Book, Paragraph

 1   I, 2 |    one, it must be either (i) motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus
 2   I, 2 |      whether Being is one and motionless is not a contribution to
 3   I, 3 | follow that Being, if one, is motionless? Why should it not move,
 4  IV, 4 |  other hand is rather what is motionless: so it is rather the whole
 5  IV, 4 |      because as a whole it is motionless.~Hence we conclude that
 6  IV, 4 |   conclude that the innermost motionless boundary of what contains
 7  VI, 9 |     flying arrow is therefore motionless. This is false, for time
 8 VIII, 2|      absolute rest, we have a motionless thing in which motion can
 9 VIII, 3|       in the world are always motionless, others always in motion,
10 VIII, 3|      existent is infinite and motionless, it certainly does not appear