Book, Paragraph

 1  II, 3  |       brought about through the action of something else as means
 2  II, 6  |       good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore necessarily
 3  II, 6  | happiness to be a kind of moral action, since it is well-doing.
 4  II, 6  |         is not capable of moral action cannot do anything by chance.
 5  II, 6  |         capable of that mode of action. This is indicated by the
 6  II, 6  |        might have fallen by the action of an agent and for the
 7  II, 8  |       us would agree. Therefore action for an end is present in
 8  II, 8  |        surely as in intelligent action, so in nature; and as in
 9  II, 8  |        nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes.
10  II, 8  |     interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end;
11  II, 9  |       the reasoning, not of the action; while in mathematics the
12  II, 9  |  reasoning only, as there is no action. If then there is to be
13 III, 3  |        potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power
14 III, 3  |    completion of the one is an "action", that of the other a "passion".
15 III, 3  |  actualization of Y through the action of X" differ in definition.~
16 VII, 3  |      Now those that depend upon action are determined by sense-perception,
17 VIII, 10|        be any time in which its action could take place. Suppose
18 VIII, 10|        the time occupied by the action of any finite force must
19 VIII, 10|      these actions, or else the action must be taken up by something