, "equally balanced from
10 III, 6 |    addition. It is a whole and limited; not, however, in virtue
11 III, 8 |      of another, the All being limited.~(2) There is a difference
12 III, 8 |     between touching and being limited. The former is relative
13 III, 8 |        of the things which are limited. On the other hand, what
14 III, 8 |        the other hand, what is limited is not limited in relation
15 III, 8 |         what is limited is not limited in relation to anything.
16  IV, 5 |     but as the limit is in the limited; for not everything that
17   V, 3 |    shortest line is definitely limited, and that which is definitely
18   V, 3 |       that which is definitely limited constitutes a measure.~A
19  VI, 2 |        if the time be taken as limited in one direction: for as
20  VI, 7 |     unequal, are none the less limited in magnitude); while on
21 VIII, 5|        the kinds of motion are limited; and if we say that the