Book, Paragraph

  1      I, II  |             the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed
  2      I, II  |       justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration
  3      I, XII |          But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are
  4     II, I   |     actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms
  5     II, II  |         Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and
  6     II, IV  |             be the greatest good of states and the preservative of
  7     II, V   | impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain
  8     II, V   |           the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts,
  9     II, V   |             Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to
 10     II, V   |           affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among
 11     II, VI  |   everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same
 12     II, VI  |           either for individuals or states, still a city should be
 13     II, VI  |             be the case in existing states. But greater care will be
 14     II, VI  |          subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing
 15     II, VI  |         suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right,
 16     II, VI  |         polities, tend to show that states like Plato’s should not
 17     II, VII |             there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of
 18     II, VII |       opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property,
 19     II, VII |         maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the
 20     II, IX  |            and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of
 21     II, IX  |             are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another
 22     II, XI  |    Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states—the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan,
 23    III, I   |            not necessarily to other states. For in some states the
 24    III, I   |           other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged,
 25    III, I   |      citizen so as to include these states. In them it is the holder
 26    III, V   |          for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length
 27    III, V   |          adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good
 28    III, VI  |          both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of
 29    III, VII |            the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of
 30    III, VIII|          govern in their respective states?~The argument seems to show
 31    III, IX  |        their engagements; different states have each their own magistracies.
 32    III, IX  |    consideration virtue and vice in states. Whence it may be further
 33    III, IX  |        peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at
 34    III, XI  |             functions which in some states are assigned to the people,
 35    III, XI  |           with the constitutions of states. This, however, is clear,
 36    III, XIII|            forms of government. For states are characterized by differences
 37    III, XIII|          for this reason democratic states have instituted ostracism;
 38    III, XIII|          not been fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking
 39    III, XIV |            from them, until in some states nothing was left to them
 40    III, XV  |      aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether the
 41    III, XV  |         power is the best thing for states, how about the family of
 42    III, XVII|           which the founders of all states, whether aristocratical,
 43    III, XVII|           or is not advantageous to states, and to which, and how.~
 44     IV, I   |            is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable,
 45     IV, I   |             which is best suited to states in general; for political
 46     IV, I   |             in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they
 47     IV, II  |            the same time adapted to states in general; (3) of the other
 48     IV, III |         first place we see that all states are made up of families,
 49     IV, IV  |        Thera; (for in each of these states the nobles, who were also
 50     IV, IV  |          which have been described; states, as I have repeatedly said,
 51     IV, IV  |              so the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior
 52     IV, IV  |       organization, is necessary to states, then there must also be
 53     IV, V   |             remembered that in many states the constitution which is
 54     IV, V   |             and conversely in other states the established constitution
 55     IV, VI  |            latest in the history of states. In our own day, when cities
 56     IV, VII |           citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only
 57     IV, VII |      government. But there are some states differing from oligarchies
 58     IV, VII |          aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not make virtue
 59     IV, VIII|           into the constitutions of states, and this is the very reverse
 60     IV, VIII|          has authority. Now in most states the form called polity exists,
 61     IV, VIII|           the existence of forms of states other than monarchy, democracy,
 62     IV, X   |           or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty
 63     IV, XI  |          best constitution for most states, and the best life for most
 64     IV, XI  |            form of government which states in general can attain. As
 65     IV, XI  |            of the greater number of states, or they approximate to
 66     IV, XI  |             of the city.~Now in all states there are three elements:
 67     IV, XI  |   friendship and good fellowship in states than this: for good fellowship
 68     IV, XI  |        middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered
 69     IV, XI  |         speak of the revolutions of states. The mean condition of states
 70     IV, XI  |       states. The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no
 71     IV, XI  |          For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction
 72     IV, XI  |             large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all
 73     IV, XI  |      government, and established in states, the one, democracies, and
 74     IV, XI  |         this middle constitution to states. But it has now become a
 75     IV, XI  |         habit among the citizens of states, not even to care about
 76     IV, XIII|            one on the poor. In some states all citizen who have registered
 77     IV, XIII|            enough to fight. In some states the government is vested,
 78     IV, XIII|          this is the reason why the states which we call constitutional
 79     IV, XIV |     appointed such as exist in some states who are termed probuli and
 80     IV, XIV |              the supreme element in states.~
 81     IV, XV  |         measurers who exist in many states and are elected officers.
 82     IV, XV  |           but more especially small states. For in great states it
 83     IV, XV  |          small states. For in great states it is possible, and indeed
 84     IV, XV  |            the worker. But in small states it is necessary to combine
 85     IV, XV  |         succeed them? And yet small states at times require the same
 86     IV, XV  |      offices to others? For in some states it may be convenient that
 87     IV, XV  |            more extensive, in other states a narrower sphere. Special
 88      V, I   |             causes of revolution in states, how many, and of what nature
 89      V, I   |     destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into
 90      V, I   |            modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular
 91      V, III |   democracies and in constitutional states. And this disproportion
 92      V, V   |            may observe that in most states the changes have been of
 93      V, VII |        already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned
 94      V, VII |      revolutions and dissensions in states.~
 95      V, VIII|         incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly,
 96      V, IX  |         proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy,
 97      V, IX  |          want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals.
 98      V, IX  |       revolution and destruction of states, and the means of their
 99      V, X   |             their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like
100      V, XI  |         with his soul."~And whereas states consist of two classes,
101      V, XII |            not rather common to all states, nay, to everything which
102      V, XII |          has happened in many other states. And it is absurd to suppose
103     VI, I   |    deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements
104     VI, I   |           existing one. Founders of states try to bring together all
105     VI, I   |     destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the
106     VI, I   |   characteristics, and aims of such states.~
107     VI, IV  |             is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule
108     VI, IV  |            the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful
109     VI, IV  |         acropolis. Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding
110     VI, IV  |        which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long
111     VI, V   |     preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against
112     VI, V   |            all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly
113     VI, VIII|            and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked,
114     VI, VIII|       marshal the citizens. In some states there are many such offices;
115     VI, VIII|             a few only, while small states are content with one; these
116     VI, VIII|      magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous,
117     VI, VIII|   magistrates are chosen in certain states—guardians of the law, probuli,
118    VII, I   |        which we say that these very states are states: so that, if
119    VII, I   |          that these very states are states: so that, if the soul is
120    VII, I   |            both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue,
121    VII, II  |          happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim both of the
122    VII, II  |         lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities
123    VII, III |         again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others
124    VII, III |            each individual, and for states and for mankind collectively~
125    VII, IV  |           beautiful. To the size of states there is a limit, as there
126    VII, VII |          eye on the more celebrated states of Hellas, and generally
127    VII, VIII|           sake of the house. And so states require property, but property,
128    VII, VIII|          there are various kinds of states and many forms of government;
129    VII, IX  |       necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state
130    VII, XI  |              Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure
131    VII, XIII|             neither individuals nor states should need anything of
132    VII, XIV |             for individuals and for states, and these are the things
133    VII, XIV |          For most of these military states are safe only while they
134    VII, XV  |           end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of
135    VII, XV  |   irrational, and two corresponding states—reason and appetite. And
136   VIII, IV  |                         IV~Of those states which in our own day seem
137   VIII, V   |             which the body gives of states of feeling. The connection