Book, Paragraph
1 I, 1 | not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted
2 I, 1 | like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation
3 I, 2 | be the principle of some thing or things.~To inquire therefore
4 I, 2 | for it will be the same thing "to be good" and "to be
5 I, 2 | not good", and so the same thing will be "good" and "not
6 I, 2 | in a pother lest the same thing should turn out in their
7 I, 2 | example "to be white" is one thing, "to be musical" another,
8 I, 2 | musical" another, yet the same thing be both, so the one is many)
9 I, 2 | difficulty about the same thing being both one and many,
10 I, 3 | hypothesi "being" means only one thing.~If, then, "substance" is
11 I, 3 | are one if being means one thing, they conceded that not-being
12 I, 3 | that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same
13 I, 4 | such and such a kind of thing is reduced to change of
14 I, 4 | has been mixed in every. thing, because they saw everything
15 I, 4 | flesh, but the nature of a thing is held to be that of which
16 I, 4 | necessary that the whole thing itself may be of any size.
17 I, 4 | flesh, bone, nor any such thing can be of indefinite size
18 I, 4 | are separated out, and a thing receives its designation
19 I, 5 | is acted on by, any other thing at random, nor may anything
20 I, 5 | not-musical", but not from any thing other than musical, but
21 I, 5 | pass into the first chance thing; "white" does not pass into "
22 I, 5 | and not into any chance thing which is not white, but
23 I, 5 | and not into any chance thing other than musical, but
24 I, 5 | a statue (or any other thing that has been shaped) from
25 I, 6 | but both act on a third thing different from both. Some
26 I, 6 | assume more than one such thing from which they construct
27 I, 6 | constitute the substance of any thing. But what is a first principle
28 I, 7 | special cases.~We say that one thing comes to be from another
29 I, 7 | comes to be from another thing, and one sort of thing from
30 I, 7 | another thing, and one sort of thing from another sort of thing,
31 I, 7 | thing from another sort of thing, both in the case of simple
32 I, 7 | musical".~When a "simple" thing is said to become something,
33 I, 7 | For we know that when a thing comes to be of such a quantity
34 I, 7 | before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the
35 I, 8 | becomes some particular thing", are to be taken (in the
36 I, 8 | nevertheless we maintain that a thing may "come to be from what
37 I, 8 | a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from the privation,
38 I, 9 | place they allow that a thing may come to be without qualification
39 I, 9 | potentiality-which is a very different thing.~Now we distinguish matter
40 I, 9 | primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to
41 II, 1 | something else external to the thing, in others those which may
42 II, 1 | this character-whether one thing or more than one thing-this
43 II, 1 | dispositions. Every such thing they held to be eternal (
44 II, 1 | in the definition of the thing.~For the word "nature" is
45 II, 1 | anything artistic about a thing, if it is a bed only potentially,
46 II, 1 | rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said to
47 II, 1 | man.~We also speak of a thing’s nature as being exhibited
48 II, 2 | sake of which". For if a thing undergoes a continuous change
49 II, 3 | do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the "
50 II, 3 | 1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists,
51 II, 3 | for the sake of which" a thing is done, e.g. health is
52 II, 3 | several causes of the same thing not merely in virtue of
53 II, 3 | change. Further the same thing is the cause of contrary
54 II, 3 | investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary to
55 II, 4 | supposed that there is no such thing as chance or whether they
56 II, 4 | for it is not any chance thing that comes from a given
57 II, 4 | intelligence, as being a divine thing and full of mystery.~Thus
58 II, 5 | plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity;
59 II, 5 | by chance". For just as a thing is something either in virtue
60 II, 5 | To resume then; when a thing of this kind comes to pass
61 II, 5 | to say that chance is a thing contrary to rule is correct.
62 II, 6 | chance. Thus an inanimate thing or a lower animal or a child
63 II, 6 | derivation the case in which the thing itself happens in vain.
64 II, 7 | this was the essence of the thing; and (4) because it is better
65 II, 8 | a house, e.g. had been a thing made by nature, it would
66 III, 1 | Again, there is no such thing as motion over and above
67 III, 1 | ripening, ageing.~The same thing, if it is of a certain kind,
68 III, 1 | agent can be moved: when a thing of this kind causes motion,
69 III, 1 | later. is possible for a thing to cause motion, though
70 III, 1 | motion is an attribute of a thing just when it is fully real
71 III, 1 | before nor after. For each thing of this kind is capable
72 III, 2 | potentiality or as an actuality-a thing that is merely capable of
73 III, 2 | undergoing change, nor yet a thing that is actually of a certain
74 III, 2 | immobility is rest-when a thing is subject to motion its
75 III, 3 | the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion
76 III, 3 | and, a second absurdity, a thing will have two motions at
77 III, 3 | one definite quality? The thing is impossible: the actualization
78 III, 3 | the actualization of one thing should be in another. Teaching
79 III, 4 | whether there is such a thing or not, and, if there is,
80 III, 4 | attribute of some other thing. Only the Pythagoreans place
81 III, 4 | together, and so of any thing: therefore all things: and
82 III, 4 | separation, not only for each thing, but for all. Each thing
83 III, 4 | thing, but for all. Each thing that comes to be comes from
84 III, 5 | the infinite should be a thing which is itself infinite,
85 III, 5 | the infinite be itself any thing, unless both number and
86 III, 5 | infinite cannot be an actual thing and a substance and principle.
87 III, 5 | infinites. But the same thing cannot be many infinites. (
88 III, 5 | follows that there is no such thing. If "bounded by a surface"
89 III, 5 | whether it is, as some hold, a thing over and above the elements (
90 III, 5 | But this is not true: a thing could be somewhere by compulsion,
91 III, 5 | quantity just means these-so a thing’s being in place means that
92 III, 6 | what fully is. Further, a thing is infinite either by addition
93 III, 6 | the games", because one thing after another is always
94 III, 6 | this mode of existence: one thing is always being taken after
95 III, 6 | after another, and each thing that is taken is always
96 III, 6 | by addition is the same thing as the infinite by division.
97 III, 8 | potentially but as a separate thing. Some have no cogency; others
98 III, 8 | The passing away of one thing may be the coming to be
99 III, 8 | or defect is not in the thing but in the thought. One
100 IV, 1 | whether there is such a thing or not, and the manner of
101 IV, 1 | turned: that is why the same thing may be both right and left,
102 IV, 1 | place must be a marvellous thing, and take precedence of
103 IV, 1 | whether there is such a thing.~
104 IV, 2 | this way the place of a thing is its form. But, if we
105 IV, 2 | are not separate from the thing, whereas the place can be
106 IV, 2 | bodies. Hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a
107 IV, 2 | vessel is no part of the thing.~In so far then as it is
108 IV, 2 | it is separable from the thing, it is not the form: qua
109 IV, 2 | that there is a different thing outside it. (Plato of course,
110 IV, 2 | If the place is in the thing (it must be if it is either
111 IV, 2 | and motion along with the thing, and are not always in the
112 IV, 2 | place, but are where the thing is. Hence the place will
113 IV, 3 | see in how many senses one thing is said to be "in" another.~(
114 IV, 3 | 7) As the existence of a thing centres "in its good and
115 IV, 3 | strictest sense of all, as a thing is "in" a vessel, and generally "
116 IV, 3 | raise the question whether a thing can be in itself, or whether
117 IV, 3 | ambiguous; we may mean the thing qua itself or qua something
118 IV, 3 | whole-the one that in which a thing is, the other the thing
119 IV, 3 | thing is, the other the thing which is in it-the whole
120 IV, 3 | as being in itself. For a thing is described in terms of
121 IV, 3 | well as in terms of the thing as a whole, e.g. a man is
122 IV, 3 | then, but not primarily, a thing can be in itself, namely,
123 IV, 3 | when there are parts, a thing will be in itself, as "white"
124 IV, 3 | these are in a way the same thing,) they differ in essence,
125 IV, 3 | if it is possible for a thing to be in itself; so that,
126 IV, 3 | Nor is it possible for a thing to be in itself even incidentally:
127 IV, 3 | the same time in the same thing. The jar would be in itself-if
128 IV, 3 | would be in itself-if a thing whose nature it is to receive
129 IV, 3 | in it.~Obviously then a thing cannot be in itself primarily.~
130 IV, 3 | infinite regress.~Another thing is plain: since the vessel
131 IV, 3 | matter or the form of the thing contained, but must different-for
132 IV, 4 | Place is no part of the thing.~(3) The immediate place
133 IV, 4 | The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater
134 IV, 4 | less nor greater than the thing.~(4) Place can be left behind
135 IV, 4 | can be left behind by the thing and is separable. In addition:~(
136 IV, 4 | smaller.~Again, when we say a thing is "moved", the predicate
137 IV, 4 | belong do so.~We say that a thing is in the world, in the
138 IV, 4 | its place, the place of a thing would not be equal to the
139 IV, 4 | primary place in which a thing is actually is.~When what
140 IV, 4 | is not separate from the thing, but is in continuity with
141 IV, 4 | continuity with it, the thing is said to be in what surrounds
142 IV, 4 | in a whole. But when the thing is separate and in contact,
143 IV, 4 | boundaries. But not of the same thing: the form is the boundary
144 IV, 4 | form is the boundary of the thing, the place is the boundary
145 IV, 4 | infinity of places in the same thing. For when the water and
146 IV, 4 | neither separable from the thing nor contains it, whereas
147 IV, 4 | above, the extension of the thing which is displaced-place
148 IV, 4 | So when what is within a thing which is moved, is moved
149 IV, 4 | i.e. a container of the thing.~Further, place is coincident
150 IV, 4 | place is coincident with the thing, for boundaries are coincident
151 IV, 5 | alongside it some other thing wherein it is and which
152 IV, 5 | fulfilment are the same thing (for water is both, the
153 IV, 6 | place" denoted the same thing, though the essence of the
154 IV, 6 | 1) They argue, for one thing, that change in place (i.e.
155 IV, 7 | this would be the kind of thing that some say place is.~
156 IV, 8 | opposite, that not a single thing can be moved if there is
157 IV, 8 | no one could say why a thing once set in motion should
158 IV, 8 | rather than here? So that a thing will either be at rest or
159 IV, 8 | because it impedes the moving thing, most of all if it is moving
160 IV, 8 | through the other, but if a thing moves through the thickest
161 IV, 8 | its force. For a moving thing cleaves the medium either
162 IV, 8 | moving things what sort of thing void is. But in fact it
163 IV, 9 | the rarer and more void a thing is the quicker it will move
164 IV, 9 | that was not hot when the thing was less hot; just as, if
165 IV, 9 | states; so that the same thing is dense and rare, and the
166 IV, 10 | Further, if a divisible thing is to exist, it is necessary
167 IV, 10 | No determinate divisible thing has a single termination,
168 IV, 10 | change or movement of each thing is only in the thing which
169 IV, 10 | each thing is only in the thing which changes or where the
170 IV, 10 | which changes or where the thing itself which moves or changes
171 IV, 11 | different, and that some third thing is intermediate to them.
172 IV, 11 | there are different kinds of thing.) Just as motion is a perpetual
173 IV, 11 | the Lyceum is a different thing from Coriscus’ being in
174 IV, 11 | what is carried is a real thing, the movement is not. Thus
175 IV, 11 | locomotion is made one by the thing which is moved, because
176 IV, 11 | in the movement of such a thing)-but because it is one in
177 IV, 12 | things "in place" by place.~A thing, then, will be affected
178 IV, 12 | there is a number of the thing, and that its being is measured
179 IV, 12 | which it is. Hence if a thing is "in time" it will be
180 IV, 12 | things, it is clear that a thing whose existence is measured
181 IV, 12 | to what eternally is. A thing whose contrary is not eternal
182 IV, 13 | the uniting are the same thing and in the same reference,
183 IV, 13 | in a sense, in the same thing, so time is always at a
184 IV, 13 | and the end of the same thing; if it were, it would be
185 IV, 13 | somehow and acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if
186 IV, 13 | rule, we chiefly mean by a thing’s being destroyed by time.
187 IV, 14 | same.~Now there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion
188 IV, 14 | is measured by some one thing homogeneous with it, units
189 IV, 14 | by a differentia of that thing, but not if they do; e.g.
190 V, 1 | an accident. Again (2) a thing is said without qualification
191 V, 1 | which refer to part of the thing in question: thus the body
192 V, 1 | there is (3) the case of a thing which is in motion neither
193 V, 1 | in motion. Here we have a thing which is essentially movable:
194 V, 1 | which is so is a different thing according to the particular
195 V, 1 | for instance it may be a thing capable of alteration: and
196 V, 1 | it is again a different thing according as it is capable
197 V, 1 | case of the mover: (1) one thing causes motion accidentally, (
198 V, 1 | anything else: for instance, a thing which is becoming white
199 V, 1 | now clear in what sense a thing is in motion essentially,
200 V, 1 | to be of the particular thing, white, while change from
201 V, 1 | respect of which we say that a thing "comes to be" without qualification,
202 V, 1 | comes to be" some particular thing. Change from subject to
203 V, 2 | definite to some other definite thing. So in this case it must
204 V, 2 | or change.~Thirdly, if a thing is capable of any particular
205 V, 2 | corresponding coming to rest, and a thing that is capable of becoming
206 V, 2 | quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or
207 V, 2 | a qualified sense: and a thing’s possessing a quality in
208 V, 2 | the only kind of immovable thing of which I use the term "
209 V, 3 | together.~That which a changing thing, if it changes continuously
210 V, 3 | contrary that is "last": and a thing is moved continuously if
211 V, 3 | constitutes a measure.~A thing is "in succession" when
212 V, 3 | succession to a particular thing, and is something posterior:
213 V, 3 | succession" to the former.~A thing that is in succession and
214 V, 4 | specifically one when the same thing changes from the same to
215 V, 4 | Of these three it is the thing in which the motion takes
216 V, 4 | specifically, it is the thing moved that makes the motion
217 V, 4 | specifically the same, of one thing, and in one time. Unity
218 V, 4 | when they refer to the same thing: e.g. they do not specifically
219 V, 5 | respectively from and to the same thing, e.g. a motion from health
220 V, 5 | motion. And in all cases of a thing that has no contrary we
221 V, 5 | from and change to the same thing. Thus coming to be is contrary
222 V, 6 | motion to that in which a thing is at rest is rather a coming
223 V, 6 | changes (viz. change from the thing and change to the thing,
224 V, 6 | thing and change to the thing, e.g. change from being
225 V, 6 | to absence of change in a thing’s being? and is this absence
226 V, 6 | absence of change in the thing’s not-being, or the ceasing
227 V, 6 | the ceasing to be of the thing: for such ceasing to be
228 V, 6 | is change from it and the thing’s coming to be is change
229 V, 6 | unnatural remaining of a thing is contrary to its natural
230 V, 6 | in the motion of the same thing: one of its motions, the
231 V, 6 | with the locomotion of a thing to its proper place.~There
232 V, 6 | from that place. For when a thing is moving from or discarding
233 V, 6 | simultaneously predicable of the same thing. May we not say, however,
234 V, 6 | however, that in so far as the thing is still stationary it is
235 V, 6 | For, in fact, whenever a thing is in motion, part of it
236 V, 6 | were not the case: for a thing may remain still merely
237 V, 6 | violence: thus we shall have a thing being in a non-permanent
238 V, 6 | unnatural motion, so, too, a thing may be in an unnatural state
239 VI, 1 | extremity, the extremity and the thing of which it is the extremity
240 VI, 1 | cannot be continuous: and one thing can be in contact with another
241 VI, 1 | as we saw, no continuous thing is divisible into things
242 VI, 1 | there could be any such thing it is clear that it must
243 VI, 1 | its motion was Z. Now a thing that is in motion from one
244 VI, 1 | it is in motion. And if a thing is in motion over the whole
245 VI, 1 | and will take place by a thing’s having completed a motion
246 VI, 1 | it will be possible for a thing to have completed a walk
247 VI, 1 | and G, it follows that a thing can be continuously at rest
248 VI, 1 | would be possible for a thing in spite of the presence
249 VI, 1 | equal velocity will cause a thing to pass through less of
250 VI, 1 | if the time in which a thing is carried over the section
251 VI, 2 | else that is less than a thing is also itself less than
252 VI, 2 | also itself less than that thing. Hence it follows that the
253 VI, 2 | comparison with that of another thing, and since, whereas a thing
254 VI, 2 | thing, and since, whereas a thing is slower if its motion
255 VI, 2 | continuous also, inasmuch as a thing asses over half a given
256 VI, 2 | that it is impossible for a thing to pass over or severally
257 VI, 2 | extremities. So while a thing in a finite time cannot
258 VI, 2 | Now in this period the thing in motion will pass over
259 VI, 3 | the word is applied to one thing in virtue of another, but
260 VI, 3 | But if the intermediate thing is time, it will be divisible:
261 VI, 3 | and it is possible for a thing to be in motion throughout
262 VI, 3 | implication that the same thing can at the same time be
263 VI, 3 | Again, when we say that a thing is at rest, we imply that
264 VI, 4 | to something, and when a thing is at the goal of its change
265 VI, 4 | parts. But the motion of a thing can never be constituted
266 VI, 4 | the being-in-motion, the thing that is in motion, and the
267 VI, 4 | showed that the motion of a thing is divisible into the motions
268 VI, 4 | motions of the parts of the thing: for if we take separately
269 VI, 4 | consequence of the fact that the thing that changes is divisible
270 VI, 4 | the first instance to the thing that changes. That divisibility
271 VI, 5 | of contradiction, where a thing has changed from not-being
272 VI, 5 | have the result that the thing that has changed, at the
273 VI, 5 | AG cannot be the primary thing in which the completion
274 VI, 5 | completed, and there is such a thing as an end of change, which
275 VI, 5 | all: for there is no such thing as a beginning of a process
276 VI, 5 | Again, if the changing thing is at rest in the whole
277 VI, 5 | divisible, and the changing thing must have changed in every
278 VI, 5 | that in respect of which a thing changes-there is a difference
279 VI, 5 | primary "where" to which a thing has changed. And if we take
280 VI, 6 | for the time in which a thing is said to change may be
281 VI, 6 | e.g. when we say that a thing changes in a particular
282 VI, 6 | ChRh, in half the time a thing that is in motion with equal
283 VI, 6 | distance. But if this second thing whose velocity is equal
284 VI, 6 | certain time, the original thing that is in motion must have
285 VI, 6 | changes.~Again, since a thing that changes continuously
286 VI, 6 | time. For suppose that a thing has changed from A to B
287 VI, 6 | continuous. For suppose that a thing has changed from G to D.
288 VI, 6 | change is completed, the thing changes to those segments.
289 VI, 6 | take the time in which a thing has changed and again apply
290 VI, 6 | is not always the actual thing that is in process of becoming
291 VI, 6 | to say, some part of the thing in question, e.g. the foundation-stone
292 VI, 6 | continuous things: and so a thing cannot be in process of
293 VI, 6 | time which the changing thing may occupy.~
294 VI, 7 | it is impossible that a thing should undergo a finite
295 VI, 7 | motion. In all cases where a thing is in motion with uniform
296 VI, 7 | finite stretch over which a thing has been moved in the given
297 VI, 7 | completed in it, whether the thing in motion changes with uniform
298 VI, 7 | impossible for one and the same thing to be infinitely in process
299 VI, 7 | which of the two is the thing in motion; either case involves
300 VI, 8 | primary time in which a thing is coming to a stand. Now
301 VI, 8 | parts, because the moving thing would necessarily have been
302 VI, 8 | therefore divisible, the thing is coming to a stand in
303 VI, 8 | that in which primarily a thing is coming to a stand must
304 VI, 8 | rest to be the state of a thing to which motion is natural
305 VI, 8 | the previous state of a thing is still unaltered, not
306 VI, 8 | consequently that in which a thing is at rest cannot be without
307 VI, 8 | period of time, and the thing must be at rest in every
308 VI, 8 | against some particular thing primarily. For if a thing-itself
309 VI, 8 | be said with truth that a thing, itself and its parts, occupies
310 VI, 8 | over against any particular thing (for the whole period of
311 VI, 8 | be true to say that the thing, itself and its parts, occupies
312 VI, 8 | single moment, then the thing will be over against a particular
313 VI, 8 | over against a particular thing not for any period of time
314 VI, 8 | opposite some particular thing, it cannot in a period of
315 VI, 9 | in the argument that if a thing is changing from not-white,
316 VI, 9 | or not-white. We call a thing white or not-white not necessarily
317 VI, 9 | relation: while the changing thing must of necessity be in
318 VI, 9 | changing into another, and the thing will never be at rest. And
319 VI, 10 | the peculiar nature of the thing that is increasing, while
320 VII, 1 | something else is at rest, but a thing must be moved by something
321 VII, 1 | take the case in which a thing is in locomotion and is
322 VII, 1 | motion, though not of one thing, but of many: and in the
323 VII, 1 | considering this is so: for each thing accomplishes its own motion,
324 VII, 2 | universally true wherever one thing is moved by another. And
325 VII, 2 | movent does not follow up the thing that it has moved: throwing
326 VII, 2 | natural locomotion of the thing moved, which continues its
327 VII, 2 | that which is twirling a thing must be pulling one part
328 VII, 2 | pulling one part of the thing and pushing another part,
329 VII, 2 | is this that causes one thing to be pulled on along with
330 VII, 2 | quality. Thus we say that a thing is altered by becoming hot
331 VII, 2 | caused by a part of the thing becoming detached. So that
332 VII, 3 | particular formation of a thing is completed, we do not
333 VII, 3 | respectively. But when a thing has been affected and altered
334 VII, 3 | the figure or shape of a thing we no longer call that which
335 VII, 3 | whereas having regard to a thing’s affections or alterations
336 VII, 3 | then if ever that we have a thing in its natural state: e.g.
337 VII, 3 | excellences are perfections of a thing’s nature and defects are
338 VII, 3 | natural constitution of a thing tend to promote or destroy
339 VII, 4 | the other. Further, if one thing alters and another accomplishes
340 VII, 4 | motion also implies that one thing traverses an equal distance
341 VII, 4 | Moreover, it is not any casual thing that is capable of carrying
342 VII, 4 | primarily only by one single thing.~Must we then say that,
343 VII, 4 | Thus in this respect one thing will not be commensurable
344 VII, 5 | for at any moment when a thing is causing motion, it also
345 VII, 5 | case we have a definite thing that cause increase and
346 VII, 5 | increase and a definite thing that suffers increase, and
347 VII, 5 | Similarly we have a definite thing that causes alteration and
348 VII, 5 | alteration and a definite thing that undergoes alteration,
349 VIII, 1 | becoming of every movable thing, it follows that before
350 VIII, 1 | time when there is no such thing but only something that
351 VIII, 1 | that is at rest, then this thing that is at rest must previously
352 VIII, 1 | something similar, for a cold thing in a sense causes heating
353 VIII, 1 | is on the approach of one thing to another that the one
354 VIII, 1 | consequence: e.g. if one thing is double another when before
355 VIII, 1 | to the last: for when a thing ceases to be moved, it does
356 VIII, 1 | of being burned, since a thing may be capable of being
357 VIII, 1 | being burned-nor, when a thing ceases to be movent, does
358 VIII, 2 | Secondly, we see that a thing that neither is in motion
359 VIII, 2 | rest, we have a motionless thing in which motion can be produced
360 VIII, 2 | can be produced from the thing itself, and not from without.
361 VIII, 2 | force at one time causes a thing to be in motion, and at
362 VIII, 3 | locomotion, it would be a strange thing if a stone could be falling
363 VIII, 3 | theory there can be no such thing as increase: nor can there
364 VIII, 3 | nor can there be any such thing as compulsory motion, if
365 VIII, 3 | it is impossible that a thing can be at rest before being
366 VIII, 3 | perishing, for that to which a thing changes comes to be, or
367 VIII, 3 | be, and that from which a thing changes ceases to be, or
368 VIII, 3 | Now if there is such a thing as false opinion or opinion
369 VIII, 3 | similarly if there is such a thing as imagination, or if it
370 VIII, 4 | or contains as a part a thing that causes motion or suffers
371 VIII, 4 | suffers motion, essential to a thing that causes motion or suffers
372 VIII, 4 | merely by belonging to such a thing or containing it as a part.~
373 VIII, 4 | source of the motion of a thing is in the thing itself we
374 VIII, 4 | motion of a thing is in the thing itself we say that the motion
375 VIII, 4 | that the motion of that thing is natural. Therefore the
376 VIII, 4 | abnormal. The fact that a thing that is in motion derives
377 VIII, 4 | something other than the thing itself. Next to things that
378 VIII, 4 | ought to distinguish in the thing between the movent and the
379 VIII, 4 | proper positions-the light thing up and the heavy thing down-their
380 VIII, 4 | light thing up and the heavy thing down-their motion is natural;
381 VIII, 4 | themselves (I mean that if e.g. a thing can cause itself to walk
382 VIII, 4 | move itself? In so far as a thing is one and continuous not
383 VIII, 4 | it is only in so far as a thing is divided that one part
384 VIII, 4 | inanimate things when an animate thing moves them. It is the fact
385 VIII, 4 | accidentally (for the same thing may be both of a certain
386 VIII, 4 | for water is the first thing that is potentially light),
387 VIII, 4 | lightness consists in the light thing being in a certain situation,
388 VIII, 4 | tendency. As we have said, a thing may be potentially light
389 VIII, 4 | one. Thus not only when a thing is water is it in a sense
390 VIII, 4 | something prevents it. The thing in a sense is and in a sense
391 VIII, 4 | that in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but
392 VIII, 4 | by that which brought the thing into existence as such and
393 VIII, 5 | immediately precedes the last thing in the series, or there
394 VIII, 5 | else. Now we say that the thing is moved both by the last
395 VIII, 5 | the first will move the thing without the last, but the
396 VIII, 5 | else: e.g. a man moves a thing either himself or with a
397 VIII, 5 | himself or with a stick, and a thing is knocked down either by
398 VIII, 5 | impossible for that with which a thing is moved to move it without
399 VIII, 5 | on the other hand, if a thing imparts motion by its own
400 VIII, 5 | if there is a different thing with which it imparts motion,
401 VIII, 5 | reasoning also shows that when a thing is moved, if it is not moved
402 VIII, 5 | Consequently the first thing that is in motion will derive
403 VIII, 5 | consider the question; if a thing moves itself, in what sense
404 VIII, 5 | and being taught (the same thing), or both restoring to and
405 VIII, 5 | possesses it. Consequently (if a thing can move itself as a whole),
406 VIII, 5 | itself as a whole), the same thing in respect of the same thing
407 VIII, 5 | thing in respect of the same thing may be at the same time
408 VIII, 5 | moved. Therefore when a thing moves itself it is one part
409 VIII, 5 | be no first movent. If a thing is moved by a series of
410 VIII, 5 | which is further from the thing that is moved is nearer
411 VIII, 5 | place we should then have a thing undergoing the same motion
412 VIII, 5 | Therefore in the whole of the thing we may distinguish that
413 VIII, 5 | way is it possible for a thing to be self-moved. Further,
414 VIII, 5 | imparts motion may be either a thing that is moved by something
415 VIII, 5 | moved by something else or a thing that is unmoved, and that
416 VIII, 5 | is moved may be either a thing that imparts motion to something
417 VIII, 5 | motion to something else or a thing that does not, that which
418 VIII, 6 | necessarily be something, one thing or it may be a plurality,
419 VIII, 6 | necessarily be some such thing, which, while it has the
420 VIII, 6 | seem to be necessary, if a thing that has not parts at one
421 VIII, 6 | time is not, that any such thing should without undergoing
422 VIII, 6 | into being, and though one thing that is unmoved moves one
423 VIII, 6 | that is unmoved moves one thing while another moves another,
424 VIII, 6 | since in the event of a thing’s being moved now by one
425 VIII, 6 | s being moved now by one thing and now by another the whole
426 VIII, 6 | motion to come to be in a thing without having been in existence
427 VIII, 6 | relation with each several thing that moves itself. (Moreover
428 VIII, 6 | confidently conclude that if a thing belongs to the class of
429 VIII, 6 | between accidental motion of a thing by itself and such motion
430 VIII, 6 | motions in each several thing that it moves and will cause
431 VIII, 7 | contrary. But the fact that a thing is altered requires that
432 VIII, 7 | place. And further, when a thing is increased or decreased
433 VIII, 7 | used in several senses. A thing is said to be prior to other
434 VIII, 7 | the case of any individual thing that has a becoming, locomotion
435 VIII, 7 | motion on the ground that the thing must first become. But though
436 VIII, 7 | the case of any individual thing that becomes, nevertheless
437 VIII, 7 | reason but also because a thing that is in motion loses
438 VIII, 7 | change in quality when a thing is altered and a change
439 VIII, 7 | change in quantity when a thing is increased or decreased.
440 VIII, 7 | contrary changes. Now a thing that is undergoing any particular
441 VIII, 7 | then, that for the changing thing the contraries will be states
442 VIII, 7 | provided it is impossible for a thing to undergo opposite changes
443 VIII, 7 | to be present to the same thing at the same time: the point
444 VIII, 7 | Nor does it matter if the thing need not rest in the contradictory
445 VIII, 7 | instances the important thing was not the relation of
446 VIII, 7 | processes being present to a thing at the same time. And there
447 VIII, 7 | one contrary to the same thing, that a particular motion
448 VIII, 7 | changes to be present to a thing at the same time. Furthermore,
449 VIII, 7 | to be an utterly absurd thing if as soon as anything has
450 VIII, 8 | that if the locomotion of a thing is rectilinear and finite
451 VIII, 8 | continuous locomotion: for the thing must turn back, and that
452 VIII, 8 | to be motion of a single thing in a single period of time
453 VIII, 8 | circle (which is not the same thing as rotatory locomotion:
454 VIII, 8 | locomotion: for, when a thing merely traverses a circle,
455 VIII, 8 | therefore, where the motion of a thing is continuous, it is impossible
456 VIII, 8 | other hand in the case of a thing that turns back in its course
457 VIII, 8 | the later so far as the thing is concerned, we shall be
458 VIII, 8 | consequence that the same thing is at the same moment existent
459 VIII, 8 | not existent, and that a thing is not existent at the moment
460 VIII, 8 | other: but so far as the thing is concerned it belongs
461 VIII, 8 | suppose a time ABG and a thing D, D being white in the
462 VIII, 8 | which it is true to call the thing white or not white respectively.
463 VIII, 8 | respectively. Otherwise a thing may be non-existent at the
464 VIII, 8 | it must be possible for a thing at the same time to be white
465 VIII, 8 | e.g. on arriving at B a thing must also have been in process
466 VIII, 8 | we are to suppose that a thing proceeds in locomotion from
467 VIII, 8 | follows another: we have a thing that is in process of change
468 VIII, 8 | this is impossible, the thing must come to a stand at
469 VIII, 8 | and it is impossible for a thing to undergo simultaneously
470 VIII, 8 | rotatory motion is motion of a thing from its place to its place,
471 VIII, 8 | so, since then the same thing would have to undergo simultaneously
472 VIII, 8 | becoming and perishing the same thing is true. It makes no difference
473 VIII, 9 | infinite: for there is no such thing as an infinite straight
474 VIII, 9 | since the velocity of a thing always increases proportionately
475 VIII, 9 | becoming or perishing of a thing is accounted for by "density"
476 VIII, 9 | noted that we say that a thing "is in motion" in the strict
477 VIII, 9 | in respect of place: if a thing is in process of increase
478 VIII, 10| finite. Therefore a finite thing cannot impart to anything
479 VIII, 10| possible for this second thing than for the original thing
480 VIII, 10| thing than for the original thing to be in motion when the
481 VIII, 10| must say further that this thing does not cease simultaneously
482 VIII, 10| continuous motion in a single thing, and therefore, since it
483 VIII, 10| the movement is a single thing, it is either itself in
484 VIII, 10| that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by a finite
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