Book, Paragraph

  1      I, II   |          used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the
  2      I, II   |         Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and
  3      I, VI   |         as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished with means,
  4      I, VI   |        kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
  5      I, VI   |         view that the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master.
  6      I, XII  |         is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the
  7      I, XIII |           call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to
  8      I, XIII |          freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may
  9      I, XIII |         arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ
 10      I, XIII |          to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may
 11      I, XIII |          other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate
 12      I, XIII |         them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural
 13      I, XIII |         other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain
 14      I, XIII |        subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the
 15      I, XIII |         ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function,
 16      I, XIII |      require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each
 17      I, XIII |        them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them;
 18      I, XIII |      those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition
 19      I, XIII |           therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself
 20      I, XIII |            and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative
 21      I, XIII |    obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from
 22      I, XIII |       what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also
 23      I, XIII |        parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard
 24      I, XIII |           must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and
 25     II, IX   |        there are many elements of virtue), to receive his enactments.
 26     II, IX   |           of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because
 27     II, IX   |         and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there
 28     II, IX   |           great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans
 29     II, IX   |         has regard to one part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier,
 30     II, IX   |           part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier, which gives
 31     II, IX   |     contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they
 32     II, IX   |        are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.~Once more:
 33     II, XI   |       wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes
 34     II, XI   |         their example; and, where virtue has not the first place,
 35    III, IV   |        the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good
 36    III, IV   |        some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like the
 37    III, IV   |   definition of each individual’s virtue applies exclusively to him,
 38    III, IV   |          is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore
 39    III, IV   |           there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which
 40    III, IV   |          citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good
 41    III, IV   |          is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue.
 42    III, IV   |           virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that
 43    III, IV   |          of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.~
 44    III, IV   |           and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the
 45    III, IV   |     citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the
 46    III, IV   |       coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen—thus,
 47    III, IV   |        but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we
 48    III, IV   |     composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot
 49    III, IV   |         show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and
 50    III, IV   |           be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and
 51    III, IV   |          the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide?
 52    III, IV   |           by a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same
 53    III, IV   |         as well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and
 54    III, IV   |          the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be
 55    III, IV   |           cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from
 56    III, IV   |          be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both.
 57    III, IV   |       both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that
 58    III, IV   |         that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include
 59    III, IV   |           those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include
 60    III, IV   |        will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free
 61    III, IV   |         to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly
 62    III, IV   |         the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same
 63    III, V    |       every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for
 64    III, V    |        then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply
 65    III, V    |     honors are given according to virtue and merit; for no man can
 66    III, V    |           for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of
 67    III, V    |          the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same
 68    III, VII  |         man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the number increases
 69    III, VII  |       perfection in every kind of virtue, though they may in military
 70    III, VII  |       though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the
 71    III, IX   |           take into consideration virtue and vice in states. Whence
 72    III, IX   |          be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a state
 73    III, IX   |     inferior to them in political virtue; or than those who exceed
 74    III, IX   |          are surpassed by them in virtue.~From what has been said
 75    III, X    |       ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those
 76    III, XI   |           the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they
 77    III, XII  |          in height more than B in virtue, even if virtue in general
 78    III, XII  |         than B in virtue, even if virtue in general excels height
 79    III, XIII |       already said, education and virtue have superior claims. As,
 80    III, XIII |   nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said
 81    III, XIII | acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others.
 82    III, XIII |           difficulty occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better
 83    III, XIII | government on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many
 84    III, XIII |        with a view to the life of virtue.~If, however, there be some
 85    III, XIII |      complement of a state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the
 86    III, XIII |         so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity.
 87    III, XIII |       that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law—they are
 88    III, XIII |         one who is pre-eminent in virtue—what is to be done with
 89    III, XV   |     obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by
 90    III, XV   |          a number of men equal in virtue can be found.~The first
 91    III, XV   |        were small, men of eminent virtue were few. Further, they
 92    III, XVII |         nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right
 93    III, XVII |  producing a race superior in the virtue needed for political rule
 94    III, XVII |           as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of
 95    III, XVII |           to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all others,
 96    III, XVIII|        all the others together in virtue, and both rulers and subjects
 97    III, XVIII|           of our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is necessarily
 98    III, XVIII|       necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect
 99     IV, II   |         both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means.
100     IV, II   |          mere name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority
101     IV, IV   |           to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar
102     IV, VII  |          states which do not make virtue the aim of the community,
103     IV, VII  |          merit and reputation for virtue may be found. And so where
104     IV, VII  |  government has regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Carthage,
105     IV, VII  |       three, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two
106     IV, VII  |       principles of democracy and virtue temper each other. There
107     IV, VIII |    principle of an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy,
108     IV, VIII |  government, freedom, wealth, and virtue (for the fourth or good
109     IV, VIII |           only ancient wealth and virtue), it is clear that the admixture
110     IV, XI   |    neither assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary
111     IV, XI   |          is the life according to virtue lived without impediment,
112     IV, XI   |      without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the life
113     IV, XI   |       same the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic
114      V, I    |    revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all
115      V, I    |     oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and
116      V, I    |      persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere
117      V, III  | opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that
118      V, IV   |          those who are eminent in virtue usually do not stir up insurrections,
119      V, VII  |         democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy
120      V, IX   |      administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind
121      V, IX   |         his skill rather than his virtue; for few have military skill,
122      V, IX   |     military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of trust
123      V, IX   |      should be observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required
124      V, IX   |       asked what a man wants with virtue if he have political ability
125      V, IX   |          Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their
126      V, X    |    himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas
127    VII, I    |           very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit
128    VII, I    |           not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external
129    VII, I    |     external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether
130    VII, I    |         consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often
131    VII, I    |         of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous
132    VII, I    |          do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage,
133    VII, I    |        and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external
134    VII, I    |          the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough
135    VII, II   |     approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous
136    VII, II   |         thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise
137    VII, II   |       most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in
138    VII, II   |         political, and that every virtue admits of being practiced,
139    VII, III  |       they agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ
140    VII, III  |    already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honorable
141    VII, III  |      there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing
142    VII, III  |    capacity for action as well as virtue.~If we are right in our
143    VII, VII  |          will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both
144    VII, VIII |           and perfect practice of virtue, which some can attain,
145    VII, IX   |        said, cannot exist without virtue), it clearly follows that
146    VII, IX   |          ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen,
147    VII, IX   |       both for the development of virtue and the performance of political
148    VII, IX   |        which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state.
149    VII, IX   |    happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not to be
150    VII, XI   |        any pretension to military virtue should not have them, are
151    VII, XII  |      which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the neighborhood.
152    VII, XIII |           and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional,
153    VII, XIII |   acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state
154    VII, XIII |       would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all
155    VII, XIII |         in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved.~There
156    VII, XIV  |         But since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler
157    VII, XIV  |           nobler and implies more virtue than despotic government.
158    VII, XV   |  Wherefore we should not practice virtue after the manner of the
159    VII, XV   |          the practice of a single virtue. And since they think these
160   VIII, I    |     therefore for the practice of virtue. And since the whole city
161   VIII, II   |        taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither
162   VIII, II   |        intellectual or with moral virtue. The existing practice is
163   VIII, II   |         useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge,
164   VIII, II   |         ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about
165   VIII, II   |           practice or exercise of virtue, is vulgar; wherefore we
166   VIII, V    |      argue that music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can
167   VIII, V    |          music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and
168   VIII, VI   |        being trained to political virtue should pursue the art, what
169   VIII, VI   |           not really conducive to virtue, and they rejected both