Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 3 |      necessary for him, then, to assume not only that "being" has
 2   I, 3 |      something else. But we must assume that substance is not the
 3   I, 4 |      bricks; and it is better to assume a smaller and finite number
 4   I, 5 |         one another in that some assume contraries which are more
 5   I, 6 | different from both. Some indeed assume more than one such thing
 6   I, 6 |      that it is not necessary to assume a third principle as a substratum
 7   I, 6 |          must, to preserve both, assume a third somewhat as the
 8  IV, 4 |     belong to it essentially. We assume then—~(1) Place is what
 9  IV, 8 |      from its place, why need we assume a place for bodies over
10  IV, 11|        thought to be time-we may assume this.~When, therefore, we
11  IV, 11|       attributes as the sophists assume that Coriscus’ being in
12  VI, 7 |         be traversed, because we assume that the traversing of the
13 VII, 1 |        Now in the first place to assume that AB, because it is in
14 VIII, 5|        but contingent. Now if we assume the existence of a possibility,
15 VIII, 6|       the same, we should always assume that things are finite rather
16 VIII, 6|         here it is sufficient to assume only one movent, the first
17 VIII, 7| successive motion, and we always assume the presence in nature of